Javad Reza'i Lafmajani: One Person’s Story

Javad Reza'i Lafmajani

About

Age: 47

Nationality: Iran

Religion: Other

Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: November 16, 2022

Gravesite location is known: Yes

Location of Killing: Dr. Alidoost Pharmacy, Lahijan, Gilan Province, Iran

Mode of Killing: Arbitrary shooting

The Courts

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

General Courts, 1982-1994

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

General Courts, 1994-2002

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

General Courts, 2002-2015

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

General Courts, 2015 to Today

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.”

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

Military Courts

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

The judges

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

He was born and lived in Lahijan, a city in the province of Gilan. He was a stonemason by profession, known for his exceptional skill in carving detailed images, especially of the Faravahar symbol and Achaemenid soldiers.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Javad Reza'i Lafmejani, son of Fatemeh and Parviz, was gathered from an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC) with one of his close relatives (April 6, 2023), the Deutsche Welle website (November 28, 2022), the burial permit issued by the Gilan Province Forensic Medicine Office (November 17, 2022), and the death certificate (November 19, 2022), and interviews given by his brother, Mas'ud Reza'i, to Iran International TV (November 26 and December 8).

Mr. Reza'i was married and had two children. He was born and raised in Lahijan, Gilan Province, where he has lived all his life. After completing his military service, he began working for a company while continuing his education, eventually earning an associate's degree in literature. When the company went bankrupt, he switched to masonry and tile work. His skills were impressive, especially in carving intricate designs such as the Faravahar symbol and Achaemenid soldiers. However, he had to give up this profession due to the strain the heavy work put on his back. He then worked for a time at a kiosk near Entezam Street in Lahijan (ABC's interview with a close relative).

Mr. Reza'i lost his mother when he was in the third grade: "She was executed after the regime fabricated a ridiculous case against her. At just 10 years old, Javad had to face this issue and live with the pain. Perhaps the loss of his mother prevented him from pursuing many of his dreams." He experienced a difficult time at home after his mother's death: "For about four years after her death, he cooked at home, preparing meals for his father and older brothers, which helped him become very skilled in cooking. His school principal would even let him leave an hour early because he knew Javad had to prepare the meal. (ABC interview with a close relative).

Mr. Reza'i had a deep passion for music and literature. His wife, Mrs. Khoshkalam, is an educator working in the Education Department of Lahijan. According to those close to him, Mr. Reza'i was a gentle, active, and cheerful person. He had a special love for animals, especially dogs and birds. He owned several dogs and spent hours playing and interacting with them (Deutsche Welle).

Mr. Reza'i was also interested in current affairs and expressed critical opinions on his social media pages on various issues, including the executions and imprisonment of intellectuals and students, the indoctrination of children in schools, the incompetence of officials, and the government's foreign policy. For example, he referred to the Islamic Republic's state television and said, "Your lies have brought laughter to the people". He also objected to newspapers that had blurred the hair of Romina Ashrafi, a 14-year-old girl whom her father murdered: "An attitude that censors a little girl's hair is no different from the scythe that killed her."

As the protests began in 2022, Mr. Reza'i became much more active, both on social media and in the streets. On several occasions, he and his friends wrote the slogan "Women, Life, Freedom" on the walls of their neighborhood at night. He often said, "For this revolution, we must pay a price, and that price is our blood." He also urged local shopkeepers to close their businesses in solidarity with the protests (ABC interview with a close relative).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year-old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The protests, which started in front of the hospital and continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried, were triggered by popular exasperation over the morality patrols, misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the resulting impunity for the violence used against detainees, as well as the mandatory veil in general. This protest, initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils and youth in general who chanted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.

According to statistics released by human rights organizations, at least 450 demonstrators were killed by security forces' gunshots during these protests, and thousands were either injured or arrested. In addition, in the past year (from October 2022 to October 2023), at least seven citizens linked to these protests have been tried and executed without meeting the minimum standards of fair trial procedures. Several others face charges that could result in the death penalty.

According to reliable reports, several families of killed protesters have been pressured by the security services to falsely report their loved ones as members of the same forces or to blame the protesters for their deaths. In regions such as Kurdistan, security forces have summoned some families and forced them to attribute the deaths of their loved ones to Kurdish opposition groups. Meanwhile, state media has claimed that 70 security officials were also killed during these protests.

Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported numerous cases of beatings, torture (including forced confessions), and sexual assault of detainees. These detainees were denied access to legal counsel during interrogations, and their confessions were later used as evidence in court to convict them.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact-finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

Mr. Javad Reza’i’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Mr. Reza'i was shot at close range by security forces on November 16, 2022.

According to a witness, on the night of November 16, groups of people in Lahijan had gathered in small groups at the intersections of Shishegaran Street. At first, no one chanted or took any action. Because the security forces had blocked both ends of Shishegaran Street, there was heavy traffic and the continuous sound of car horns filled the air. After a while, some people started chanting slogans and the security forces attacked: "You can't even begin to imagine the level of violence - it's like trying to peel an apple with a sword. How is that possible? The moment four people shouted 'Death to the dictator,' you'd hear forty gunshots and at least ten tear gas canisters going off." The officers and Basij members on motorcycles fired indiscriminately to instill fear. According to the protester: "They wear all-black uniforms with helmets that leave only small openings for their eyes and mouths. Each of them is equipped with two weapons: one for shooting bullets and another for tear gas. This is a small town; everyone knows everyone. These are Basij forces from Lahijan and nearby villages - we recognize them.” (Deutsche Welle)

Around 7 p.m., Mr. Reza'i went to the Shishegaran neighborhood with his friends, following the daily routine of the previous days when protesters had taken to the streets of Lahijan. At 7:30 p.m., he called his wife and told her he was coming home. Shortly thereafter, security forces confronted some demonstrators and attempted to arrest a woman. Mr. Reza'i and a group of protesters standing at the end of the street saw this and began chanting slogans in response. The security forces and motorcyclists then attacked the group. (ABC interview with a close relative and Deutsche Welle)

Mr. Reza'i had told his friends that, as unarmed pedestrians, the law prohibited the security forces from shooting at them. He advised them not to run if the forces attacked. One of his friends who was with him that night later described the events to Mr. Reza'i's family: "About seven or eight motorcyclists were heading toward the main street of Shishegaran. There's an alley there called Shishegaran Alley. Javad was almost at the back of the group, with his hands in his pockets. He seemed very sure they wouldn't attack." (ABC interview with a close relative).

According to a reliable source, “the security forces got off their motorcycles and shouted in the local Gilaki dialect, telling the people to "get lost"! Then they started shooting - at close range, extremely close. One of the officers, from less than a meter away, pointed his gun directly at Javad and started shooting. Javad's hands were in his pockets; he didn't even hold a stone.”

Mr. Reza'i's friend told the family: "Javad had been talking to us for barely two minutes when we suddenly saw him fall. We thought he was giving us advice and then he just fell. Since they hadn't seen any blood, Mr. Reza'i's friends first took him to Dr. Alidust's pharmacy on Shishegaran Alley. There, he began bleeding from his mouth and nose, and his heart rate spiked. They rushed him to the Aria Clinic in the same alley. According to the doctor, it was too late; the severe damage to his organs and internal bleeding caused him to die before he reached the clinic. (ABC interview with a close relative).

The bullet struck his side, causing severe damage to his heart, lungs, and kidneys. A reliable source said that during the forensic examination, "115 pellets were removed from his body. The pellets tore through the tissues of his heart, lungs, and kidneys, causing shock, and he died instantly". The burial permit listed the cause of death as "hemorrhagic shock due to rupture of internal organs and chest and abdomen caused by high-velocity metal pellets. However, his death certificate listed the cause of death as "violence by others”. Several others were also injured in the same incident by security force gunshots. (ABC interview with a close relative)

Mr. Reza'i was buried in the Aqa Seyed Mohammad cemetery on Friday, November 18.

Officials’ Reaction

Shortly after Mr. Reza'i's death, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence officers arrived at the Aria Clinic and took his body to the forensic center in Rasht. "About 20 minutes later, the officers invaded the clinic, surrounded it, evacuated it, and put it under quarantine," his brother said. (Interview with his brother - November 26, 2022)

Initially, the authorities refused to allow Mr. Reza'i's family to bury him. They even threatened them, saying, "We will either bury the body in the Baghe Rezvan cemetery in Rasht or one of the villages near Emamzadeh Hashem, and we'll inform you of the location after one or two months." They forced the family to sign a pledge that only immediate family members could attend the funeral, no public appeals could be made, and no slogans could be chanted. The family was also denied the right to hold traditional third- and seventh-day mourning rituals. (ABC interview with a close relative)

On the day of Mr. Reza'i's burial, the authorities closed the cemetery's main gate, allowing only family members to enter. They also blocked the road leading to the graveyard from both sides. Security forces were stationed inside the cemetery during the funeral, taking pictures of those in attendance. "The number of officers inside the Aqa Seyed Mohammad Cemetery was far greater than us, and all of them were holding cameras and recording the funeral," a source said. The gate to the cemetery was kept closed for a week, and the family was only allowed to visit the grave early in the morning.

The authorities put pressure on Mr. Reza'i's family after they filed a complaint. Branch 101 of Lahijan Criminal Court 2 summoned his wife on charges of "propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran". The summons was issued on April 3, 2024, requesting her presence in court on April 13, 2024. However, she did not attend the hearing, and a verdict was issued in absentia on April 15, 2024. She was sentenced to three months in prison or a fine of seven million tomans.

Mr. Reza'i's wife's omplaint was forwarded to the Military Prosecutor's Office, on March 17, 2024, IRGC intelligence officers entered Mr. Reza'i's home with an arrest and search warrant. They arrested Ms. Khoshkalam and took her cell phone and laptop. She was held for over four hours before being released on bail. However, a new case was opened against her. The prosecutor in charge of her case threatened her, saying that he would personally handcuff her if she continued her complaint against the officials.

On April 17, 2024, IRGC intelligence officials again arrested his wife to pressure her, detaining her for several hours before rereleasing her.

Familys’ Reaction

According to available information, Mr. Reza'i's family learned of his death from a relative. His son and brother searched hospitals and IRGC intelligence offices for him but received no information. When the family finally discovered that Mr. Reza'i's body was being held at the forensic medicine office in Rasht, security forces forced them to sign an undertaking to bury him in Lahijan: "It was six o'clock in the morning on Friday. We were told that since it was Friday, everything had to be done by 9 a.m. They wanted to make sure that the people of the city didn't hear about it. It was Friday, a holiday, and all the announcements had already ended. They wanted it done quickly and quietly. The family had to bury him in Lahijan's Aqa Seyed Mohammad cemetery within 30 minutes: "On Friday morning, everything was done in half an hour. The washing had already been done in Rasht. The burial, the digging of the grave - everything was done in just half an hour". (ABC interview with a close relative)

Mr. Reza'i's family held his third, seventh, and fortieth-day commemorations at home. These gatherings included traditional music.

Mr. Reza'i's wife, does not believe that her husband's death was an accident. She believes that the security forces had identified him beforehand and that his killing was premeditated. She has filed a complaint with the Lahijan court, asking for the names of the officers on duty that night and those carrying weapons. But she has little hope that the case will move forward: "The court determined that it was a military murder, and the case was transferred to the military prosecutor's office, with a complaint filed against the IRGC and Basij forces" (ABC interview with a close relative).

His wife has also appealed the sentence against her.

Impacts on Family

According to available information, Mr. Reza'i's arbitrary execution left the family in a state of deep shock, and the emotional impact on his wife and children was severe. The eldest son, overwhelmed by emotional distress, was unable to return home for several days. When he did return, he locked himself in his room and avoided interacting with others. The younger son, who was deeply attached to his father, suffered a significant emotional breakdown. Not yet seven years old, he entered a critical psychological state, often expressing his grief and longing through constant, anguished screaming.

Correct/ Complete This Entry ❯

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran