Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

Left: Then-President Raisi meets with the Special Committee, August 14, 2023. President Portal
Right: Members of the Special Committee, from top left; Hossein Mozaffar, Zohreh Elahian,Sakineh Sadat Pad, Kazem Gharibabadi

“The Special Committee’s report, which elaborates on its methodology and findings, is filled with disinformation and falsehoods,” said Roya Boroumand, Executive Director of Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran (ABC). These include the data on the number of victims, claims of restraint in the use of firearms by various armed forces, denial of responsibility for the killing of peaceful protesters, distortion of the grounds for the execution of protesters, and false claims regarding the prosecution of women for improper veiling. The Special Committee’s data on casualties is limited to numbers. It provides no names or other verifiable details, nor does it provide evidence to substantiate its claims.. 

Protester Death Statistics and State Responsibility

In Section 3, titled “Additional Findings Regarding the Deceased and Injured,” the Special Committee’s report presents a table that categorizes 281 deaths as follows: 90 "individuals identified as rioters,  armed elements, and terrorists;" 112 "civilians present at the scene, whose purpose and degree of involvement in the riots remain ambiguous and undetermined;" 54 "law enforcement agents;" and 25 civilians killed in “terrorist operations” in Shiraz, Izeh, Amol, Hamedan, and Kermanshah.

The Special Committee does not acknowledge state responsibility in the killing of any peaceful protester or bystander. However in multiple court cases, the responsibility of government forces in killing peaceful civilians has been acknowledged. In the cases of Mehran Samak, who was fatally shot with a pellet gun by security forces in Bandar Anzali on November 29, 2022, and Mohammad Jame Bozorg, who was killed on September 24, 2022 by a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC)  with a shotgun from a distance of one meter, after he refused to accompany them without seeing a court warrant, government responsibility and even the identities of the shooters were established. In four other cases (Abolfazl Adinezadeh, Fereydoun Mahmoudi, Mehdi Babrnejad, and Omid Movidi), courts acknowledged government forces were responsible, although the specific individuals were not identified. 

Additionally, the deaths of seven civilians in Izeh are attributed to “rioters and terrorist elements.” (Page 21, Section (c), Part 3 of the report refers to the incident as a "terrorist attack.”)

However, in at least three of the seven Izeh cases (Kian Pirfalak, Artin Rahmani, and Milad Saidianjou), family and eyewitness testimonies directly contradict the official narrative.

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Killed during protests:
From left; Kian Pirfalak, Artin Rahmani, Milad Saidianjou

- Kian Pirfalak, a 9-year-old boy killed on November 16, 2022, was shot while sitting with his family in their private car. Although authorities accused a protester, Mojahed Korkori, of murdering Kian and sentenced him to death, Kian’s mother, Mahmonir Molaei, testified that she personally witnessed security forces firing at the car and killing her son. The family officially recorded a sworn statement rejecting any accusations against Mojahed Korkori and the others arrested from Izeh.

- Artin Rahmani, a 16-year-old boy, was also killed during the November 16 protests in Izeh. Despite authorities blaming Korkori, Artin’s family strongly denied the accusation. His uncle stated that he was near Korkori at the time and that Korkori could not have shot his nephew. He also testified that he saw security forces shoot Milad Saidianjou, who was also killed during the same protests. However, the judiciary also listed Milad as a victim of a “terrorist attack” and blamed Korkori.

These three individuals are officially listed as victims of terrorist attacks, while their families insist the perpetrators were government forces.

The Committee further asserts that “the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy from the outset of the riots until the present has been characterized by accountability and transparency, as will be further elaborated in the relevant section. The investigation’s findings demonstrate that the allegation of impunity for violators among law enforcement officials is entirely false.” 

Among 16 cases of complaints against law enforcement forces investigated by Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, two resulted in prosecution of state agents and their conviction, in the absence of transparency and independent scrutiny. Ten cases have been pending for two years without effective judicial processing, and the authorities have subjected families to various forms of harassment in order to discourage them from seeking justice, and in four cases, the judiciary held security forces responsible but did not identify or prosecute the perpetrators. Families pursuing justice faced threats, harassment, and prosecution, while their lawyers risked imprisonment or professional bans. The judiciary often failed to hold perpetrators accountable, offering financial compensation to silence families instead. (For more information about these cases, see  *Woman, Life, Freedom: Victims' Fight for Accountability Amid Repression*)

Judicial Cases and Issued Verdicts

Section Four of the government report, titled “Status of Detainees and Judicial Cases,” subsection A-3, includes a list of 10 “executed individuals who were convicted of murder and homicide.” The report stresses that these individuals were executed on the request of their victims’ families: “qisas (retribution-in-kind) remains a private right of the victims’ next of kin. Consequently, in several cases where the victims’ families unequivocally refused to pardon the convicted individuals, death sentences were issued and carried out following meticulous legal proceedings.” However, based on ABC’s research, in several cases, this assertion contradicts both judicial documents and previous reports by state media, according to which, some of the executions mentioned in the Special Committee’s report were not related to Qisas or private complaints.

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Protesters summarily prosecuted and executed. 
From left: Mohsen Shekari, Mohammad Mehdi Karami, Mohammad Qobadlu 

Mohsen Shekari

Mohsen Shekari, the first individual listed among those executed, was not accused of having killed anyone. His death sentence was not based on Qisas but rather on the charge of moharebeh ("waging war against God").

Shekari was arrested during the protests for allegedly blocking a street and inflicting a superficial wound on a security officer on September 25, 2022, in a street near Sattarkhan, in Tehran. The Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran charged him with “moharebeh through drawing a cold weapon with the intent to kill, causing fear and panic, and depriving citizens of safety, thereby disturbing public order.” Shekari’s case did not involve any private plaintiff, contradicting the report’s claim. Shekari’s arrest, trial, and execution all took place within 74 days, which raises serious concerns about the fairness of his trial.

Further, Iranian lawyers Ali Mojtahedzadeh and Nemat Ahmadi noted that not only did the case not meet “any definition of moharebeh,” but based on Article 279 of the Islamic Penal Code, “moharebeh only applies when a weapon is used to harm civilians or cause terror among the public—not when directed at state agents.”

Mohammad Mehdi Karami

Mohammad Mehdi Karami, the second person on the list, was also executed on charges of moharebeh, not murder. He was arrested on November 5, 2022, for participating in protests and being present at the scene where a Basij member, Rouhollah Ajamian, was killed. Karami and 15 others were accused of beating Ajamian to death. However, no investigation was conducted to identify the fatal blow or determine the cause of death.

Karami was denied the right to choose his own lawyer. His court-appointed attorney did not present an effective defense. Karami was also reportedly tortured during interrogation, making his confession legally inadmissible. His prosecution was rushed and he was executed 62 days after his arrest.

Mohammad Qobadlou

Mohammad Qobadlou is the ninth individual on the list of those executed. He was sentenced to death for allegedly killing a police officer named Fereydoun Karimpour Hassanvand in Robat Karim. 22-year-old Qobadlou had been arrested around midnight after he drove his vehicle into motorcycle-mounted law enforcement on September 21st, 2022, and tried 38 days later on the charge of "corruption on earth." The Public and Revolutionary Court of Tehran, presided over by Judge Salavati, sentenced him to death in November. According to his mother, Qobadlou was denied legal representation during interrogation and his first trial session. The forensic medical authority ascertained Qobadlou's mental fitness only on the basis of his own statements, neglecting letters from prison authorities stating he was mentally "precarious,” and failed to ask for his medical records. Qobadlou’s mother, in a video message on social media, also alluded to her son’s illness and mental disturbances. 

According to a report from his trial published in Iranian media, the prosecutors alleged Qobadlou injured five security officers and killed one. In the absence of recourse within the judiciary to dispute the allegations, his lawyer used Twitter. He posted documents, and his defense, pointing to serious inconsistencies and his client’s innocence. For example, preliminary police reporting mentioned bodily injuries to six officers and no injuries to their heads. The hospital report, however, specifies that the deceased officer died of a strike to the brain and skull fracture and had no bodily injuries. Further, the officer was hospitalized late on September 26, 5 days after Qobadlou’s arrest, and died the next day. In a video of his funeral, the speaker’s statement also contradict the official narrative.

At Karimpour Hassanvand’s funeral, the speaker told mourners that he had been surrounded and killed in a street clash. Furthermore, a video briefly posted on the official "Martyrs of the Police" website showed scenes from the protests in Robat Karim and stated that Officer Karimpour was injured by rioters and taken to the hospital. This account contradicted the official narrative that Qabadlou was responsible for the death.

The official news agency of the Islamic Republic’s judiciary, Mizan, published a report on the conviction by the Revolutionary Court of Tehran in which there is no mention of a murder charges of these three executed protesters (without naming them) on November 16, 2022. The report specified that they were convicted of waging “war against God” or “corruption on earth.” The acts leading to these convictions were “crimes against the bodily integrity of individuals, destruction, and actions against national security that resulted in the disturbance of public order and security in the country, and damaging people and public property,” having used a cold weapon to attack a state agent with homicidal intent, “causing fear among citizens and insecurity in the area,” closing a road and blocking traffic and transportation, and “creat[ing] fear, and destroy[ing] public property, while playing a guiding role in these activities.”

Status of the Deceased and Injured and Complaints Filed by Citizens Against Law Enforcement Officers

In Section Three of the Special Committee’s report, under the title “Additional Findings of the Special Committee Regarding the Deceased and Injured,” subsections A and B claim that 202 “rioters and civilians present at the scene of riots” and 79 law enforcement personnel and civilians were killed by “rioters and terrorist elements.” The report also claims that 627 civilians were injured during the protests as well as 5,681 law enforcement personnel, while acknowledging that “no precise statistics exist regarding the number of injured persons—particularly among civilians—due to factors such as minor injuries, failure to seek medical treatment or the absence of legal complaints.” 

Based on the report’s data, the total number of civilians and “rioters” killed and injured is 829. In Section Four, subsection (B), the report states that 1,148 complaints were officially filed by civilians against law enforcement personnel. 

The Special Committee’s data on civilians and “rioters” killed does not include biographical details or any specifics. ABC research on the number of protesters and bystanders killed during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests has so far resulted in data on 496 individual killed by law enforcement forces. Unlike ABC, the Special Committee has access to medical examiners, hospitals, and cemeteries’ records. It can and should be requested to provide at the very least names and specifics about how and where civilians and “rioters” were killed. 
               

Further, the data on the complaints filed by civilians against law enforcement personnel is limited to numbers of complaints. The report provides no data that could shed light on the cases and explain the basis on which complaints were dismissed, for example, or whether these complaints were solely related to civilians killed and injured by state forces, in which case there are 319 more complaints than the total number of dead and injured “civilians” and “rioters” reported by the Committee. 

Claim of Restraint in Law Enforcement’s Handling of the Protests



Basij member shooting at protestors, Emam Hossein Boulevard, Rey muncipality, September 23, 2022. Vahid Online Telegram Channel.

In Section (C) of the report, concerning law enforcement's handling of unrest, the committee states that commanders of military, police, and security forces instructed law enforcement personnel not to use firearms or violence against protesters, resulting in strict adherence to orders, significantly deterring the use of force, and ensuring a cautious and restrained approach in handling protests.” In Section 4, it further argues that the fact that “more than 5,000 law enforcement, IRGC, and Basij personnel were injured during the riots … further demonstrates the restraint exercised by law enforcement in handling the rioters” and that “had law enforcement personnel been authorized to use firearms or permitted to engage in forceful intervention, the riots would not have lasted several months but would have been resolved within a few days.”

However, official information from the court ruling in the case of protester Mehdi Babrnejad contradicts this claim. According to a document from the Military Appeals Court of Khorasan Province: 

“On this day (September 21, 2022 – Quchan), government forces, including police, IRGC, and Basij, were present in large numbers at the protest site and used a total of 312 live rounds, 57 blanks, 280 plastic pellet cartridges, and 30 tear gas and smoke grenades to suppress the protest.”

Mehdi Babrnejad, who participated in the Quchan protests on that day, was shot by security agents using a Kalashnikov and died later in the hospital. The military court confirmed that his death was due to a live round fired by security personnel. Nevertheless, no one was held accountable, and the victim was labeled a “rioter.”

Scores of interviews with victims and eyewitnesses of the September 30, 2022, massacre in Zahedan, in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, where over 90 were reportedly killed according to ABC’s documentation, and the leaked statements of Basij and IRGC officials, raise serious questions about the Special Committee’s claim of law enforcement forces’ restraint in the use of lethal force. 

On Page 12 of the report, under Section C titled “The Role of Terrorist Groups in Participating in and Aiding Violence”, the events in Sistan and Baluchestan on September 30  are addressed. The report narrates the incident as follows:

“On that day, a number of extremist and armed individuals attacked a police station adjacent to the Friday prayer site with the intention of seizing it. These armed individuals, with prior planning, created unrest throughout the city and attacked two other police stations. They also engaged in the destruction and arson of public property… They opened fire on the police station and on civilians, and also threw several Molotov cocktails at the police station.”

However, a leaked audio file (1) of a two-hour meeting of several commanders from the Basij and IRGC in November 2022 presents a narrative that starkly contrasts with that of the special committee. This description of events makes no mention of organized armed protesters shooting at the police station. Qasem Qoreishi, deputy commander of the Basij, mentions Molotov cocktails thrown at the police station and attributes responsibility for the high number of casualties to overreaction and panic by a shooter positioned on the roof of the police station, “a failure on the part of the shooter positioned on top of the police station.” Qoreishi acknowledges that “the response was disproportionate to the threat,” and that the officer at the police station “fired indiscriminately.”

In the same meeting, Qoreishi revealed that a delegation, representing Ayatollah Khamenei, had traveled to Zahedan — not only to express sympathy with the victims, but also to “issue a warning” to Molavi Abdolhamid, the Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan, who had been outspoken in support of the victims.

Claim on Judicial Responses to Inappropriate Hejab 

In Section (D), titled “Review of Allegations Raised by International Organizations by the Special Committees” from the report’s concluding section, item number five asserts:

“Furthermore, hejab and modesty are deeply rooted in Iran’s religious and historical heritage, having long been an established cultural and civilizational norm in Iranian society. Iranian women, in accordance with this cultural and traditional framework, have chosen a form of attire known as hejab. Additionally, no woman has ever been prosecuted in Iran’s judicial system solely for non-compliance with hejab regulations”

Judicial records however, contradict the report’s assertion. Women in Iran have faced and continue to face legal prosecution and punishment solely for non-compliance with mandatory hejab laws. Between the years 2017 and 2022, the Boroumand Center had identified in Tehran alone, at least 17 instances where Iranian courts have prosecuted and sentenced women —including to fines, flogging, and imprisonment— on charges such as “appearing in public without proper Islamic hejab,” and “unveiling in public spaces.”

In November 2024, the case of Roshanak Molaei Alishah received significant public attention.  On October 31, 2024, Molaei Alishah, who was walking without a veil in a Tehran street, was touched inappropriately by a motorcycle rider passing by her on the sidewalk. A video of the incident and her angry interaction with the man went viral and Molaei Alishah was arrested on November 2 for not observing the mandatory veil laws and taken to the District 38 Prosecutor’s Office and released on bail. The next day, she was summoned by phone and ultimately sent to Qarchak Prison on November 4 where she was detained until November 23rd. Based on reliable reports, Roshanak Molaei was tried via video conference on November 19 in Branch 1097 of the Ershad Court. The court convicted her of "disturbing public modesty" and sentenced her to 74 lashes and a two-year travel ban. The number of lashes was reduced based on her days in detention and she received 14 lashes in the implementation office of Qarchak Prison on November 23 before being released.

The cases below are drawn from official documents:

• Z.T. was prosecuted and sentenced on July 17, 2019, by Branch 1089 of Criminal Court II at Ershad Judicial Complex, presided over by Judge Jafar Khorshahiān, and sentenced to pay a fine of 2 million Iranian rials.

• Z.H. was prosecuted for unveiling and on July 22, 2020, she was sentenced by Branch 1077 of Criminal Court II, Shahid Modarres Judicial Complex, presided over by Judge Seyed Mehdi Aboutalebi, to 10 days of discretionary imprisonment, converted to a monetary fine of 5 million Iranian rials paid to the State Treasury.

• Sh.V. was prosecuted and sentenced on February 2, 2021 by Criminal Court II, Branch 1090, Tehran, presided over by Judge Vahid Naseri, to 38 lashes, suspended for two years, for “appearing in public without proper Islamic hejab and committing a forbidden act by wearing highly inappropriate attire in public.”

• S.H. was prosecuted and sentenced on July 28, 2021 by Enforcement Branch No. 3, General and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office, District 38, Tehran, to 74 lashes and 2 years imprisonment, suspended for 3 years; 6 months of participation in six Basij-affiliated "Jihadi Camps" (women’s division), under the supervision of the IRGC's Protection and Intelligence; 4 hours of monthly community service for 6 months at the shrine of Abdolazim al-Hasani for “appearing in public unveiled, defying hejab laws, violating public decency, and opposing the legal obligation of Islamic dress code for women.”

• M.A. was prosecuted and sentenced on February 4, 2023, by Branch 1191 of Criminal Court II, Tehran, presided over by Judge Abolfazl Amari Shahreb,i to 91 days of discretionary imprisonment, 74 lashes, monetary fine of 10 million Iranian rials, payable to the State Treasury for “appearing in public without a mandatory hejab and disrupting public order and peace.”

Roya Heshmati's case is also a case in point as she was arrested for posting a picture of herself without the veil. Her lawyer explained in an interview with the Shargh Daily that she was arrested after posting a photo of herself without a hejab on social media on April 21, 2023 and detained for 11 days. Initially arrested and charged with appearing in public without a hejab, her case was escalated to the Revolutionary Court and the Ershad Judicial Complex with multiple accusations. Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court sentenced her to one year in prison for propaganda against the regime, with most of the sentence suspended. However, Branch 1091 of the Ershad Judicial Complex sentenced her to 13 years and 9 months in prison, 148 lashes, and fines on charges including encouraging corruption and prostitution, offending public decency, and creating and publishing indecent content. After appeal, she was acquitted of most charges, but her sentences for being in public without a hejab (a fine) and offending public decency (74 lashes) were upheld. The flogging was carried out on January 3, 2024. 

These examples highlight the fact that women have indeed been prosecuted by Iran’s judicial system solely for non-compliance with hejab regulations. The Special Committee’s assertion that “no woman has ever been prosecuted in Iran’s judicial system solely for non-compliance with hejab regulations” is a deliberate attempt to mislead member states.  

The Special Committee’s report, circulated by Iran to counter the UN resolution, is rife with misinformation across all key areas: protester deaths, state accountability, judicial proceedings, law enforcement conduct, and the treatment of women over hejab laws. It denies state responsibility for killings despite documented court rulings, misrepresents protest-related executions, and ignores clear evidence of legal prosecution for non-compliance with mandatory hejab. Its portrayal of restraint by security forces, especially in Zahedan’s Bloody Friday, is contradicted by leaked statements, official documents, and the Independent Fact-Finding Mission’s findings.

“Rather than providing transparency,” said Roya Boroumand, “the report is a political tool aimed at misleading UN member states and shielding Iranian authorities from scrutiny. Its lack of verifiable data, accountability, and consistency with court and eyewitness evidence underscores the need for continued international oversight.”

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center urges member states to vote for the resolution to ensure that human rights violations in Iran remain under scrutiny and that the Islamic Republic is held accountable for its blatant abuses. Without sustained international attention, impunity will persist and atrocities will be repeated. The extension of the Fact-Finding Mission and the Special Rapporteur mandates are critical to not only addressing the violations themselves and holding Iran’s leaders accountable, but also to shedding light on the structural obstacles and systemic failures that perpetuate impunity and enable these crimes to recur.

(1) The audio file was released by the hacker group "Black Reward" on their Telegram channel on November 29, 2022. Discussions regarding "Zahedan’s Bloody Friday" take place towards the end of this two-hour audio file, starting from 1:50:00 onward. A copy of this audio file was downloaded from the "Black Reward" Telegram channel and archived by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center.