Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Karim Mohammadzadeh (Kholkholah)

About

Age: 28
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: April 1, 1990
Location of Killing: Fröjas väg 13, Nynäshamn, Sweden
Mode of Killing: Other extrajudicial method

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Detentions, interrogations, and trials: 1989-1993

Pre-trial detentions

The accused, including political dissidents, were arrested and detained for months without trial, and sometimes without being informed of the charges against them. Detainees were routinely subjected to torture in order to coerce confessions of guilt. A single individual, the judge, was in charge of both the investigation and the interrogation.

Trials

Trials, particularly in the cases of prisoners of opinion, were held in camera. Despite the fact that a 1991 law authorized the presence of a defense attorney, there was no evidence that defendants were permitted access to legal counsel.

Appeal processes

The judgment of the revolutionary court was not subject to appeal. A 1988 law gave defendants tried by penal courts a right to appeal to the Supreme Court in certain circumstances, such as in cases of false testimony or procedural violations. However, if the appeal was accepted, the case was retried by the penal court--not a higher court. Executions were often carried out shortly after the judgment.

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

“Reza Taslimi likely committed the murder for Iranian state terrorism and Säpo probably hindered the murder investigation and protected the suspected murderer. It is important to maintain the rule of law and have suspected criminals prosecuted without there being any suspicion that Säpo is releasing someone for political reasons” -  Member of Parliament Tuve Skånberg to the (then) Minister of Justice Thomas Boström.

Information regarding the life and extra-judicial killing of Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh, born in 1962 in the village of Qasemlu, on the outskirts of Orumieh in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran, has been obtained through Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights (ABC) interviews conducted with two of Mr. Mohammadzadeh’s friends (December 15, 2021) and (September 7, 2022). Additional information was drawn from Swedish newspapers Dagens Nyheter (September 30, 2003); Svenska Dagbladet, SvD (April 7, 1990; May 10, 1990; September 18, 2002, September 29 and 30, 2003, May 23, 2023); Expressen (September 29, 2003); Flamman (February 17, 2020); Swedish documentaries “Terrorkommandot” (released in 2002) and “I nationens intresse” (released in 2003), both aired on national television; Expressen, 29 September, 2003); written question 2003/04:48 by Member of Parliament Tuve Skånberg to Minister of Justice Thomas Boström on Säpo’s role (skriftlig fråga 2003/04:48 av Skånberg, Tuve (kd), answer to written question 2003/04:48 answered by Minister of Justice Thomas Bodström, October 8, 2003 (svar på skriftlig fråga 2003/04:48 besvarad av Justitieminister Thomas Bodström, den 8 oktober 2003, available at the website of the Riksdag (Swedish parliament)), and judgement on illegal intelligence activities from Linköping First Instance Court (Linköpings tingsrätt dom 1993-04-23 i mål nr B 412/92).  

Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh joined the ranks of the Peshmerga of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) as a teenager around the end of 1979 or the early months of 1980. It is not known if Mr. Mohammadzadeh’s finished high school. 

In the late 1980s, Mr. Mohammadzadeh was severely injured during an operation to take over bases from government forces trying to get control of Oshnavieh in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran, all the way to Khakurk mountains in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. A bullet hit his shoulder and jaw and broke his jaw, subsequently forcing him to undergo several surgeries to repair his jaw. He had massive scars on his face and could not eat solid food for over a year (ABC interview, December 15, 2021). Before being injured, in 1981, during the conflict between the PDKI and the Kurdistan Democratic Party [of Iraq] (PDK), Mr. Mohammadzadeh had been held captive and tortured by Ghiade Movaghat, a group that collaborated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to suppress Kurdish movements in Iran and was hospitalized after his detention. [1]

Mr. Mohammadzadeh arrived as a quota refugee in Sweden as part of the resettlement program in late December 1989 with 14 other Peshmergas who were all wounded and needed treatment and surgery. They all got permanent residence in Sweden (ABC interview, December 15, 2021). 

Mr. Mohammadzadeh was taken to the Regional Hospital in Linköping to undergo plastic surgery to reconstruct his face and receive treatment for his injuries. He arrived in Nynäshamn after his hospital stay. He was happy with the outcome of the surgery, which corrected the huge scar he had on his face. Yet he still couldn’t eat solid foods and continued to eat primarily soups and lighter food. He began taking Swedish classes to learn the language. He dreamed of starting over in Sweden. Through friends and family in Iran, he came in contact with a woman in Iran. They were planning a wedding and she was to join him in Sweden (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

The Kurdish Problem in the Islamic Republic

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the disagreements between the government of the Shiite Islamic Republic and the organizations in the Kurdish regions of western Iran regarding the rights and roles of minorities in drafting the Constitution; whether the government should be secular or religious, and especially the issue of Kurdish autonomy; and conflicts that resulted in Kurdish political organizations boycotting the April 1979 Referendum on instituting an Islamic Republic; led to serious, and at times armed, clashes between the central government and the Peshmerga (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s armed forces).

On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the oldest and most influential Kurdish Party, “the Party of the Devil”, and declared it “unofficial and illegal” and ordered a military attack on Kurdistan. Mass executions and intense armed clashes continued in the region for months, clashes that resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians and the displacement and relocation of the residents of certain towns. In the next four years, Kurdish parties lost their grip on power in the region to a great extent, and relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, a number of their leaders and members have been assassinated outside Iran, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. [2] 

Background on the Formation of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan 

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) was founded in 1945 with the goal to gain autonomy for Kurdistan, in north-western Iran. After the Revolution, conflicts between the new central Shiite government and mainly Sunni Kurdistan regarding the role of minorities in the drafting of the constitution, specification of Shiite as the official state religion, and particularly the autonomy of the region, ended in armed clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and the peshmerga (the militia of the PDKI). The PDKI boycotted the referendum of April 1, 1979, when people went to polls to vote for or against the Islamic regime. On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called the PDKI the “party of Satan” and declared it “unofficial and illegal.” Mass executions and fighting broke out and continued for several months in the region. By 1983, the PDKI had lost much of its influence in the region. In the years since various leaders of the PDKI have been assassinated. Following internal disputes, the party split in 2006 and two organizations were established as “The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” and “The Democratic Party of Kurdistan.”

Background of Extra-judicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Extra-judicial Killings and Attempts in Sweden 

In the early 1990s, Iranian state terrorism and espionage activities in Sweden were particularly high during this period and were tracked closely by Säpo, the Swedish Security Service. [3]  A wave of targeted killings against Kurds in Sweden occurred. Säpo believed that all of these killings were politically motivated and that Reza Taslimi, an Iranian intelligence agent, was connected to these killings (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002 and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).

Reza Taslimi’s modus operandi as an intelligence agent was to coerce other Kurds in Sweden to act as informants. [4]  One informant, Mohsen Rashidzadeh, [5]  came to describe his interactions with Reza Taslimi and how he planned the murder of opponents and refugees in Sweden in two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse”. When Mr. Jalil Gadani, a senior leader of PDKI, visited Sweden in January 1990, there was great concern for his safety in the Kurdish community. Säpo was aware that an attack on his life was planned and warned Mr. Gadani, effectively preventing the attack (“I nationens intresse,” 2003, and SvD, September 18, 2002).  In fact, Reza Taslimi and Mohsen Rashidzadeh were tracking Mr. Gadani. According to Rashizadeh, Taslimi was infuriated when the assassination operation failed (“I nationens intresse,” 2003).

There are also connections between Reza Taslimi and the Iranian embassy in Stockholm. Taslimi would use the private car of Jamshid Hassanpour, a diplomat at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002). In early September of 1990, Jamshid Hassanpour and four other men were detained by Säpo for conspiring to kill the Saudi Ambassador to Sweden, Marwan Bashir al-Roume. Three of the men apprehended were diplomats and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. [6]  Sweden declared the three Iranian diplomats at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm as persona non grata; an action typically taken in response to individuals’ undesirable or detrimental behavior to the host country’s interests. However, two of the five men apprehended were not protected by diplomatic immunity. Even though Sweden has an absolute obligation to prosecute, they were flown out of Sweden with the diplomats the day after Säpo apprehended them. One of the men, Abdolrahman Banihashemi, [7]  was one of the assailants who, two years later, carried out the Berlin Mykonos restaurant assassinations of four PDKI leaders. [8]  Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, two-term Prime Minister of Sweden, Mrs. Mona Sahlin, Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and Mr. Pierre Schori, former Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were all invited to the dinner at Mykonos restaurant and were in Berlin. Shortly before the dinner, Mr. Ingvar Carlson received a phone call from Prime Minister Carl Bildt, requiring them to return to Sweden immediately. As a result, they all flew back to Sweden the same day, likely avoiding a potential assassination (SvD, May 23, 2023). On April 10, 1997, a German court issued an international arrest warrant for Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian after ruling that he had ordered the Mykonos restaurant assassinations with knowledge of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. [9] 

In 1992, Mohsen Rashidzadeh and another informant, Khosrow al-Gilani were arrested, suspected of having conducted illegal intelligence activities, jointly and in concert. The Linköping District Court concluded that between 1989 and 1992, Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani “deliberately carried out activities on Iran's behalf secretly and using fraudulent means to obtain information about another’s personal relationship.” Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani regularly met or spoke with Reza Taslimi, using codewords to inform him about people and events in Sweden. They would participate in political meetings and gatherings, weddings, and other celebratory events to gather information about those participating by taking photos or filming guests and participants and by listing names and addresses of political figures in Sweden and where other leading political figures would stay when visiting Sweden. The Court declared Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani guilty of spying on other Kurds in Sweden and sentenced Rashidzadeh to prison and deportation and al-Gilani to prison (Linköping District Court judgment nr B 412/92, date 1993-04-23). Mohsen Rashidzadeh returned to Iran after his time in prison and was greeted by Reza Taslimi in Iran. Rashidzadeh eventually moved to Canada (“I nationens intresse”, 2003). 

Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh’s Extrajudicial Execution

On April 2, 1990, Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh was found beaten to death with a hammer in his home in Nynäshamn, Sweden. His body was found in the bathroom. There was severe blunt force trauma to the back of his head, and his head was submerged in the water-filled bathtub (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

The murder had occurred between 5 pm Sunday, April 1, and 3 am Monday, April 2. There were no signs of struggle, and the apartment was not cleaned up after the crime. There were bloodstains splattered on the walls of the hallway. A massive pile of blood was found on the carpet by the entrance, indicating that he had been murdered in the hallway and that his body had been moved to the bathtub. He had his back against his murderer or was leaning forward toward the murderer when he was struck. The murder weapon, the hammer, was found in the apartment (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

Nothing in the crime scene showed signs that anyone had broken in or had forced his way into the apartment, leading the police to believe that whoever had killed Mr. Mohammadzadeh was let in voluntarily and would have been an acquaintance of his. The police forensic experts were able to collect several DNA tests that they believed belonged to the killer, as well as a footprint. (DN, September 30, 2003). From the bloody footprint in the hall, the police could tell that the person to whom the print belonged had a hammer toe (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). A hammer toe is a deformity where the second, third, or fourth toe is bent at the middle joint in a claw-like position, resembling a hammer. It can cause pain and difficulty walking. 

Soon, the police department asked the public for any information regarding the killing. They wanted to get in touch with people traveling from Stockholm Central Station on Monday, April 2, around noon, with the airplane buses or who had meetings nearby. The reason was an unidentified man who, around 11 am the day after the murder, left Nynäshamn by taxi. The police believed the unidentified man could be the perpetrator. The taxi driver, Mr. Weine Österberg, was initially asked by the passenger to take him to Arlanda airport, and in poor English, repeatedly told the taxi driver he needed to be at the Central Station by 11:30 am (SvD, May 10, 1990). The passenger disembarked in central Stockholm before arriving at the airport.  He asked to be let out by the Centralbron overpass behind Hotel Sheraton on Tegelbacken. He descended the stairs to Vasagatan in front of the Central Station. The man is described as dark, in his 30s, 175-180 cm tall, and carrying an oval blue sports bag. The police had no other information regarding the man. 

While the police first believed the murder was politically motivated and worked under that assumption, a few days after the murder, on April 5, 1990, Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh’s neighbor was arrested, suspected of having killed him. The 50-year-old Swede denied the charges and denied even being in contact with Mr. Mohammadzadeh (SvD, April 7, 1990). He was released soon after. 

The police went back to their initial working assumption that the murder was politically motivated, had been carried out by a fellow countryman, and was a planned assassination (DN, September 11, 1990). “It must have been a pure execution… a person who has been a guerilla soldier for ten years… who has lived with persistent threats to his life, is not a person who is careless with his relationships,” said Chief Prosecutor Claes Edlund (SvD, May 10, 1990). Yet, with no leadership positions or high ranking in the PDKI, it was unclear why Mr. Mohammadzadeh was targeted or the motive behind the killing. 

The murder of Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh remains officially unsolved. 

Iranian Officials’ reaction

In the documentary “I nationens intresse,” Ahmed Reza Daneshkou, the First Counselor of the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm, was asked about Iran’s involvement in the killing of Mr. Karim Mohammadzadeh. He responded by stating, “the matter you are referring to happened some years ago, and we lack any relevant information or documentation that we can provide for your use. So, it’s essentially a historical incident.” When the reporter questioned if he meant that it’s now history, Daneshkou affirmed, “something like that.”

Swedish Officials’ reaction

Säpo went to Nynäshamn on the first day of the police investigation, seeking access to case information. Yet, they did not offer meaningful assistance and withheld crucial information from the local police (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). Säpo was routinely tracking and wiretapping the calls of the known Iranian intelligence agent Reza Taslimi when he was in Sweden. On the night of the murder of Mr. Mohammadzadeh, Säpo lost track of Taslimi at the train station about 30 minutes away from Mr. Mohammadzadeh’s apartment (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002 and “I nationens intresse,” 2003). Säpo contacted the taxi driver, Mr. Weine Österberg, without informing the police. On different occasions, Säpo presented photos to Mr. Österberg photos, who identified Reza Taslimi as the passenger. This information was not disclosed to the police until three years later (SvD, September 29, 2003, and DN, September 30, 2003). Consequently, as Säpo failed to disclose the information they had about the case and the suspect, the police department in Nynäshamn not only lost the opportunity to interrogate Reza Taslimi but also to have Mr. Weine Österberg, the taxi driver, do a witness confrontation, to test the DNA samples collected at the crime scene against Taslimi, or to ensure if the bloody footprint found in the hallway, revealing the killer had a hammer toe, matched the footprint of Taslimi. 

The two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse,” showing how Säpo knew of Iranian agents’ operations on Swedish territory, yet did not intervene in their actions caused a public outcry in Sweden. Mr. Sten Andersson, Sweden’s foreign minister between 1985 and 1991, commented on the documentaries, stating that “the security police easily become a state within the state, and it has to. Walking at the border, sometimes crossing the line of what is allowed. On the other hand, we couldn’t argue against them if they claimed that the security of the state required that they expel some people” (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

In a written question by Member of Parliament Tuve Skånberg to Minister of Justice Thomas Boström, Mr. Skånberg stated “that Reza Taslimi likely committed the murder for the Iranian state terrorism and that Säpo probably hindered the murder investigation and protected the suspected murderer. It is important to maintain the rule of law and have suspected criminals prosecuted without there being any suspicion that Säpo is releasing someone for political reasons. Although Sweden does not have an extradition agreement with Iran, the possibility of having the man in question extradited to be tried should be investigated in contact with the Iranian authorities. Since both Iran and Sweden are connected to Interpol, it is possible to request help from the Iranian police to get information about the man’s whereabouts and more” (written question 2003/04:48 by Member of Parliament Tuve Skånberg to Minister of Justice Thomas Boström on Säpo’s role).” 

In his response, Minister of Justice Thomas Bodström does not address the issue of Säpo protecting Iranian intelligence agents and instead asserts that while the security police must collaborate with the regular police, constraints within the Secrecy Act may limit the exchange of information (response to written question 2003/04:48, October 8, 2003).

When Mr. Kurt Malmström, then Secretary General of Säpo, was asked about the killing of Mr. Mohammadzadeh in 2003, 13 years after the murder, he stated that “I think that would have a lot of foreign policy consequences if we started to get involved in the mass media and report on the detailed operations of various countries... It is a case of an operational nature that has both internal security concerns with pre-trial confidentiality and other things. And also, possibly then, depending a little on what you bring up, foreign policy consequences that we don’t normally talk about openly, that is, if it concerns foreign operations” (“I nationens intresse”, 2003). 

It was disclosed to the documentary maker that Säpo feared revenge actions in Sweden similar to those that affected France (Expressen, 29 September, 2003). A series of bombings causing the death of 20 people and another 255 injured, shook Paris after French police arrested the men who tried to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur (Chapour) Bakhtiar. The bombings were claimed by an unknown group in Lebanon, who demanded the release of the assailants. In 1990, they were granted a Presidential pardon by Francois Mitterand, and they were all sent immediately to Iran. [10]   

Säpo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have continuously refused to comment on the information, particularly what was disclosed in the two Swedish documentaries. Even in 2020, when asked about Iran’s role in the case, Ms. Sofia Hellqvist, press secretary at Säpo at the time, stated that Säpo was aware that some 15 states conduct various forms of intelligence gathering in Sweden and that foreign powers in their intelligence operations are prepared to commit industrial espionage, obtain military secrets, and even murder (Flamman, February 17, 2020). 

Säpo’s most recent yearbook confirms that Iran is a significant security threat and “Iran conducts intelligence activities and security-threatening operations in and against Sweden and Swedish interests, involving intelligence gathering, influencing opposition, and procurement activities. Iranian intelligence services have long been carrying out attacks against individuals perceived to threaten the stability of the Iranian regime.” [11]

Sweden’s obligations under international law 

Based on the available information, in the instance of extrajudicial killings by state agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran occurring in Europe, European states may have failed in their obligation to ensure the safety of and the right to life for individuals in Europe and prosecute perpetrators. Extrajudicial killings are a violation of the right to life as enshrined in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 6 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a violation of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 3 of ECHR, and its two additional protocols on the death penalty: Protocol No. 6, which provides for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, and Protocol No. 13, which provides for its abolition in all circumstances, as well as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Furthermore, the right to safe haven is a fundamental principle enshrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which obligates states to protect individuals fleeing persecution and violence in their home countries. According to the Convention, a person qualifies as a refugee and is entitled to the right of asylum if they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on factors such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This international legal framework aims to ensure that individuals seeking refuge are not forcibly returned to situations where their life or freedom is at risk, emphasizing the importance of offering a safe and secure haven for those in need.

Family’s Reaction

ABC has no information about the family's reaction. 

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[1] In 1975, following the signing of the Algerian agreement between the governments of Iran and Iraq under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi government was quelled. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leading the Iraqi Kurdish movement and the Kurdistan Democratic Party [of Iraq] (PDK), sought refuge in Iran with their families. Subsequently, Idris Barzani, one of Mullah Mustafa's children, initiated reorganization by forming a group known as the Ghiade Movaghat (“Temporary Leadership”). Following the 1979 revolution, the interim leadership collaborated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to counter Kurdish parties like Komla and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDK-I). They, alongside the military institutions of the Islamic Republic, played a significant role in suppressing the struggles of the Kurdish people in Iran, particularly those associated with these two parties.
[2] In the years since the Islamic Republic has been in existence, in addition to such entities as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan), the Koran School led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (which was active in the early years of the Revolution), certain other Kurdish opposition parties were established outside Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These parties, with policies and ideologies that are not necessarily similar and uniform, have settled in parts of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq, such as Koy, Soleimanieh, and in the foothills of Qandil mountains. Some of these parties have undergone splits in recent years. These conflicts have been more about the methods of running the organizations rather than theoretical and ideological differences. These parties have not controlled any part of the Iranian territory since the late 1980’s, and have adopted different strategies in different periods in order to confront the Islamic Republic, advance their political objectives, and recruit members. Beginning in 2006, the conflicts between the regime and Kurdish parties – who had increased their presence in Iran in reaction to the government intensifying the detention and execution of Kurdish activists and the spread of fundamentalist beliefs in Kurdish regions – entered a new and more serious phase. Kurdish forces, especially the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the PJAK, were attacked several times inside Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan border regions by border patrol forces and the revolutionary Guards. That same year, Revolutionary Guards conducted armed attacks against the positions of Iranian Kurdish parties inside the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. The bombing of the Night of Yalda ceremonies (an ancient celebration of the longest night of the year) in 2006, which was also Abdorrahman Qassemlu’s birthday, resulted in the death of five Party members and 2 members of the Iraqi Kurdistan security forces. Kurdish forces also attacked Islamic Republic forces on several occasions. At least dozens were killed on each side in these military clashes. In subsequent years, particularly in 2017 and 2018, the clashes continued with less frequency and intensity. The most important of these clashes was the attack by PJAK forces on a border post on July 21, 2018, which resulted in 11 deaths (Deutsche Welle, July 22, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018). On September 8 of that same year, the seat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – a party that opposed armed struggle and had not participated in the clashes with the Islamic Republic forces – located in Koy in Iraqi Kurdistan, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in which 16 people were killed and 50 injured (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018; Kurdistan u Kurd website (September 8, 2018).
[3] Säpo’s primary responsibilities are countering espionage, combating terrorism, and leading investigations of offenses related to national security and acts of terrorism.
[4] In particular, there were many attempts to coerce Kurds in Nynäshamn to serve as informants in Sweden. Nynäshamn became a hub for Kurdish exile activities in the early 1990s. Consequently, Iranian intelligence was also very active in Nynäshamn. Several Kurds in the city received calls where an unidentified voice encouraged them to leave the party and “to not fight side by side against them” (“I nationens intresse”, 2003).
[5] Mohsen Rashidzadeh himself was a member of PDKI and part of the central command of the Peshmerga during the war with Iran. He left the party in 1985 due to conflicts with party leadership. He alleges being forced to spend four months in a Peshmerga-controlled area. After the PDKI lost the war, he was imprisoned in Iran. In prison, he encounters Reza Taslimi, who was his interrogator. Released after a few months, rumors circulated that he provided information about the party. He fled to Sweden, seeking asylum. Court documents reveal he lied when entering Sweden and had no legitimate reason to be granted refugee status in Sweden (Linköpings tingsrätt dom 1993-04-23 i mål nr B 412/92). Soon after Mohsen Rashidzadeh arrived in Sweden, he was contacted by Reza Taslimi, who told him to join PDKI again. Rashidzadeh met with Taslimi on a regular basis and received multiple assignments from Taslimi and was told weapons were hidden in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002, and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).
[6] Diplomatic immunity is a legal concept enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This international treaty establishes the framework for diplomatic relations between countries and defines the rights and privileges of diplomats. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, diplomats enjoy absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host country. This means that diplomats are generally exempt from prosecution for any criminal activities they may engage in while serving in their diplomatic capacity.
[7] Apprehended under the fake name of Hassan Poursamani.
[8] Mr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, Secretary-General of the PDKI, Mr. Fattah Abdoli, PDKI’s European representative, Mr. Homayoun Ardalan, member of PDKI’s central committee, and Mr. Nuri Dehkordi, translator, were assassinated on September 17, 1992.
[9] Mykonos-Urteil. Urteil in der Strafsache gegen Amin und andere wegen Mordes und Beihilfe zum Mord. Dokumentation. Archiv für Forschung und Dokumentation Iran-Berlin e.V. Verein iranischer Flüchtlinge in Berlin e.V. Berlin, 1998.
[10] On July 19, 1980, after a shootout with the police following an assassination attempt on the former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur (Chapour) Bakhtiar in Paris, the French police arrested Mr. Anis Naccache and his associates, who later admitted they received orders from Iran to assassinate former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. While he was not injured in the attack, a police officer and his neighbor were shot dead. Another police officer was paralyzed for life in the attack. Mr. Naccache and his accomplices were sentenced to life in prison, except for one accomplice who received a term of 20 years. Between 1985-86, a series of bombings in public places in Paris occurred (causing 20 deaths and 255 wounded) and were claimed by an unknown group in Lebanon demanding the release of Naccache and his accomplices. In 1990, President Francois Mitterand granted Mr. Naccache and his associates a Presidential pardon, and they were all sent immediately to Iran.
[11] Säpo 2022/2023 yearbook. 

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