Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Abolfazl Adinehzadeh

About

Age: 16
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: October 8, 2022
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Emam Reza Hospital, Mashhad, Khorasan\Khorasan-e Razavi Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary shooting

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

  • The right of a person not to be subjected to the capital punishment for an offence committed before the age of eighteen. The right not to be deprived of life while pregnant. 

ICCPR, Article 6.5; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37.a.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Everyone who knew him remarked on his manners and his good behavior. From a young age he had started to work and he wanted to stay in his country and have a comfortable life.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Mr. Abolfazl Adinehzadeh, son of Ali, and Goldasteh Hosseini, has been provided by Voice of America website (October 13, 2023). The following sources have been used to complete the memorial page of Mr. Abolfazl Adinehzadeh: Voice of America website (November 6, 2023), Radio Farda (June 21, 2023; November 8, 2023; February 16, 2024; July 31, 2024), X Dadban.com (April 12, 2023), Court Judgement in Abolfazl’s sister Marzieh Adinehzadeh’s Instagram page (November 6, 2023); and the Instagram page of one of Mr. Adinehzadeh’s friends (November 17, 2022).

Mr. Abolfazl Adinehzadeh was born on June 17, 2005. He was from Mashhad. He had three sisters. Abolfazl was a high school senior in Electronics. While going to school he also worked in mobile repairs since the age of 14. He was interested in Taekwondo and his acquaintances and coworkers commented on his good behavior and his manners. When his family decided to send him abroad for higher education, he had said, “Why should I leave my homeland?  I love my country. I want to live here, and I want to have a good life (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, October 27, 2022; July 18, 2023).

According to one of his close friends, Abolfazl had told him, “I want people to be happy. I want everybody to be dancing with happiness when we are free.” (Mr. Adinehzadeh’s friend’s Instagram page, November 17, 2022).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The news of her death triggered protests, which started with a widespread expression of outrage on social media and the gathering of a large crowd in front of the hospital,continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried. Popular exasperation over the morality patrols and the veil in general, aggravated by misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the impunity generally granted to state agents for the violence used against detainees led to months of nationwide protests. Initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils, and youth in general, protesters adopted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” chanted during Amini’s burial. The protest rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. 

The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Security forces shot protesters outside and worshipers inside the Mosala prayer hall. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.

 By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at a minimum at 22,000 , of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them or offered them rewards to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

Mr. Abolfazl Adinehzadeh’s Arbitrary Execution

According to available information, on October 8, 2022, Mr. Adinehzadeh was shot by Special Unit agents in front of Ferdowsi University in Mashhad. He was taken to the hospital, but he passed away later that day due to his shotgun injuries.

In the morning of October 8, 2022, Abolfazl was caught on closed circuit tv cameras opposite his school. Abolfazl got out of his father’s car. He waited a minute, bent down and tightened his shoelaces, and went to the demonstration instead of school. At noon on that day, Abolfazl was among a group of demonstrators in front of Ferdowsi University. Special Unit forces opened fire and Abolfazl was hit with 70 shotgun rounds in his right side. Mr. Adinehzadeh got as far as the passageway under Mellat Park and collapsed (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, November 6, 2023; Novemeber 1, 2022).

The Adinehzadeh family quote one of the witnesses, whose testimony has been included in the indictment: “I was walking along the Mellat Park underpass, located on Vakil Abad Blvd. I noticed a young man, 15 or 16, had collapsed on the ground. I told the people who had gathered around to lift his legs. Someone said police are telling us to evacuate this are and not to stand around. A few people helped the young man to his feet and carried him up to the street. When we got him up there, he suddenly collapsed. People helped us take him into Mellat Park and we were able to lay him down on the grass. The young man was unconscious. We could see wounds in his side, but he did not seem to be bleeding very badly. People were saying, ‘He has been shot with a shotgun.’  We put him in a car and took him to the hospital.” (Court Judgement in Marzieh Adinehzadeh’s Instagram page, November 6, 2023)

Mr. Adinehzadeh was taken by some bystanders to Imam Reza Hospital in Mashhad, and he was operated on. The doctors were able to remove 27 shotgun pellets from his body, but they could not save his life. At noon that day, Abolfazl Adinehzadeh passed away due to his injuries (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram, October 9, 2022).

On October 9, 2022, the Custodial section of the Education Department contacted the Adinehzadeh family and told them they could take their son’s body after paying a deposit. When the Adinehzadeh family went to the police department, they were told their son had been killed by 3 shotgun pellets. On October 10, 2022, the Adinehzadeh family went to the Mashhad Medical Examiner’s office to receive their son’s body, but only the mother was given permission to enter that office to identify the body.

The funeral ceremony of Abolfazl took place on October 10, 2022, in the village of Najaf Abad, near Farooj, Northern Khorasan Province. His family were in attendance, as were many people holding Abolfazl’s picture, and also a large number of security agents (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram, October 9, 2022; November 27, 2022). 

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:"a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective. b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms. 

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. 

Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible: a) Warning shots; b) Shots aimed at the lower body; c) Shots aimed at the upper body. (Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

Note 1:If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Officials’ Reaction

From the minute Mr. Adinehzadeh’s body was given to his family, security agents accompanied them and even controlled the way the ceremony was conducted. The security agents did not allow them to take the body to the resting place of Imam Reza prior to the funeral and forced the ambulance driver to go directly to the cemetery in the village of Najaf Abad. They stayed at the cemetery, to make sure the funeral was done quickly, and they collected the pictures of Mr. Adinehzadeh that the attendees were carrying (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram, October 9, 2022).

On March 7, 2023, the Prosecutor of Mashhad summoned Abolfazl’s father, Mr. Ali Adinehzadeh, to his office. He was convicted of “propaganda against the government” for filing a complaint about his son’s killing. The investigator of Branch 211 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Public Prosecutor’s Office was assigned to the murder case of Mr. Abolfazl Adinehzadeh. He issued special instructions for collection of evidence and different security offices came together at the site of Mr. Adinehzadeh’s killing. The Office of Information and the Office of the City of Mashhad Revolutionary Guard Security issued a joint statement in response to the prosecutor’s office, declaring that the riot police had shot Mr. Adinehzadeh (Radio Farda, October 29, 2023).

Referring to reports from security organizations, Branch 211 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Public Prosecutor’s Office voted to disqualify itself and referred the case to Branch 1 of the Khorasan Razavi Province Military Court. In response to the plaintiff’s request, the military court prepared a list of 30-40 members of the Special Unit who were present at the demonstration where Mr. Adinehzadeh had been killed. The military court ordered five of these people to be summoned to the court and to be questioned. All of the members of the special unit who were summoned to the court stated that, “They had been at that event, but that they had only fired aerial shots.” (Radio Farda, October 29, 2023)

On November 4, 2023, referring to “the absence of sufficient criminal evidence” for the conviction of the security forces, the prosecutor for Branch 1 of the Khorasan Razavi Province Military Court, Mr. Gholam Hasan Alvandi, decided that the case “would not be pursued”.

“Since we have not been able to find reliable evidence to ascertain that the military forces had used shotguns, therefore we have found that the accusation cannot be proven due to lack of evidence. According to Article 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we have decided that this case should not be pursued.” (Decision of the Court in Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, November 6, 2023)

On June 16, 2023, security forces arrested Mr. Ali Adinehzadeh and Ms. Marzieh Adinehzadeh, Abolfazl’s father and sister, at his grave site. That same evening, security forces attacked Mr. Adinehzadeh’s family home and arrested Mrs. Goldasteh Hosseini, Abolfazl’s mother. Mr. Ali Adinehzadeh was transferred to Bojnurd Prison, and Ms. Marzieh Adinehzadeh and Mrs. Goldasteh Hosseini were transerred to Shirvan Prison. They were all released on bail on June 20, 2023. (Radio Farda, August 1, 2023)

On August 1, 2023, Mr. Khosrow Alikordi, the attorney handling Mr. Adinehzadeh’s case, was summoned to Branch 901 of the Mashhad Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office, arrested, and transferred to Vakil Abad prison in Mashhad. Mr. Alikordi was released on bail, five days later.

In mid-September 2023, security agents summoned Mr. Ali Adinehzadeh to the prosecutor’s office in the town of Faruj, “for a short conversation”. He was told, “If you remain on our side, we will prosecute the killing of Abolfazl and get the result you want. If not, you can be sure we will not allow your son’s case to be resolved.”  Before that, the judiciary had told the previous attorney for this case, Mr. Reza’i, that as long as the Adinehzadeh family remained vocal about their son’s killing, this case would not be resolved. (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, November 6, 2023)

In December 2023, Mr. Alikordi was put on trial in Branch 1 of the Revolutionary court of Mashhad, Judge Hadi Mansouri presiding. He was charged with “carrying out promotional activities in aid of groups opposing the government” and “publishing falsehoods on internet sites and failing to keep secrets”. He was sentenced to one year in prison, two years exile to the town of Nehbandan, two years of not being able to leave the country, two years of not being able to practice law, and two years of not being able to go online. This sentence was fully confirmed in January 2024, in Branch 35 of the Appeal Court of Khorasan Razavi (Radio Farda, February 16, 2024).

Family’s Reaction

Mr. Adinehzadeh’s family filed a complaint about the killing of their son in Branch 211 of the Prosecutor’s Office of Mashhad (Radio Farda, November 8, 2023).

Mr. Adinehzadeh rejected the officials’ offer about being on their side if he wanted his complaint about his son’s killing to be resolved. He told them, “I will never be on your side because since my son was killed, there is an ocean of blood between you and us.”  Since their complaint has not been acted upon and since the court ruled that the military forces would not be investigated for this case, the Adinehzadeh family have said that they are certain that their son was killed by the Mashhad Special Unit Forces. The family has repeatedly asked the judiciary to give them access to recordings from the closed circuit tv cameras at the site of Abolfazl’s killing. Officers in charge have told them that these cameras were not working and that there are no recordings from that event. The Adinehzadeh family have said that they knew since the beginning that there would not be a resolution from this “Court of Injustice” (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, November 6, 2023).

Mr. Alikordi, defending attorney, said that the military court’s ruling on not pursuing the case was “unexpected, unjust, and unsympathetic”, and that this ruling is not in line with any of the precepts of the code of criminal procedure. He said although the prosecutor of Branch 211 of the Mashhad Public and Revolutionary Court ordered all the recordings from 20-25 cameras in the area where Mr. Adinehzadeh had been killed to be collected on October 3, 2022, these recordings were never shared with the family’s attorney. He believes the missing link in this case lies in these recordings. The Adinehzadeh family rejected the idea of settling for blood money because they believe their son was killed by anti-uprising police. They are of the opinion that the judicial system is responsible for considering all the pertinent evidence. They should mount an investigation to find the killer or killers, try them, and punish them (Radio Farda, November 8, 2023).

When Mr. Ali Adinehzadeh was arrested on July 31, 2024, he reacted to his arrest in a phone conversation, “You think now that I’ve been sent to prison, I’m going to bow my head?  No!”  Mrs. Goldasteh Hosseini, Abolfazl’s mother, published a video statement on her daughter’s Instagram page in reaction to her husband’s arrest. In it, she said, “Instead of finding my child’s murderer, they arrested my husband.” (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, August 2, 2024)

When he was arrested for filing a complaint about his son’s killing, Abolfazl’s father, Ali Adinehzadeh, said, “Do you think I am going to bow my head, now that you have sent me to prison?  No!”

Military Court Verdict Regarding the Complaint Filed by Mr. Adinehzadeh’s Family

On November 4, 2023, Branch 1 of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Khorasan Razavi Province investigated the complaint filed by Mr. Adinehzadeh’s family against military and police officials, who they claimed had “fired against the regulations, causing death”. The Chief of Police of Khorasan Razavi Province replied to this accusation, “Some members of this force had been authorized to use shotguns that day, but they never used their weapons.”

Mr. Gholam Hossein Alvandi, prosecutor for Branch 1 of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, pursuant to article 265 of the Legal Code of Criminal Procedure, voted “not to further investigate” this case, on the grounds that there was no compelling evidence to show with any degree of certainty that police or military personnel had used shotguns and that the accusation could not be satisfactorily proven.

This court also pointed out that the Adinehzadeh family should be “enlightened” about article 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so that they will be able to collect blood money from the treasury through the court system. (Court Order in Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, November 6, 2023) 

Impacts on Family

According to available information, the killing of Mr. Adinehzadeh dealt a heavy blow to his family. Abolfazl’s sister has addressed the government about their lives after her brother was killed, “You killed a boy who would go to work after school. In a few years, he would have been his father’s support in old age. You killed a boy who had told his father not to worry and that he would be with him until the end. You killed a boy who was saddened to see his father getting old and frail under the pressure of this country’s awful economy.”  Ms. Adinehzadeh writes about the last moments of her brother’s life after he was shot, “You killed a boy who while he was bleeding, was telling his mother, ‘I love you, Mom. Forgive me, Mom.’ because he knew his mom’s life depended on his life.”

“You took the only boy in our family, you took our hope, you took our breath, you broke our heart into pieces by killing Abolfazl. You broke our whole family’s heart; you broke the heart of an Iran.” (Marzieh Adinehzadeh Instagram page, October 27, 2022)

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