Musa Karampur: One Person’s Story

The Courts

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

General Courts, 1982-1994

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

General Courts, 1994-2002

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

General Courts, 2002-2015

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

General Courts, 2015 to Today

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.”

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

Military Courts

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

The judges

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Molavi Musa Karampur served as the Imam of Friday prayer at the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Sunni mosque in Mashhad. The mosque was a place of worship for Sunnis from various regions and Afghanistan. The mosque was destroyed, and a tree was planted in its place. Additionally, the Imam of Friday prayer was expelled from Iran. However, this action did not satisfy the perpetrators.

Information about the extrajudicial execution of Mr. Musa Karampur, son of Ahmad, was gathered by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC) through interviews with one of his close friends on December 9, 2022, and another acquaintance on October 17, 2023, and from the Islamic Republic News Agency - IRNA (May 8, 2001). Additional details about his assassination were obtained from Mr. Karampur's speech in Herat, Afghanistan on March 9, 2000, his book "The Last Cry of the Martyred Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque*" (published in 2006), Hamshahri Newspaper (May 6, 2001), information written on his gravestone, and the websites and Facebook pages of the Baloch Activists Campaign (February 2, 2015) and Radio Azadi (December 29, 2018).

Mr. Musa Karampur, born in 1962, was a Sunni cleric from the village of Shahrabad, a district of Torbat-e Jam in Razavi Khorasan Province (according to the information on his tombstone). He was married and had six children. (Interview with ABC, October 17, 2023)

Molavi Karampur began his religious education at the age of 12 at the religious school in Torbat-e Jam. He was first arrested in 1981 in the middle of a sermon at the mosque. While still a student, he was imprisoned in Vakilabad prison in Mashhad and released after 40 days (ABC's Interview with a close friend, December 9, 2022). He later wrote about those 40 days in his book (The Last Cry), describing how security officials pressured his weaknesses to the point that he repeatedly wished for death. According to a friend, during his detention, Mr. Karampur was forced to swear to cooperate with the security officials, so he advised other clerics not to speak against the Islamic Republic in his presence to avoid lying. (ABC's Interview with a close friend, December 9, 2022).

In 1984, Mr. Karampur went to the Darul Uloom School in Karachi, Pakistan, for one year to complete his religious studies. He believed that he was being monitored by one of his roommates during his studies in Pakistan, a fact that he realized in later interrogations (book The Last Cry).

Upon returning to Iran in 1985, he resumed his religious activities, initially delivering sermons at Mehrabad Mosque in Mashhad. In 1989, he was appointed as the imam of Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque, which was regarded as a "point of communication" and the "heart of the Sunni community."(The Last Cry book). In a televised interview, Abdollah Heidari, director of the Center for Thought and Dialogue Studies and a classmate and friend of Molavi Karampur, discussed his capabilities and activities. Heidari noted that Molavi Karampur, initially an unknown young man, was transferred to Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque. However, due to his erudition and exemplary academic performance, he leveraged the mosque as a cultural hub, drawing in young people through a range of religious classes and programs (Kalameh Global Network, Silent Scream Special Program, February 21, 2013). As the Imam of the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque, he was very popular and eloquent, with one close friend describing him as "our leader and spokesman...we never tired of his speeches and meetings." (ABC's Interview with a Close Friend, December 9, 2022). During his tenure at the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque, he was repeatedly summoned and interrogated by security officials, writing in his book, "The intelligence service summoned me several times a week, blindfolded me, and attacked me like rabid dogs, torturing me in ways that make me tremble just thinking about it. (Karampur’s speech, March 9, 2000).

In 1993, the Mashhad Municipality, backed by security and military forces, demolished the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque. To prevent the demolition, Mr. Karampur collected fatwas from influential Sunni scholars stating that the demolition was un-Islamic, illegal, and impermissible. However, upon learning of this, the intelligence officials arrested him and confiscated the scroll containing the collected fatwas (Kalameh Global Network, Silent Scream Special Program, February 21, 2013). Aware that the demolition of the mosque would provoke Sunni protests, days before the demolition, intelligence security officials circulated forged letters purportedly signed by Molavi Karampur indicating his consent to the sale and demolition of the mosque. This act was intended to defame him among his followers and incite protesters against him (Karampur's speech, March 9, 2000). According to Mr. Karampur, during an interrogation before the demolition, the intelligence officials asked him hypothetically, "If the Supreme Leader orders the demolition of the mosque, what is your opinion?" He replied, "Muslims all over the world will not remain silent in the face of such a tragedy. Even the Prophet does not have the right to order the demolition of a mosque; this is the decree of the Quran" (Karampur speech, March 9, 2000). Despite the efforts of intelligence officials to tarnish his reputation after the mosque's demolition, Molavi Karampur remained influential, with thousands of people attending the congregational prayers he led. (Karampur's speech, March 8, 2000).

Mr. Karampur stated that after the demolition of the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque, he was prohibited from speaking or expressing his opinion in any gathering due to pressure from security officials. After his last speech at the Reza'iyeh Mosque in Mashhad, which he delivered under intense pressure from his Sunni supporters, individuals visited his home and informed him that intelligence officials wanted to meet him at 9 p.m. in Koohsangi Square in Mashhad. Fearing for his safety, Mr. Karampur lived in hiding for 20 days in different cities of Khorasan Province before finally fleeing with his family to Herat, Afghanistan, on April 11, 1994, where he lived until his death. (Karampur's speech, March 9, 2000).

During his years in Afghanistan, he began writing a book titled "The Last Cry," in which he described all the pressures and detailed the illegal demolition of the Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque.

Musa Karampur relocated to Herat, Afghanistan, and became the prayer Imam of the city's largest mosque, Kharqa Mobarak Mosque. In his sermons, in addition to his religious activities for the Sunni community, he also spoke out against the Islamic Republic. (Interview with ABC, October 17, 2023)

Assassination attempts in Afghanistan

During his years in Afghanistan, he survived at least eight assassination attempts. In a speech on March 10, 2001, he detailed several assassination attempts planned by the Islamic Republic, but emphasized his commitment to his activities, concluding, "May God not forgive me... if I fear this evil government.

The Iranian government attempted to kill Mr. Karampur on at least eight occasions before his assassination.

The first attempt, involving the Taliban's intelligence service, failed. Several people were arrested and some fled to Iran. The second attempt involved a taxi driver who was offered money to assassinate him, but the plan was foiled by Mr. Karampur's friends. In the third incident, an Afghan informed him that an Iranian intelligence security official had offered 1,000 Lakh Afghanis to kill him. The man explained that he changed his mind after the officer insulted him by saying, "You Afghans would even rape your mother to get a visa.” In the fourth attempt, a friend and Herat intelligence chief, Mola Vali Jan, warned him of an Iranian consulate plot to assassinate him, which was again foiled by Afghan intelligence security. The fifth failed attempt occurred during his trip to Kandahar, when two armed men were arrested by the city's intelligence agency and confessed their intention to kill him and two other Iranian Sunni clerics in Afghanistan. In 1998, two assassination plots were planned against him: one on October 3 and another on an unspecified date. Both were thwarted in Herat with the help of the city's intelligence agency, and several arrests were made. The last unsuccessful attempt occurred in January 2001, when the would-be assassin was apprehended by Herat's intelligence agency. (Speech file of Musa Karampur, March 10, 2001)

Molavi Karampur was deliberately shot and injured in the leg on March 10, 1998. This intention happened when he visited a market in the Lilami Road area of Herat. A beggar approached him for help and shot him while he was giving him money. (Speech file of Musa Karampur, March 10, 2001; ABC's interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022)

According to one of Molavi Karampur's friends, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud had warned him a year before the assassination to move to Panjshir Province because Iranian intelligence officials were planning to assassinate him. (Interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022)

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long-term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation.

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left-hand highlight with the same title.

Mr. Molavi Musa Karampur’s Extrajuditial execution

On May 4, 2001, as Mr. Musa Karampur was leaving the main door of the Kharqa Mobarak Mosque in Herat after Friday prayers, he was assassinated along with 13 others, including 2 Iranians and 11 Afghans, by a remote-controlled bicycle bomb. Many others were injured in the attack. (ABC's interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022; information from Karampur's gravestone; Hamshahri newspaper, May 6 and 9, 2001)

Ultimately, he was killed by a remote-detonated bicycle bomb as he was leaving the mosque.

After the explosion, some Herat residents attacked and burned the Iranian consulate, blaming the Iranian authorities for this terrorist incident. (ABC's interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022; Hamshahri newspaper, May 6, 2001)

According to an acquaintance of Molavi Karampur, a few days before the assassination, an Iranian confessed to Mr. Karampur and his friend that he had been paid by Iranian intelligence to kill him. He expressed remorse and revealed that he had seen Karampur's name on a hit list and had warned him. (ABC interview, October 17, 2023)

Three months before his assassination, Mr. Karampur publicly recounted the Islamic Republic's numerous assassination attempts during a speech at Herat's Kharqa Mobarak Mosque. A close friend mentioned that security officials had repeatedly sent messages through his father, in one of which they told him, "If you return to Iran, you will be forgiven," and in another message, they warned him, "If you do not remain silent, you will face the consequences.” (Interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022)

Molavi Karampur was buried in Herat.

Afghan Officials’ Reaction

Herat's then-governor, Molavi Kheirullah Kheirkhah, immediately accused the Iranian government of involvement in the bombing. (IRNA, May 8, 2001)

However, Molla Abdol Salam Za'if, Taliban’s representative in Islamabad, Pakistan, later called the bombing of the Kharqa Mobarak mosque "terrorist and sabotage" and announced the arrest of several people in connection with it. He also stated that the Herat governor's claim of Iranian involvement in the incident was his personal opinion and not the official position of the Taliban government. (IRNA, May 8, 2001)

The exact number of detainees and their fate remains unknown due to the fall of the Taliban six months after the incident.

According to one of Karampur's friends, the Taliban government arrested an Iranian citizen in connection with the bombing of the Kharqa Mobarak Mosque, but this person was killed six months later in the clashes that occurred during the fall of the Taliban government. According to this informed source, the Iranian citizen admitted after his arrest that "we were two groups; the first group wanted to assassinate him [Musa Karampur] near the market, but they failed and only one bullet hit him in the leg. The second group succeeded.” (ABC interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022) There is no information about how this person was arrested and died.

Iranian Officials’ Reaction

Following the assassination of Molavi Karampur, Hamidreza Asefi, the then spokesman for foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic condemned the assassination, called it suspicious, and demanded the identification and punishment of the perpetrators of the attack on the Iranian consulate in Herat (Hamshahri newspaper, May 6, 2001; IRNA, May 8, 2001). He added that Musa Karampur "had expressed his desire to return to Iran in contacts with Sunni scholars and officials of the country, which was followed up by the relevant authorities.” (IRNA, May 8, 2001). This claim was made while Molavi Karampur, in a public speech less than three months earlier, had described the many abuses and ill intentions of the Iranian government against him, calling the Islamic Republic "evil".

According to a close friend of Mr. Karampur's family, security officials informed Mr. Karampur's father immediately after the assassination that his son had been killed by Afghans (ABC Interview, November 30, 2022). According to an acquaintance, despite the years that have passed since Mr. Karampur's death, the intelligence service is still in contact with his family in Iran to ensure that they do not talk about his death or provide information to anyone (ABC Interview, October 17, 2023). One of Molavi Karampur's close friends also mentioned that even though years have passed since Molavi's death, "from time to time, security officials from the Intelligence Service still visit Mr. Karampur's family, and that's why they don't want to talk about Mr. Karampur's death or give any information" (ABC Interview, November 30, 2022).

Familys’ Reaction

There is no information available on the reaction of Mr. Karampur's family.

Impacts on Family

The assassination deeply affected his family, who moved back to Iran a few months later and now reside in Mashhad. (ABC interview with a close friend, November 30, 2022)

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* Sheikh Feiz Mohammad Mosque was a Sunni mosque located on Khosravi No Street near the Imam Reza Shrine in the center of Mashhad. This mosque, with a historic building from the Qajar era, was one of the main Sunni centers in Khorasan province and held a special place in the activities of Tablighi Jamaat. (Jamaat Tabligh is a global religious movement focused on spreading the teachings of the Sunni branch of Islam). On February 1, 1994, the mosque was completely destroyed under the pretext of the neighborhood's need for green space. The Mashhad Municipality, with the help and support of the security and military forces, used heavy machinery and bulldozers to transform it into the "Narges Flower Park". The demolition of this mosque provoked protests from the Iranian Sunni community, especially the people of Zahedan. Following this demolition, a protest rally was held around the Makki Zahedan Mosque on February 2, 1994. This protest was met with a violent attack by the security forces, with bullets being fired from a helicopter at the protesters from the top of the Makki Mosque, resulting in the deaths of 6 to 8 people and injuries to dozens.

Correct/ Complete This Entry ❯

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

Musa Karampur

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Human rights violations in this case