Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Ebrahim Dameni

About

Age: 51
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: July 16, 2002
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Khatam-ol Anbia Hospital, Iranshahr, Sistan Va Baluchestan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Other extrajudicial method
Charges: Unknown charge
Age at time of alleged offense: 51

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

In response to threats of execution during his interrogation, Mr. Dameni stated: "My execution will be your shame because people will realize that instead of answering my arguments, you chose to kill me."

Information regarding the extrajudicial execution of Mohammad Ebrahim Dameni, son of Golshah and Zeinab, born in Tando Allahyar, Sindh Province, Pakistan, married and father of 16 children, was obtained through interviews with his son, Mohammad Osman Dameni, conducted on three separate occasions (December 12, 2022; December 18, 2023; and February 2, 2024). Additional information was gathered from the book Withered Flowers: The Martyrs of Sunni Muslims in Iran (November 22, 2021), the book The Destruction of Gornak: Mistake or Conspiracy by Mohammad Armian (2000), the Noor International Network YouTube channel (January 28, 2012), the Neday-e Haq TV YouTube channel (May 14, 2012), the Sunnat Online website (May 31, 2020), the Baloch Activists Campaign (April 16, 2019), and the Edalat News website (June 11, 2016).

Mohammad Ebrahim Dameni was born on October 29, 1950 (Noor International Network YouTube Channel, January 28, 2012). His father had previously migrated to Pakistan, then under Indian rule, from the Sarbaz district due to various hardships, including drought. Dameni spent his childhood and adolescence there. From an early age, he developed a keen interest in the Quran and religious studies. He quickly enrolled in a traditional maktab (religious school) and, at the age of seven, learned to read the entire Quran fluently within a month. At the same time, he enrolled in a public school in Pakistan, where he excelled academically and advanced through the grades at an accelerated pace compared to his peers (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; Noor International Network YouTube Channel, January 28, 2012). However, after his school was closed due to lack of students, he shifted his focus entirely to Islamic studies. In 1960, he continued his education first at Madina Al-Uloom Behinda Sharif, a larger institution, and later at Darul Uloom Tando Allahyar, which was established after Pakistan's independence (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020).

After graduating from a religious seminary in Pakistan and receiving the title of Molavi*, Mr. Dameni returned to Iran at about the age of 20 (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020). Until 1978, he worked at the Abdollah Ravanbod Religious School, also known as Sa'adi Baluchistan, located at the zero-point border between Iran and Pakistan. Later he moved with his family from the border areas to Iranshahr. Upon his arrival in Iranshahr, he assumed the role of Imam at the Makki Mosque and initiated two important programs: Quran interpretation sessions and reformist theological lectures. During the 1979 revolution, at the suggestion of Molavi Qamareddin, he began teaching at the Shams-ul-Uloom School in Iranshahr and later at the Haqqanie School. After the revolution, Mr. Dameni was hired by the Ministry of Education as a teacher of religious studies at the middle school level. However, because the official curriculum did not include Sunni beliefs, he attempted to teach Sunni theological principles beyond the standard textbooks. This led to his dismissal from the Ministry of Education after only a few months (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020; Noor International Network YouTube Channel, January 28, 2012).

According to Mohammad Ebrahim Dameni's son, in 1980 he was one of the key members of the "Union of Muslims" organization recently founded by Mullah Mohammad Omar Sarbazi** in southern Baluchistan, Iran. In the same year, the Iranian government dissolved the organization and dispersed its members (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022).

In August 1982, Mr. Dameni was summoned by security officials and arrested for his religious activities and ideological speeches, particularly in defense of the Sunni faith. (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 1982). Even during his interrogations, he spoke with remarkable boldness and conviction. In one of his public speeches after his release, he recalled an exchange with his interrogator: "I said it right there, inside [the prison]. The man who was interrogating me in Iranshahr, after hearing my argument, was astonished and asked, 'If what you say is true, then you have completely destroyed us! I replied, 'Well, I don't know if I have destroyed you or if you have been destroyed. (Noor International Network YouTube Channel, January 28, 2012). During his initial interrogation, he was repeatedly threatened with execution. In response, he firmly stated: "My execution will be your shame because people will realize that instead of answering my argument, you chose to kill me." During this detention, Mr. Dameni was accused of "propaganda against the regime," "insulting the Imam Mahdi," and "insulting the Supreme Leader. He was detained first in Iranshahr and later in Zahedan. While serving his sentence, his case was transferred to a Pakistani-born Shiite judge who had studied in Qom and lived in Iran. In 1984, after one year and nine months, this judge finally ordered his release. According to his son, Mr. Dameni was repeatedly subjected to physical and psychological torture during this period (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; December 18, 2023; and February 2, 2024).

In 1984, after his release, Dameni began teaching at another religious seminary in Iranshahr. He later became a permanent member of the curriculum review and revision committee for religious seminaries and served as a teacher trainer for seminary instructors (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022).

In 1986, government officials in Iranshahr distributed a leaflet claiming that they had successfully converted some Sunnis to Shiism. This propaganda was strongly criticized by figures like Dameni. In response, he publicly denounced the pamphlet during his Friday sermons and in several mosques, stating: "Are Sunnis considered infidels if you speak this way and act as if you have converted an unbeliever to Islam?" (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022). Dameni has been a vocal critic of the distortion and misrepresentation of Sunni beliefs in the educational system, particularly with regard to misleading religious teachings aimed at children and students. One of his most controversial sermons was a direct critique of Mohammad al-Tijani's*** book detailing the author's conversion from Sunni to Shia Islam. The recorded sermon caused considerable controversy among the Sunni community in Baluchistan (Withered Flowers: The Martyrs of Sunni Muslims in Iran, November 22, 2021; Neday-e Haq YouTube Channel, May 14, 2012).

In 1988, Mr. Dameni left teaching to concentrate on writing and translation, producing numerous works that greatly enhanced his reputation in Baluchistan (ABC Interview with Mohammad ]sman Dameni, December 12, 2022). He believed that due to the low literacy rate in the region, it was necessary to publish concise yet powerful pamphlets. Some of his notable works include Drug Use and Trafficking, Etiquette of Life, Dameni's Quatrains, What is Eid and Why is it Celebrated, Education of Girls, and Easy Arabic. In addition to his own writings, he translated several books, including Mu'awiyah and Historical Realities, Reflections on Surah Al-Kahf, History of Preaching and Reform, and Islamic Marriage. According to his son, Mr. Dameni was deeply committed to strengthening the cultural and religious identity of Baluchistan, writing in the Baluchi language and working on a Baluchi encyclopedia.  (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 18, 2023). He had also begun writing his autobiography to document the torture he endured in solitary confinement and the religious discrimination he faced in prison. (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020). In 1991, following the death of Molavi Abdol Aziz, the founder of the Makki Mosque in Zahedan, and around the time of Ali Khamenei's ascension to the position of Supreme Leader, sectarian tensions between Shi'a and Sunni scholars escalated, particularly over the status of some of the Prophet's companions. In one of his speeches, Mr. Dameni harshly criticized a Shiite theological stance that labeled certain companions as infidels, a move that led to his re-arrest. (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022).

This time, Mr. Dameni was sentenced to 16 years in prison on charges of "propaganda against the regime," "insulting the leadership," and "insulting Shiite beliefs" (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022). He was first held in Tehran and later transferred to the general ward of Vakilabad prison in Mashhad, where he remained without the right to temporary leave until 1997. During this time, Dameni, who had already lost his father during his previous imprisonment, also lost his mother. Despite repeated requests, he was denied permission to attend her funeral. His family, faced with the challenge of his imprisonment in Mashhad, had to travel long distances to visit him (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 18, 2023). After 1997, he was granted limited temporary leave and was able to visit his family a few times before his final release in 2000 (ABC Interview with a Close Relative, December 12, 2022).

Ebrahim Dameni was finally released in November 2000 after serving a total of 11 years in prison in separate cases (Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020). According to his son, judicial officials attempted to obtain a written pledge from him prohibiting him from engaging in activities such as giving speeches or organizing religious gatherings. After his release, however, Dameni resumed his activities without hesitation. Shortly after his release, at the request of Molavi Abdolhamid Esma'ilzehi, the influential Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan, he was appointed secretary of the Coordination and Inspection Council for Sunni Schools in Baluchistan and was to relocate to Zahedan for this role (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 18, 2023).

Several accounts of Dameni's life, some confirmed by a family member, highlight his outspokenness and commitment to truth (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 18, 2023; Edalat News, June 11, 2016). He was a strong advocate for women's education, a stance that was particularly important in Balochistan, where girls rarely attended school. Despite the challenges and limited resources, he ensured that all his daughters were enrolled in religious schools and encouraged them to continue their education, whether in religious seminaries or at the university level (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022).

Baluch in Iran

Believed to make up one to three percent of the country’s population (ABC), Baluchi ethnic groups make up the majority of the population in Sistan-Baluchistan, where 64-77 percent of residents live below the poverty line. Despite having abundant gas, oil, gold, and marine resources, approximately two thirds of residents lack access to clean drinking water, and economic policies have allowed it to remain one of the poorest-sourced provinces in education, health, and food. Civil unrest in the region has given way to militant opposition groups and fatal skirmishes. In moving to bring the region under tighter control, the government has resorted to violence, including assassinations, as well as arbitrary arrests of peaceful human rights defenders. Ten Baluch civil rights activists were arbitrarily detained between March and September of 2017 alone (MRG).

Iran's Baluch minority are mostly Sunni Muslims, whereas the majority of Iran’s population are Shi'a Muslims. Policies and actions from authorities have been restrictive toward the practice of Sunni Islam, e.g. limiting and even blocking the construction of Sunni mosques in majority-Sh’ia areas (including Tehran), arbitrary closure of Sunni prayer halls and celebratory gatherings, and violence from security forces towards groups of Sunnis praying in public (MRG, HRW: Religious Minorities, AL). Lack of institutional support pushes Sunni leaders to pursue study in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, a trend which has historically aroused government suspicion due both to the hostility of Wahabism (the dominant branch of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia) towards Shiism, and to the political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Baluch activists reported that government repression of Sunni Baluch groups had increased since February 1994, when locals gathered at Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan, to protest the destruction of a Sunni mosque in Mashhad. Government agents reportedly fired shots into the crowd and detained several activists (HRW: Ethnic Minorities). Dr. Sayyad was one of four Sunni clerics of Baluch or Kurd descent to die in suspicious circumstances between 1994 and 1996 (UN, BC article 2/14/16).

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Mr. Ebrahim Dameni’s Extrajudicial Execution

Molavi Dameni was known for his outspokenness and truthfulness. He was a strong advocate for women's education. In Baloch society, where women rarely attended school, he made sure that all his daughters received religious education, despite the hardships and limited resources. He encouraged them to continue their studies, whether in religious seminaries or at the university level.

According to available information, on Monday, July 16, 2001, Ebrahim Dameni was taken to the hospital after a car accident on the Iranshahr-Sarbaz road and died a few hours later under suspicious circumstances (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, February 2, 2024; Sunnat Online, May 31, 2020).

On July 16, 2001, at the request of the Ministry of Intelligence, Ebrahim Dameni traveled to the Gornak region of Sarbaz County to mediate with an armed anti-government figure named Kamal Salahzehi**** to defuse tensions. After an hour-long stop in the village of Gornak to conduct the talks, Dameni left for Iranshahr. On the way, however, his car's brakes failed and the vehicle plunged into a valley on a bend in the road. Dameni suffered chest injuries in the accident but managed to pull himself to the side of the road. A minibus driver helped transport him to a medical center in Iranshahr. According to Dameni's son, passengers in the minibus that took him to Khatam Al-Anbia Hospital in Iranshahr testified that he was in relatively stable condition and even spoke to some passengers who recognized him. (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022).

As Mr. Dameni was being transported to the hospital, residents of Iranshahr became aware of the accident and rushed to the hospital. Security forces were also present. When Dameni's family members arrived at the hospital, they were prevented from seeing him. They were told that he needed surgery, and only one of his brothers was allowed to visit him briefly. Before the surgery could begin, Mr. Dameni died. According to his son, his uncle told him that Mr. Dameni was given an injection of an unknown substance before the operation, which caused a sudden deterioration in his condition and ultimately led to his death. His son also stated that the doctor who administered the injection disappeared after Dameni's death (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; December 18, 2023).

Mr. Dameni was laid to rest the day after his death in the village of Chah-Jamal, near Iranshahr, in the presence of his family, acquaintances, and supporters. According to his son, a significant number of people attended the funeral (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; February 2, 2024).

Officials’ Reaction

Iranian authorities and state media have not officially responded to Mr. Dameni's death. However, amid widespread suspicion about the circumstances of his death, his son recalled that, according to his uncle, government officials approached the family and urged them to pursue legal action through official channels instead of making accusations (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, February 2, 2024).

Familys’ Reaction

The Dameni family  decided not to pursue legal action over his death, stating that they had "entrusted the matter to God," believing that seeking justice through the Islamic Republic would lead nowhere. According to his son, the family was convinced that the government was responsible for his father's death, adding, "Of course, our family believed that the government itself was behind it. So should we go to the same authorities and say we are filing a lawsuit against you? No, the family refused." (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022; February 2, 2024).

The family strongly believes that the government could not tolerate Dameni because of his strong influence among the Baloch people and his exceptional ability to organize and mobilize gatherings in Balochistan. They claim that on the day of his death, the first attempt on his life was made by interfering with the brakes of his car. However, when he survived the accident, he was finally killed by lethal injection (ABC interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni and a close associate, December 12, 2022).

Impacts on Family

According to available information, Mr. Dameni's sudden death, only eight months after his release from prison, had a profound impact on his family, especially his young children. One of his children later reflected on this loss, saying, "I have always been deprived of the feeling of having a father. (ABC Interview with Mohammad Osman Dameni, December 12, 2022). 

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*The title or rank of "molavi" is used for certain Sunni Islamic scholars in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, Iran. Among Sunni clerics, "Molavi" is the second highest religious rank after "Molana". This ranking system was introduced into the Iranian Sunni community from the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary in India. Many Sunni Molavis in Sistan and Baluchistan have studied in Deobandi seminaries in India. At Darul Uloom Deoband, Molavis are classified according to their academic ability as "Molavi Alem" (scholar), "Molavi Fazel" (distinguished scholar), and "Molavi Kamel" (complete scholar).
**Mohammad Omar Molazehi, widely known as Molana Mohammad Omar Sarbazi, was a prominent Sunni scholar and Sheikh of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Through his extensive writings and distinctive way of life, he gained significant influence and widespread recognition among the Sunni community in Baluchistan.
***Mohammad al-Tijani al-Samawi is a Tunisian Islamic scholar who converted from Sunni Islam to Shia Islam. His book, "Then I Was Guided," caused controversy in Iran and Iraq. With the support of the Iranian government, he established a center in Mashhad dedicated to promoting Shiite Islam.
**** Mollah Kamal Salahzehi is a prominent figure in the Baluchistan region who, according to local accounts, has undertaken numerous community initiatives, including the construction of mosques, religious schools for boys and girls, and a food distribution cooperative. In government media and official reports, however, he has been portrayed as an internal security threat and even labeled a drug trafficker (from the book The Destruction of Gornak: Mistake or Conspiracy by Mohammad Armian, 2000; Nehzat-e-Edalat Baluchistan blog, July 10, 2014).
***** Mohammad Abdollatif Ansari is a writer and broadcaster who works as an expert for the Persian section of Saudi Arabian Radio.

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