Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Efat Qazi

About

Age: 54
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: September 6, 1990
Location of Killing: Önsta-Gryta, Västerås, Sweden
Mode of Killing: Bombing

About this Case

Ms. Qazi, daughter of Qazi Muhammad, the president of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, a self-autonomous Kurdish state in northwestern Iran in 1946, was killed in 1990 by a letter bomb in Västerås, Sweden, intended for her husband.

Information regarding the life and extra-judicial execution of Ms. Effat Qazi, born in 1935 in Mahabad, Kurdistan Province and mother of two, has been obtained through Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights (ABC) interviews conducted with Mr. Amir Qazi (October 30, 2021) and a relative (October 16, 2022); Swedish newspapers Dagens Nyheter (October 3, 1990, September 8, 9, 11, 12, 23, November 8, 28, 1990, January 21, 22, 1993, October 20, 2001); Svenska Dagbladet (September 8, 18, 23, 1990); Expressen (29 September, 2003); Flamman (February 17, 2020); the Swedish documentary “Terrorkommandot” (released in 2002); and “I nationens intresse” (released in 2003); Interview with Ms. Effat Qazi’s husband Mr. Amir Qazi by Swedish journalist Erik Hjärtberg published on his website erikhjartberg.se (March 4, 2020); and Swedish podcast “Olösta Mord: Brevbombsmordet” (April 5, 2020).

Ms. Ghazi, daughter of Qazi Muhammad, the president of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, a self-autonomous Kurdish state in northwestern Iran in 1946, grew up without her father as he was executed in 1947. [1] The entire family went through significant hardship and their property was confiscated at the time of the execution of her father (ABC interview with Mr. Amir Qazi, October 30, 2021). 

Ms. Qazi studied political science at Tehran University and worked at the Department of Culture after graduating in 1971. She married Mr. Amir Qazi when they were university students, and they had two daughters. According to her husband, she focused on raising them with a strong sense of their Kurdish identity. 

While Ms. Qazi had been an active member of the youth committee of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), founded by her father when she was young, she did not participate in the organizational work of the party as an adult. Her husband, Mr. Amir Qazi, was an active member of the  party’s leadership, which endangered his safety and led him into exile to Sweden in 1972. Mr. Qazi returned to Iran after the Revolution and, as tensions rose between the Kurdish parties and the revolutionary government over the rights of the Kurds and the political future of the country, he participated in the Kurdish parties armed struggle that opposed the central government, which began in mid-1979. Ms. Qazi lived apart from her husband for years, after he was forced to leave Iran and returned to Sweden. She moved to Sweden in 1986 with her daughters, took Swedish classes and became a teacher, which she loved. 

Her husband describes her as a brave and devoted wife and mother (ABC interview with Mr. Amir Qazi, October 30, 2021). 

The Kurdish Problem in the Islamic Republic

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the disagreements between the government of the Shiite Islamic Republic and the organizations in the Kurdish regions of western Iran regarding the rights and roles of minorities in drafting the Constitution; whether the government should be secular or religious, and especially the issue of Kurdish autonomy; and conflicts that resulted in Kurdish political organizations boycotting the April 1979 Referendum on instituting an Islamic Republic; led to serious, and at times armed, clashes between the central government and the Peshmerga (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s armed forces).

On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the oldest and most influential Kurdish Party, “the Party of the Devil”, and declared it “unofficial and illegal” and ordered a military attack on Kurdistan. Mass executions and intense armed clashes continued in the region for months, clashes that resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians and the displacement and relocation of the residents of certain towns. In the next four years, Kurdish parties lost their grip on power in the region to a great extent, and relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, a number of their leaders and members have been assassinated outside Iran, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. [2]

Background on the Formation of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan 

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) was founded in 1945 with the goal to gain autonomy for Kurdistan, in north-western Iran. After the Revolution, conflicts between the new central Shiite government and mainly Sunni Kurdistan regarding the role of minorities in the drafting of the constitution, specification of Shiite as the official state religion, and particularly the autonomy of the region, ended in armed clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and the peshmerga (the militia of the PDKI). The PDKI boycotted the referendum of April 1, 1979, when people went to polls to vote for or against the Islamic regime. On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called the PDKI the “party of Satan” and declared it “unofficial and illegal.” Mass executions and fighting broke out and continued for several months in the region. By 1983, the PDKI had lost much of its influence in the region. In the years since various leaders of the PDKI have been assassinated. Following internal disputes, the party split in 2006 and two organizations were established as “The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” and “The Democratic Party of Kurdistan.”

Background of Extra-judicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Extra-judicial Killings and Attempts in Sweden 

In the early 1990s, Iranian state terrorism and espionage activities in Sweden were particularly high during this period and were tracked closely by Säpo, the Swedish Security Service. [3] A wave of targeted killings against Kurds in Sweden occurred. Säpo believed that all of these killings were politically motivated and that Reza Taslimi, an Iranian intelligence agent, was connected to these killings (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002 and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).

Reza Taslimi’s modus operandi as an intelligence agent was to coerce other Kurds in Sweden to act as informants. [4] One informant, Mohsen Rashidzadeh, [5] came to describe his interactions with Reza Taslimi and how he planned the murder of opponents and refugees in Sweden in two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse”. When Mr. Jalil Gadani, a senior leader of PDKI, visited Sweden in January 1990, there was great concern for his safety in the Kurdish community. Säpo was aware that an attack on his life was planned and warned Mr. Gadani, effectively preventing the attack (“I nationens intresse,” 2003, and SvD, September 18, 2002).  In fact, Reza Taslimi and Mohsen Rashidzadeh were tracking Mr. Gadani. According to Rashizadeh, Taslimi was infuriated when the assassination operation failed (“I nationens intresse,” 2003).

There are also connections between Reza Taslimi and the Iranian embassy in Stockholm. Taslimi would use the private car of Jamshid Hassanpour, a diplomat at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002). In early September of 1990, Jamshid Hassanpour and four other men were detained by Säpo for conspiring to kill the Saudi Ambassador to Sweden, Marwan Bashir al-Roume. Three of the men apprehended were diplomats and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. [6] Sweden declared the three Iranian diplomats at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm as persona non grata; an action typically taken in response to individuals’ undesirable or detrimental behavior to the host country’s interests. However, two of the five men apprehended were not protected by diplomatic immunity. Even though Sweden has an absolute obligation to prosecute, they were flown out of Sweden with the diplomats the day after Säpo apprehended them. One of the men, Abdolrahman Banihashemi, [7] was one of the assailants who, two years later, carried out the Berlin Mykonos restaurant assassinations of four PDKI leaders. [8] Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, two-term Prime Minister of Sweden, Ms. Mona Sahlin, Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and Mr. Pierre Schori, former Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were all invited to the dinner at Mykonos restaurant and were in Berlin. Shortly before the dinner, Mr. Ingvar Carlson received a phone call from Prime Minister Carl Bildt, requiring them to return to Sweden immediately. As a result, they all flew back to Sweden the same day, likely avoiding a potential assassination (SvD, May 23, 2023). On April 10, 1997, a German court issued an international arrest warrant for Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian after ruling that he had ordered the Mykonos restaurant assassinations with knowledge of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. [9]

In 1992, Mohsen Rashidzadeh and another informant, Khosrow al-Gilani were arrested, suspected of having conducted illegal intelligence activities, jointly and in concert. The Linköping District Court concluded that between 1989 and 1992, Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani “deliberately carried out activities on Iran's behalf secretly and using fraudulent means to obtain information about another’s personal relationship.” Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani regularly met or spoke with Reza Taslimi, using codewords to inform him about people and events in Sweden. They would participate in political meetings and gatherings, weddings, and other celebratory events to gather information about those participating by taking photos or filming guests and participants and by listing names and addresses of political figures in Sweden and where other leading political figures would stay when visiting Sweden. The Court declared Rashidzadeh and al-Gilani guilty of spying on other Kurds in Sweden and sentenced Rashidzadeh to prison and deportation and al-Gilani to prison (Linköping District Court judgment nr B 412/92, date 1993-04-23). Mohsen Rashidzadeh returned to Iran after his time in prison and was greeted by Reza Taslimi in Iran. Rashidzadeh eventually moved to Canada (“I nationens intresse”, 2003).

Ms. Effat Qazi’s Extrajudicial Execution 

On Thursday, September 6, 1990, Ms. Effat Qazi was killed by a letter bomb in Västerås, Sweden. She had just come home from work when she stopped to pick up the mail before entering her home. Neighbors heard a loud explosion and ran out to see what had happened when they found Ms. Effat Qazi severely injured on the ground (Flamman, February 17, 2020).

Ms. Effat Qazi was alive when the ambulance rushed her to the hospital, but died at the hospital a few hours later as the impact of the bomb on her chest and abdomen had been severe (Flamman, February 17, 2020).

The police cordoned off the neighborhood, gathered evidence, and started knocking on doors for information. Analysis of the fragments of the explosives found in the padded envelope would later show that the letter bomb was addressed to her husband, Mr. Amir Qazi (DN, November 8, 1990). The police were confident that a professional had constructed the extremely powerful letter bomb. The bomb had an electrically initiated detonator set to explode when the circuit closed, either when the mailbox or package was opened (DN, November 8, 1990). Preliminary analysis of the remains of the explosive showed that the explosive material was not made in Sweden (DN, November 8, 1990). The explosive material was at first unknown, but it was speculated that it could possibly be Semtex (Swedish podcast “Olösta Mord: Brevbombsmordet” (April 5, 2020). Semtex was originally developed for Czechoslovak military use and export but became very popular with terrorists as the (at that time) odorless explosive was extraordinarily powerful and virtually undetectable. In 1988, less than a pound of Semtex hidden in a cassette player is believed to have taken down Pan Am Flight 103, also known as the Lockerbie bombing, killing 270 people. [10] In 1990, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel disclosed that his country's former Communist regime had supplied over a ton of Semtex to Libya and had also supplied Semtex to Iran. [11] 

The police also established that the letter bomb had been placed in the mailbox between 9:45 and 10:15 on the morning of the killing. Ms. Effat Qazi’s oldest daughter had looked in the mailbox before leaving for school at 9:45 and had not seen anything except advertising. The mailman had come to deliver the mail at 10:15 and could see a package in the mailbox already (DN, September 8, 1990). 

The police quickly suspected political motives behind the murder, since Mr. Amir Qazi was the intended target, given his background in PDKI and having a prominent role for the party in Sweden  (DN, September 8, 1990 and SvD, September 8, 1990). In an interview with ABC, Mr. Amir Qazi stated that the Iranian regime always considered him a threat and wanted to eliminate him because of his mission to ensure an autonomous Kurdistan (ABC Interview, October 30, 2021). The letter bomb had exploded the day before Mr. Amir Qazi was expected to travel to Dusseldorf, Germany, to meet with other leading Kurds fighting for an independent Kurdistan (Svenska Dagbladet, September 8, 1990). 

The highly attended funeral of Ms. Effat Qazi took place about two weeks after the explosion, under heavy surveillance by the police and Swedish Security Service (Säpo) (SvD and DN, September 23, 1990). 

The case of Ms. Effat Qazi remains officially unsolved. In February 2020, Ms. Effat Qazi’s case was reopened by the police’s cold case group (Flamman, February 17, 2020).

Iranian Officials’ Reaction

Shortly after the killing, the Iranian embassy denied any involvement in the killing of Ms. Effat Qazi and condemned the crime (Swedish podcast “Olösta Mord: Brevbombsmordet” (April 5, 2020). Iranian embassy also denied that any diplomats had been involved in illegal activities (DN, September 11, 1990).

Swedish Officials’ Reaction

Quickly after the letterbomb killed Ms. Effat Qazi, the police stated in Swedish media that they had few leads but were confident the killing was politically motivated (DN, September 11, 1990). 

Three years after the murder, on January 18, 1993, the police arrested an acquaintance of Ms. Qazi, suspected of having murdered her. The man denied all charges. A search of his home did not give the police substantial proof of involvement and he was released three days later. He continued to be a murder suspect after his release (DN, January 22, 1993). When asked if he knew of the man who was arrested for the murder of his wife in 1993, Mr. Amir Qazi said he never heard of the arrest (Swedish podcast “Olösta Mord: Brevbombsmordet” (April 5, 2020). A few years later, Mr. Amir Qazi received a note from the police stating that his wife’s murder was no longer investigated. 

The available information indicates that Sweden intelligence was informed about Iran’s operatives’ activities in Sweden, but did not act to stop them. The two Swedish documentaries, “Terrorkommandot” and “I nationens intresse,” showing how Säpo knew of Iranian agents’ operations on Swedish territory, yet did not intervene in their actions caused a public outcry in Sweden. Mr. Sten Andersson, Sweden’s foreign minister between 1985 and 1991, commented on the documentaries, stating that “the security police easily become a state within the state, and it has to. Walking at the border, sometimes crossing the line of what is allowed. On the other hand, we couldn’t argue against them if they claimed that the security of the state required that they expel some people” (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

It was disclosed to the documentary maker that Säpo feared revenge actions in Sweden similar to those that affected France (Expressen, 29 September, 2003). A series of bombings causing the death of 20 people and another 255 injured, shook Paris after French police arrested the men who tried to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur (Chapour) Bakhtiar. The bombings were claimed by an unknown group in Lebanon, who demanded the release of the assailants. In 1990, they were granted a Presidential pardon by Francois Mitterand, and they were all sent immediately to Iran. [12]  

Säpo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have continuously refused to comment on the information, particularly what was disclosed in the two Swedish documentaries. Even in 2020, when asked about Iran’s role in the case, Ms. Sofia Hellqvist, press secretary at Säpo at the time, stated that Säpo was aware that some 15 states conduct various forms of intelligence gathering in Sweden and that foreign powers in their intelligence operations are prepared to commit industrial espionage, obtain military secrets, and even murder (Flamman, February 17, 2020). 

Säpo’s most recent yearbook confirms that Iran is a significant security threat and “Iran conducts intelligence activities and security-threatening operations in and against Sweden and Swedish interests, involving intelligence gathering, influencing opposition, and procurement activities. Iranian intelligence services have long been carrying out attacks against individuals perceived to threaten the stability of the Iranian regime.” [13]

Sweden’s obligations under international law 

Based on the available information, in the instance of extrajudicial killings by state agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran occurring in Europe, European states may have failed in their obligation to ensure the safety of and the right to life for individuals in Europe and prosecute perpetrators. Extrajudicial killings are a violation of the right to life as enshrined in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 6 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a violation of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 3 of ECHR, and its two additional protocols on the death penalty: Protocol No. 6, which provides for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, and Protocol No. 13, which provides for its abolition in all circumstances, as well as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Furthermore, the right to safe haven is a fundamental principle enshrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which obligates states to protect individuals fleeing persecution and violence in their home countries. According to the Convention, a person qualifies as a refugee and is entitled to the right of asylum if they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on factors such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This international legal framework aims to ensure that individuals seeking refuge are not forcibly returned to situations where their life or freedom is at risk, emphasizing the importance of offering a safe and secure haven for those in need.

Family’s Reaction

The family was immediately after the incident sent to a secret location and was under the surveillance of the police. Other leading party members also went into hiding in Sweden, fearing yet another impending killing (Svenska Dagbladet, September 8, 1990). Mr. Amir Qazi said that he felt threatened during the period leading up to the bombing but was unaware that his family had been followed or targeted (DN, September 8, 1990). 

Shortly after the killing of his wife, Mr. Qazi stated in an interview that he refused to be scared, would continue fighting for a free Kurdistan, and would not stop being politically active (DN, September 8, 1990). After the funeral, Mr. Qazi and his daughters, who had been moved to a secret location for safety reasons, moved back into their house. He was tired of living in hiding and wanted to go back to work (Swedish podcast “Olösta Mord: Brevbombsmordet” (April 5, 2020). 

While the police worked under the assumption that the killing was politically motivated, Mr. Amir Qazi maintains that the police were never interested in investigating Iran’s role in the killing (ABC interview with Mr. Amir Qazi, October 30, 2021). By the end of November 1990, Mr. Qazi expressed his frustration with the police investigation of his wife’s case in a reportage for DN (November 28, 1990). He stated that Säpo tapped his phone and would call to question whomever he had conversations with. He said that instead of investigating Iran’s involvement, Säpo focused on mapping Kurds in Sweden under the pretext of investigating her case (ABC interview, October 30, 2021).

Their daughter, Ms. Tara Qazi, stated that despite her family history, her mother had distanced herself from politics, which had negatively impacted her childhood and adult life; that it was ironic that she was killed in a politically motivated attack (“I nationens intresse,” 2003). 

Impact on the family

According to the available information, there were enormous implications for the family. The daughters lost their caring and nurturing mother, and Mr. Qazi lost his loving wife. He was left to raise the daughters and was constantly worried about his daughters, traumatized by what had happened to their mother, and terrified that their father was a target. Mr. Qazi never remarried and focused on raising the daughters so they would live a happy and successful life. Even though they are adults now, the effects of the killing of their mother still lingers (ABC interview with Mr. Amir Qazi, October 30, 2021). 

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[1] As the founder of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Ms. Effat Qazi’s father, Mr. Qazi Mohammad, played a central role in establishing the Mahabad Republic. Despite its brief existence, the Mahabad Republic is considered an important historical event in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy. The Mahabad Republic aimed to secure independence for the Kurdish people in Iran and to promote their cultural and political rights and was backed by the Soviet Union until December 1946. Shortly after the withdrawal, the Iranian army reoccupied Mahabad, leading to the downfall of the Mahabad Republic. On March 31, 1947, Mr. Qazi Muhammad was executed on charges of treason by orders of the Iranian Shah.
[2] In the years since the Islamic Republic has been in existence, in addition to such entities as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan), the Koran School led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (which was active in the early years of the Revolution), certain other Kurdish opposition parties were established outside Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These parties, with policies and ideologies that are not necessarily similar and uniform, have settled in parts of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq, such as Koy, Soleimanieh, and in the foothills of Qandil mountains. Some of these parties have undergone splits in recent years. These conflicts have been more about the methods of running the organizations rather than theoretical and ideological differences. These parties have not controlled any part of the Iranian territory since the late 1980’s, and have adopted different strategies in different periods in order to confront the Islamic Republic, advance their political objectives, and recruit members. Beginning in 2006, the conflicts between the regime and Kurdish parties – who had increased their presence in Iran in reaction to the government intensifying the detention and execution of Kurdish activists and the spread of fundamentalist beliefs in Kurdish regions – entered a new and more serious phase. Kurdish forces, especially the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the PJAK, were attacked several times inside Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan border regions by border patrol forces and the revolutionary Guards. That same year, Revolutionary Guards conducted armed attacks against the positions of Iranian Kurdish parties inside the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. The bombing of the Night of Yalda ceremonies (an ancient celebration of the longest night of the year) in 2006, which was also Abdorrahman Qassemlu’s birthday, resulted in the death of five Party members and 2 members of the Iraqi Kurdistan security forces. Kurdish forces also attacked Islamic Republic forces on several occasions. At least dozens were killed on each side in these military clashes. In subsequent years, particularly in 2017 and 2018, the clashes continued with less frequency and intensity. The most important of these clashes was the attack by PJAK forces on a border post on July 21, 2018, which resulted in 11 deaths (Deutsche Welle, July 22, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018). On September 8 of that same year, the seat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – a party that opposed armed struggle and had not participated in the clashes with the Islamic Republic forces – located in Koy in Iraqi Kurdistan, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in which 16 people were killed and 50 injured (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018; Kurdistan u Kurd website (September 8, 2018).
[3] Säpo’s primary responsibilities are countering espionage, combating terrorism, and leading investigations of offenses related to national security and acts of terrorism.
[4] In particular, there were many attempts to coerce Kurds in Nynäshamn to serve as informants in Sweden. Nynäshamn became a hub for Kurdish exile activities in the early 1990s. Consequently, Iranian intelligence was also very active in Nynäshamn. Several Kurds in the city received calls where an unidentified voice encouraged them to leave the party and “to not fight side by side against them” (“I nationens intresse”, 2003).
[5] Mohsen Rashidzadeh himself was a member of PDKI and part of the central command of the Peshmerga during the war with Iran. He left the party in 1985 due to conflicts with party leadership. He alleges being forced to spend four months in a Peshmerga-controlled area. After the PDKI lost the war, he was imprisoned in Iran. In prison, he encounters Reza Taslimi, who was his interrogator. Released after a few months, rumors circulated that he provided information about the party. He fled to Sweden, seeking asylum. Court documents reveal he lied when entering Sweden and had no legitimate reason to be granted refugee status in Sweden (Linköpings tingsrätt dom 1993-04-23 i mål nr B 412/92). Soon after Mohsen Rashidzadeh arrived in Sweden, he was contacted by Reza Taslimi, who told him to join PDKI again. Rashidzadeh met with Taslimi on a regular basis and received multiple assignments from Taslimi and was told weapons were hidden in Stockholm (“Terrorkommandot,” 2002, and “I nationens intresse,” 2003).
[6] Diplomatic immunity is a legal concept enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This international treaty establishes the framework for diplomatic relations between countries and defines the rights and privileges of diplomats. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, diplomats enjoy absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host country. This means that diplomats are generally exempt from prosecution for any criminal activities they may engage in while serving in their diplomatic capacity.
[7] Apprehended under the fake name of Hassan Poursamani.
[8] Mr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, Secretary-General of the PDKI, Mr. Fattah Abdoli, PDKI’s European representative, Mr. Homayoun Ardalan, member of PDKI’s central committee, and Mr. Nuri Dehkordi, translator, were assassinated on September 17, 1992.
[9] Mykonos-Urteil. Urteil in der Strafsache gegen Amin und andere wegen Mordes und Beihilfe zum Mord. Dokumentation. Archiv für Forschung und Dokumentation Iran-Berlin e.V. Verein iranischer Flüchtlinge in Berlin e.V. Berlin, 1998.
[10] Observer, “The Truth Behind This Bomb That Took Down Pan Am Over Lockerbie Remains a 30-year Mystery,” published 12/21/2018.
[11] Washington Post, “Havel Details Sale of Explosives to Libya,” published 3/23/1990.
[12] On July 19, 1980, after a shootout with the police following an assassination attempt on the former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur (Chapour) Bakhtiar in Paris, the French police arrested Mr. Anis Naccache and his associates, who later admitted they received orders from Iran to assassinate former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. While he was not injured in the attack, a police officer and his neighbor were shot dead. Another police officer was paralyzed for life in the attack. Mr. Naccache and his accomplices were sentenced to life in prison, except for one accomplice who received a term of 20 years. Between 1985-86, a series of bombings in public places in Paris occurred (causing 20 deaths and 255 wounded) and were claimed by an unknown group in Lebanon demanding the release of Naccache and his accomplices. In 1990, President Francois Mitterand granted Mr. Naccache and his associates a Presidential pardon, and they were all sent immediately to Iran.
[13] Säpo 2022/2023 yearbook.

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