Abubakr (Kamran) Hedayati: One Person’s Story

The Courts

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

General Courts, 1982-1994

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

General Courts, 1994-2002

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

General Courts, 2002-2015

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

General Courts, 2015 to Today

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.”

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

Military Courts

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

The judges

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Information regarding the life and extra-judicial killing of Mr. Abubakr (Kamran) Hedayati, the son of Khan Hassan Hedayati, born in 1949 in the village of Hajj Kand, in the Bukan region, West Azerbaijan province in Iran, has been obtained through Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights (ABC) interview conducted with a family member of Mr. Hedayati (September 21, 2021); Swedish newspapers Dagens Nyheter (January 19, 20, 1994); Svenska Dagbladet (January 19, 20, 1994); Uppsala Nya Tidning, January 19, 1994; Amnesty International Report: Iran - Official secrecy hides continuing repression MDE 13/02/95 DISTR: SC/CO/GR/CC/PO; the Swedish documentary “Terrorkommandot” (released in 2002); Swedish documentary “I nationens intresse” (released in 2003) and Expressen (29 September, 2003).

Mr. Hedayati lost his father at the age of three when his mother was only 21 years old. His mother never remarried and raised the children herself. Mr. Hedayati’s elder brother, Seyyed Umar Hedayati, was a political leader opposed to the Shah and was imprisoned at Khoramabad prison for a year, where he was tortured and then exiled to Kashmir. Mr. Hedayati postponed his university studies so he could take care of his mother and support his family while the elder brother was in prison. He studied chemistry at Arak University and received his bachelor’s degree in 1976/77 (ABC interview with family member of Mr. Hedayati).

Mr. Hedayati married his wife, Mrs. Parvin Hassankhali in 1979. They moved to Kermanshah where he taught chemistry. After the fall of the monarchy in February 1979, they contacted friends in the PDKI party to form a party committee in Kermanshah and soon ended up leading the party in Kermanshah (ABC interview with family member of Mr. Hedayati).

After the revolution, 13 death sentences were issued for individuals residing in Kermanshah. Mr. Hedayati and Mrs. Hassankhali were among the individuals given a death sentence, but they were able to escape. [1] They were informed by a Kurdish army officer, who was secretly a member of the party, that they needed to leave immediately. They packed everything they could and drove off to Bukan, West Azerbaijan province. Their house in Kermanshah was seized after they had fled. All of the other individuals were executed on August 19, 1979 [2] (ABC interview with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

During their time in Bukan, Mr. Hedayati was very involved in the party’s organizational work. He was first appointed party official and soon elected representative of the people of Bukan. The couple were sent on missions to Qatur and Orumieh, West Azerbaijan province, to spread party propaganda. Mr. Hedayati was now part of the central committee of the PDKI, and Mrs. Hassankhali was party cadre while also working for the party radio station and teaching. At first, all of their activities were conducted in hiding, but soon, they were conducted in public.

By 1985, Mr. Hedayati suffered from severe health issues. His liver fibrosis required a liver transplant, and the PDKI arranged for him and his wife to be sent to Stockholm, Sweden. They arrived in Sweden in September 1985. The couple started over in Sweden and started learning the language. They both continued to be active dissidents and politically active within the party. In 1992, they adopted a boy whose parents had been killed in Mahabad.

In 1993, after a long wait, Mr. Hedayati successfully underwent a liver transplant. Mr. Hedayati is remembered as a man who had a positive outlook on life and strongly believed in women’s rights to equality. He encouraged women, including his spouse, to get education and work side by side with men (ABC interview with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

The Kurdish Problem in the Islamic Republic

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the disagreements between the government of the Shiite Islamic Republic and the organizations in the Kurdish regions of western Iran regarding the rights and roles of minorities in drafting the Constitution; whether the government should be secular or religious, and especially the issue of Kurdish autonomy; and conflicts that resulted in Kurdish political organizations boycotting the April 1979 Referendum on instituting an Islamic Republic; led to serious, and at times armed, clashes between the central government and the Peshmerga (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s armed forces).

On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the oldest and most influential Kurdish Party, “the Party of the Devil”, and declared it “unofficial and illegal” and ordered a military attack on Kurdistan. Mass executions and intense armed clashes continued in the region for months, clashes that resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians and the displacement and relocation of the residents of certain towns. In the next four years, Kurdish parties lost their grip on power in the region to a great extent, and relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, a number of their leaders and members have been assassinated outside Iran, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. [3]

Background on the Formation of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) was founded in 1945 with the goal to gain autonomy for Kurdistan, in north-western Iran. After the Revolution, conflicts between the new central Shiite government and mainly Sunni Kurdistan regarding the role of minorities in the drafting of the constitution, specification of Shiite as the official state religion, and particularly the autonomy of the region, ended in armed clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and the peshmerga (the militia of the PDKI). The PDKI boycotted the referendum of April 1, 1979, when people went to polls to vote for or against the Islamic regime. On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called the PDKI the “party of Satan” and declared it “unofficial and illegal.” Mass executions and fighting broke out and continued for several months in the region. By 1983, the PDKI had lost much of its influence in the region. In the years since various leaders of the PDKI have been assassinated. Following internal disputes, the party split in 2006 and two organizations were established as “The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” and “The Democratic Party of Kurdistan.” The two parties unified in August 2022.

Background of Extra-judicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation.

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Extra-judicial Killings and Attempts in Sweden

In the early 1990s, Iranian state terrorism and espionage activities in Sweden were particularly high during this period and were tracked closely by Säpo, the Swedish Security Service. [4] A wave of targeted killings against Kurds in Sweden occurred. Säpo believed that all of these killings were politically motivated and that Reza Taslimi, an Iranian intelligence agent, was connected to these killings (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002 and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).

Reza Taslimi’s modus operandi as an intelligence agent was to coerce other Kurds in Sweden to act as informants. [5] One informant, Mohsen Rashidzadeh, [6] came to describe his interactions with Reza Taslimi and how he planned the murder of opponents and refugees in Sweden in two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse”. When Mr. Jalil Gadani, a senior leader of PDKI, visited Sweden in January 1990, there was great concern for his safety in the Kurdish community. Säpo was aware that an attack on his life was planned and warned Mr. Gadani, effectively preventing the attack (“I nationens intresse,” 2003, and SvD, September 18, 2002). In fact, Reza Taslimi and Mohsen Rashidzadeh were tracking Mr. Gadani. According to Rashizadeh, Taslimi was infuriated when the assassination operation failed (“I nationens intresse,” 2003).

There are also connections between Reza Taslimi and the Iranian embassy in Stockholm. Taslimi would use the private car of Jamshid Hassanpour, a diplomat at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002). In early September of 1990, Jamshid Hassanpour and four other men were detained by Säpo for conspiring to kill the Saudi Ambassador to Sweden, Marwan Bashir al-Roume. Three of the men apprehended were diplomats and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. [7] Sweden declared the three Iranian diplomats at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm as persona non grata; an action typically taken in response to individuals’ undesirable or detrimental behavior to the host country’s interests. However, two of the five men apprehended were not protected by diplomatic immunity. Even though Sweden has an absolute obligation to prosecute, they were flown out of Sweden with the diplomats the day after Säpo apprehended them. One of the men, Abdolrahman Banihashemi, [8] was one of the assailants who, two years later, carried out the Berlin Mykonos restaurant assassinations of four PDKI leaders. [9] Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, two-term Prime Minister of Sweden, Mrs. Mona Sahlin, Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and Mr. Pierre Schori, former Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were all invited to the dinner at Mykonos restaurant and were in Berlin. Shortly before the dinner, Mr. Ingvar Carlson received a phone call from Prime Minister Carl Bildt, requiring them to return to Sweden immediately. As a result, they all flew back to Sweden the same day, likely avoiding a potential assassination (SvD, May 23, 2023). On April 10, 1997, a German court issued an international arrest warrant for Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian after ruling that he had ordered the Mykonos restaurant assassinations with knowledge of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. [10]

In 1992, Mohsen Rashidzadeh and another informant, Khosrow al-Gilani were arrested, suspected of having conducted illegal intelligence activities, jointly and in concert. The Linköping District Court concluded that between 1989 and 1992, Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani “deliberately carried out activities on Iran's behalf secretly and using fraudulent means to obtain information about another’s personal relationship.” Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani regularly met or spoke with Reza Taslimi, using codewords to inform him about people and events in Sweden. They would participate in political meetings and gatherings, weddings, and other celebratory events to gather information about those participating by taking photos or filming guests and participants and by listing names and addresses of political figures in Sweden and where other leading political figures would stay when visiting Sweden. The Court declared Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani guilty of spying on other Kurds in Sweden and sentenced Rashidzadeh to prison and deportation and al-Gilani to prison (Linköping District Court judgment nr B 412/92, date 1993-04-23). Mohsen Rashidzadeh returned to Iran after his time in prison and was greeted by Reza Taslimi in Iran. Rashidzadeh eventually moved to Canada (“I nationens intresse”, 2003). Mr. Abubakr (Kamran) Hedayati’s death

Mr. Hedayati’s continued activism led him to start receiving threatening phone calls, letters, and even notes in the elevator in the building where he lived (ABC interview with family member of Mr. Hedayati, DN, January 20, 1994, Amnesty International Report: Iran - Official secrecy hides continuing repression MDE 13/02/95 DISTR: SC/CO/GR/CC/PO). The threats escalated in 1993. In the fall of 1993, the Iranian regime contacted him through friends, delivering warnings and threats. They told him that either he cooperated with them, or they would kill him and his family. In a call, they stated that if he were to return to Iran, he would receive all of the wealth that had been confiscated. Mrs. Hassankhali urged her husband to report the threats to the Swedish Security Service, but Mr. Hedayati said not to take the issue seriously. The family changed their home, and only a few close friends and family knew of their new address. However, the husband of Mr. Hedayati’s sister was cooperating with Iranian agents and gave them the new address. (ABC interview with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

On January 17, 1994, Mr. Hedayati sustained severe injuries to his face, eyes, eardrums, hands, and splinters in his chest and legs after opening a letter bomb in his home (DN, January 18, 1994). On July 6, 1996, he died from the injuries sustained in the explosion after undergoing several surgeries and hospitalizations. About three months before the explosion, Mrs. Hassankhali’s father was forcibly coerced to give out the address of the couple. The father traveled to another city to inform them that they were aware of their location and urged them to be cautious. They feared they might plant a bomb under their car, but had a clear view of any suspicious activity from their apartment on the 5th floor.

The bomb, which was blown into smithereens, was mailed via regular post in a standard envelope measuring about 15x20 cm, was addressed to his wife (DN, January 19, 1994). Mr. Hedayati had thought the package was sent to his wife by a friend of theirs from the Kurdish Institute of Paris (SvD, January 18, 1994) and was a graduation gift. Mrs. Hassankhali was graduating in a few days and Mr. Hedayati had planned a big celebration for the occasion. Despite the fact that the couple had a routine when handling mail – they would apply essential oils to their fingers before opening anything – this day Mr. Hedayati did not follow their protocol (ABC interview conducted with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

As he opened the letter in his apartment around 1 pm in the Stockholm suburb of Bagarmossen, the bomb exploded in his face. Even though he sustained severe injuries, he was able to get out of the apartment to alert the neighbors. There were bloody fingerprints all over the hallway. Bits of flesh had splashed all over the hallway and the ceiling, including on their son’s toys (“I nationens intresse”). The neighbors, who had heard the explosion, immediately called the police. He was conscious when the ambulance arrived.

He was kept sedated for three days after the explosion had occurred. He underwent several surgeries to address his injuries, including finger transplantation and metal implants to restore the function of his hands, as his bones had been completely shattered, and nose reconstruction. He lost both his eyes, and suffered hair loss and ear damage. During the period between the explosion and his death, he spent most of his time in the hospital and was regularly operated on.

Despite the ordeal, Mr. Hedayati remained in high spirits, displaying remarkable courage and never complained. He was given morphine for the pain but would never say he was in pain; in fact, he would deny it. The surgeries exerted pressure on his liver, ultimately contributing to his liver's deterioration, which led to his eventual demise (ABC interview conducted with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

The Swedish police did not at first want to acknowledge if there were political motives behind the attack, even though they recognized that Mr. Hedayati was an active dissident against the Iranian regime (SvD, January 18, 1994). By the day after the attack, the police declared that they were working under the assumption that the attempt was politically motivated, but that they did not have any leads or suspicions about who could be behind it (SvD, January 19, 1994). They stated that their expectations of solving the crime were not great as the package had been sent from France (Uppsala Nya Tidning, January 19, 1994) and they were unable to identify what kind of explosive it was (DN, January 19, 1994). The case of Abubakr (Kamran) Hedayati remains officially unsolved.

Iranian Officials’ reaction

No official statements have been made in regard to the extrajudicial killing of Mr. Hedayati.

Swedish Officials’ reaction

The two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse,” which aired on Swedish television in 2002 and 2003 respectively, showed how Säpo knew of Iranian agents’ operations on Swedish territory yet did not intervene in their actions caused a public outcry in Sweden. Mr. Sten Andersson, Sweden’s foreign minister between 1985 and 1991, commented on the documentaries, stating that “the security police easily become a state within the state, and it has to. Walking at the border, sometimes crossing the line of what is allowed. On the other hand, we couldn’t argue against them if they claimed that the security of the state required that they expel some people” (Terrorkommandot,” 2002 and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).

It was disclosed to the documentary maker that Säpo feared revenge actions in Sweden similar to those that affected France (Expressen, 29 September, 2003). A series of bombings causing the death of 20 people and another 255 injured, shook Paris after French police arrested the men who tried to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur (Chapour) Bakhtiar. The bombings were claimed by an unknown group in Lebanon, who demanded the release of the assailants. In 1990, they were granted a Presidential pardon by Francois Mitterand, and they were all sent immediately to Iran. [11]

Säpo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have continuously refused to comment on the information, particularly what was disclosed in the two Swedish documentaries. Even in 2020, when asked about Iran’s role in the case, Ms. Sofia Hellqvist, press secretary at Säpo at the time, stated that Säpo was aware that some 15 states conduct various forms of intelligence gathering in Sweden and that foreign powers in their intelligence operations are prepared to commit industrial espionage, obtain military secrets, and even murder (Flamman, February 17, 2020).

Säpo’s most recent yearbook confirms that Iran is a significant security threat and “Iran conducts intelligence activities and security-threatening operations in and against Sweden and Swedish interests, involving intelligence gathering, influencing opposition, and procurement activities. Iranian intelligence services have long been carrying out attacks against individuals perceived to threaten the stability of the Iranian regime.” [12]

Sweden’s obligations under international law

Based on the available information, in the instance of extrajudicial killings by state agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran occurring in Europe, European states may have failed in their obligation to ensure the safety of and the right to life for individuals in Europe and prosecute perpetrators. Extrajudicial killings are a violation of the right to life as enshrined in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 6 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a violation of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 3 of ECHR, and its two additional protocols on the death penalty: Protocol No. 6, which provides for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, and Protocol No. 13, which provides for its abolition in all circumstances, as well as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Furthermore, the right to safe haven is a fundamental principle enshrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which obligates states to protect individuals fleeing persecution and violence in their home countries. According to the Convention, a person qualifies as a refugee and is entitled to the right of asylum if they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on factors such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This international legal framework aims to ensure that individuals seeking refuge are not forcibly returned to situations where their life or freedom is at risk, emphasizing the importance of offering a safe and secure haven for those in need.

Family’s Reaction

As Mrs. Hassankhali was the presumed target, after the explosion, there were extensive police inquiries and persistent questioning of her. According to a family member, she conducted an interview with the BBC, despite the disapproval of Swedish police who claimed that due to the existing threats against her, it was preferable not to draw attention to the case.

Mrs. Hassankhali believed that they were targeted due to their commitment to the Kurdish cause and their high profile, which made their assassination more impactful and effective in instilling fear among politically active Kurds in Europe. (ABC interview conducted with a family member of Mr. Hedayati).

Impact on the family

According to the available information, the impact of the death of Mr. Hedayati on Mrs. Hassankhali and their son was substantial. She lost her husband and best friend of 21 years, who had always supported her. Their son constantly worries about the safety of his mother, fearing that the Islamic Republic would come after his mother and he would lose her too. Even though this traumatic event has overshadowed their life, Mrs. Hassankhali has tried to preserve a positive outlook for herself and her son and prevent him from being overly distrustful.

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[1] These executions were part of a wave of executions that took place in order to combat the “anti-Revolutionary” elements in the Kordestan region. Following the negotiations between the Kordish Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) and the interim prime minister, several clashes occurred, at times armed, between the Revolutionary Guards and the peshmerga (the militia of the PDKI) particularly in the cities of Sanandaj (Kordestan province) and Paveh (Kermanshah province). These intensifying conflicts between the new central Shiite government of Iran and the mainly Sunni region of Kordestan concerned the role of minorities in the drafting of the constitution, specification of Shiite as the official state religion, and particularly the autonomy of the region. Subsequent to conflicts that resulted in some casualties, on August 18, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini issued an order to the military and the armed forces to “move to Paveh and end the fighting…” In the same order, he encouraged them to use force and threatened that: “if they do not move toward Paveh within 24 hours with missiles and tanks and all necessary arsenals, I will hold them accountable. And in case of any infringement of this order, I will treat them in a Revolutionary manner.” On August 19, Ayatollah Khomeini called the PDKI the “party of Satan” and declared it “unofficial and illegal” noting that some of these “anti-Islamic” individuals had boycotted the referendum of April 1, when people went to polls to vote for or against the Islamic regime. In accordance with Khomeini’s order, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali traveled the western region of Iran and told a reporter from the Ettela’at newspaper: “I will visit all areas of Kordestan… and will bring to justice anybody who was involved in these bloody plots.” According to Mr. Boluri, Ayatollah Khalkhali condemned at least 58 Kords to death in the span of 10 days. Mass executions and conflicts continued for many months in that region.

[2] For more info see https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-4693/azarnush-mahdavian

[3] In the years since the Islamic Republic has been in existence, in addition to such entities as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan), the Koran School led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (which was active in the early years of the Revolution), certain other Kurdish opposition parties were established outside Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These parties, with policies and ideologies that are not necessarily similar and uniform, have settled in parts of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq, such as Koy, Soleimanieh, and in the foothills of Qandil mountains. Some of these parties have undergone splits in recent years. These conflicts have been more about the methods of running the organizations rather than theoretical and ideological differences. These parties have not controlled any part of the Iranian territory since the late 1980’s, and have adopted different strategies in different periods in order to confront the Islamic Republic, advance their political objectives, and recruit members. Beginning in 2006, the conflicts between the regime and Kurdish parties – who had increased their presence in Iran in reaction to the government intensifying the detention and execution of Kurdish activists and the spread of fundamentalist beliefs in Kurdish regions – entered a new and more serious phase. Kurdish forces, especially the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the PJAK, were attacked several times inside Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan border regions by border patrol forces and the revolutionary Guards. That same year, Revolutionary Guards conducted armed attacks against the positions of Iranian Kurdish parties inside the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. The bombing of the Night of Yalda ceremonies (an ancient celebration of the longest night of the year) in 2006, which was also Abdorrahman Qassemlu’s birthday, resulted in the death of five Party members and 2 members of the Iraqi Kurdistan security forces. Kurdish forces also attacked Islamic Republic forces on several occasions. At least dozens were killed on each side in these military clashes. In subsequent years, particularly in 2017 and 2018, the clashes continued with less frequency and intensity. The most important of these clashes was the attack by PJAK forces on a border post on July 21, 2018, which resulted in 11 deaths (Deutsche Welle, July 22, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018). On September 8 of that same year, the seat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – a party that opposed armed struggle and had not participated in the clashes with the Islamic Republic forces – located in Koy in Iraqi Kurdistan, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in which 16 people were killed and 50 injured (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018; Kurdistan u Kurd website (September 8, 2018).

[4] Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998, which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders,” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

[5] Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms. Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies.

[6] In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information.

[7] In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution.

[8] Säpo’s primary responsibilities are countering espionage, combating terrorism, and leading investigations of offenses related to national security and acts of terrorism.

[9] In particular, there were many attempts to coerce Kurds in Nynäshamn to serve as informants in Sweden. Nynäshamn became a hub for Kurdish exile activities in the early 1990s. Consequently, Iranian intelligence was also very active in Nynäshamn. Several Kurds in the city received calls where an unidentified voice encouraged them to leave the party and “to not fight side by side against them” (“I nationens intresse”, 2003).

[10] Mohsen Rashidzadeh himself was a member of PDKI and part of the central command of the Peshmerga during the war with Iran. He left the party in 1985 due to conflicts with party leadership. He alleges being forced to spend four months in a Peshmerga-controlled area. After the PDKI lost the war, he was imprisoned in Iran. In prison, he encounters Reza Taslimi, who was his interrogator. Released after a few months, rumors circulated that he provided information about the party. He fled to Sweden, seeking asylum. Court documents reveal he lied when entering Sweden and had no legitimate reason to be granted refugee status in Sweden (Linköpings tingsrätt dom 1993-04-23 i mål nr B 412/92). Soon after Mohsen Rashidzadeh arrived in Sweden, he was contacted by Reza Taslimi, who told him to join PDKI again. Rashidzadeh met with Taslimi on a regular basis and received multiple assignments from Taslimi and was told weapons were hidden in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002, and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).

[11] Diplomatic immunity is a legal concept enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This international treaty establishes the framework for diplomatic relations between countries and defines the rights and privileges of diplomats. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, diplomats enjoy absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host country. This means that diplomats are generally exempt from prosecution for any criminal activities they may engage in while serving in their diplomatic capacity.

[12] Apprehended under the fake name of Hassan Poursamani.

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Human rights violations in this case