Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Emran Dehvari

About

Age: 27
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: November 20, 2016
Location of Killing: Zahedan, Gwatam Residential Complex, Sistan Va Baluchestan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Other extrajudicial method
Charges: Unknown charge

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

A few days before his death, Mr. Emran Dehvari informed his wife that he had noticed his personal closet had been forcibly opened at the hospital. He observed signs of impact and damage on the closet's lock.

Information about the case of Dr. Emran Dehvari, son of Ali and Jannat, hailing from Khash city in Sistan and Baluchestan province, who was married and had one child, was obtained from an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with Mr. An'am Dehvari, one of his brothers (on July 24, 2023 and October 20, 2023). To complement the details of this case, data from the websites of the Baloch activists' campaign (December 17,21 and 25, 2016), Iran Wire (January 26, 2017), the IslamTape website (January 29, 2024), and the YouTube channel of NourTV (December 28, 2016) were also consulted.

Mr. Dehvari was born on September 16, 1989, into a well-known and devout Sunni Baloch family. He spent his formative years in Saravan city. Mr. Dehvari moved to Zahedan for high school and initially attended a prestigious model high school affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Zahedan University, which required an entrance exam. However, after two years, he returned to his hometown of Saravan and resumed his studies at Dar al-Hadith Imam Bukhari Religious School. His father, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, established this institution for individuals interested in religious sciences. According to his brother, Mr. Dehvari developed an interest in religious activities during his high school years. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

After completing high school, Mr. Emran Dehvari took part in the Iranian University Entrance Exam and was accepted into the medical field. He enrolled at Zahedan University of Medical Sciences. His admission to the medical university coincided with the peak of his father's religious and political activities. Emran's father, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, a prominent Sunni cleric in Baluchestan and the founder of the "Dar al-Hadith Imam Bukhari School" in Saravan city, was assassinated by two unidentified armed motorcycle riders on November 10, 2008, while visiting a mosque in Saravan city. Mr. Emran Dehvari was actively involved in religious activities while pursuing his medical studies. Following his father's assassination, he served as a member of the management council at his father's school for an extended period. Mr. Dehvari, a Hafiz (one who memorizes the Qur'an), assumed the responsibility of leading congregations at his father's educational centers and mosques, including "Dar al-Hadith Imam Bukhari School" and "Umar Farooq Mosque" in Saravan. Additionally, during Ramadan, he participated in ceremonies such as "Tarawih" (special religious gatherings for Sunnis during Ramadan). With his "good manners" and "high social appeal," he cultivated strong relationships with Zahedan missionaries and other Sunni followers across the country. Through online platforms like Paltak (an older platform for audio-visual conversations, akin to Clubhouse), he maintained contact with Sunni youth in various regions, including Hormozgan and Kurdistan. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, October 20, 2023) In addition to contributing articles to "Sunnat Magazine,"* Mr. Dehvari compiled three collections of articles on Sunni hadiths (the IslamTape website, January 29, 2024) Moreover, conducting religious classes in Zahedan University's dormitory was among his other activities during this period, ultimately resulting in his expulsion from the dormitory. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

Mr. Emran Dehvari worked at "Imam Ali Zahedan Hospital" during the final years of his medical studies. According to his brother, Mr. Dehvari harbored many sensitivities regarding medical ethics and the "normalization of human death by physicians." Describing Emran as a "quiet yet dynamic and active" individual, his brother noted that despite Emran's belief that the Islamic Republic was responsible for his father's assassination, he advocated for avoiding emotional reactions and instead emphasized the use of "wisdom" to move forward. In the last two years of his life, his focus shifted from religious activities to social endeavors, such as providing medical services in underserved and rural areas. This transition led him to halt the writing of religious materials, channeling his efforts into medical work. Consequently, among the people, he became more commonly known as an "elite," a "social face," and a "respected individual" rather than a "religious figure." (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

The Situation of Iran’s Baloch Population

Baluch ethnics make up one to three percent of the country’s population and the majority in Sistan and Baluchistan, where 64-77 percent of residents live below the poverty line. Despite having abundant gas, oil, gold, and marine resources, approximately two-thirds of residents lack access to clean drinking water. Economic policies have caused Sistan and Baluchistan Province to remain one of the most deprived provinces in terms of education, health, and food. (Boroumand Center research).

Iran's Baluch minority are mostly Sunni Muslims, whereas the majority of Iran’s population are Shi'a Muslims. Policies and actions from authorities have been restrictive toward the practice of Sunni Islam, e.g. limiting and even blocking the construction of Sunni mosques in majority-Sh’ia areas (including Tehran), arbitrary closure of Sunni prayer halls and celebratory gatherings, and violence from security forces towards groups of Sunnis praying in public (Minority Rights Group; Human Rights Watch: Religious Minorities; Al-Monitor).

Baluch activists have reported that government repression of Sunni Baluch groups had increased since February 1994, when locals gathered at Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan, to protest the destruction of a Sunni mosque in Mashhad. Government agents reportedly fired shots into the crowd and detained several activists. Over the years, several religious and political personalities inside and outside the country have been killed, including four Sunni clerics, who died under suspicious circumstances between 1993 and 1995-96. (Boroumand Center and United Nations research; Baluch Campaign article, February 14, 2016). 

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published and the local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state-committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial and the evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

How these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long-term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation.

To access the complete text of "The Background of Extrajudicial Executions by the Islamic Republic of Iran," along with comments from various officials of the Islamic Republic and a historical account of the murders, please click on the corresponding title in the sidebar.

Background of Threats and Pressures on Emran Dehvari

Mr. Emran Dehvari had been under pressure from security agencies for a considerable period leading up to his death. These pressures commenced following the assassination of his father, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, in 2008. Initially, Hujjat al-Islam Abdul Hossein Nouri, the official representative of the Supreme Leader in Saravan city, summoned Mr. Dehvariand one of his brothers to his office via telephone and cautioned them against engaging in any propaganda activities, hinting that they were under his surveillance. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

According to Mr. An'am Dehvari, Emran's traits and actions, coupled with his standing and societal acceptance as an educated individual and a doctor in the Baluchistan region, heightened the sensitivity of security institutions towards him (YouTube channel of NourTV, December 28, 2016) Since his student days in Zahedan, Mr. Dehvari was frequently -  sometimes on a weekly basis - summoned by the Zahedan Intelligence Department. These interrogations covered various issues, including the activities of one of his brothers in foreign media and the necessity of ceasing his religious classes in the university dormitory. The pressure to halt these classes was so intense that it ultimately led to his expulsion from the university dormitory. Mr. An'am Dehvari asserts that these threats and summonses were intended to demonstrate control over his activities. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

When Emran attempted to investigate and pursue the circumstances surrounding his father's death by visiting the Saravan prosecutor's office and providing documents, including provocative speeches by Ayatollah Hosseini Qazvini (the plenipotentiary representative of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi in Afghanistan), where Emran's father was labeled a "Wahhabi with a birth certificate," he was told by Saravan's prosecutor, identified as Judge Najafi: "I advise you not to pursue this case." (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

Mr. An'am Dehvari stated that following the murder of Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, the government opposed the ongoing operation of the "Dar al-Hadith Imam Bukhari School." Additionally, significant efforts were made to prevent his son from participating in the school's management council. (Interview with An’am Dehvari, July 24, 2023)

In addition to the threats previously mentioned, Mr. Emran Dehvari informed his wife a few days before his death that he had noticed signs indicating that his personal closet at the hospital had been forcibly opened. He observed marks of impact and breakage on the closet lock, which he typically used to store personal items. (Iran Wire, January 26, 2017, and ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

Extrajudicial execution of Mr. Dehvari

Mr. Emran Dehvari died unexpectedly and under questionable circumstances on November 20, 2016, at his residence in Zahedan city. According to his wife, on that day, after finishing his hospital shift, Mr. Dehvari  complained of severe stomach pain and went to bed without eating. The next morning, when his wife tried to wake him, she noticed that his body was cold, and there was white foam coming from his mouth and nose. (Iran Wire, January 26, 2017)

On November 20th, Emran returned home after his hospital shift, feeling severe stomach pain. Despite his discomfort, he went to bed without eating. The next morning, when his wife tried to wake him, she discovered that his body was cold, and he was foaming at the mouth and nose.

While contacting the emergency, Mr. Dehvari's wife also reached out to some of her husband's friends and medical professors to notify them of the situation. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023) In a separate interview, Mr. An'am Dehvari mentioned that after the emergency personnel observed Mr. Dehvari's mouth and nose, they inquired about the food he had consumed the previous night. Subsequently, they notified the police, which dispatched investigators to the scene. (YouTube channel of NourTV, December 28, 2016) During the initial examinations, the two doctors present— one of whom was a friend and teacher of Emran Dehvari, and the other an emergency dispatch doctor— expressed their opinion that the cause of death might be "poisoning." Emran's body was transported to the hospital by ambulance that night. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

Emran Dehvari was 28 years old when he passed away. He was laid to rest beside his father's grave in the central cemetery of Saravan City, located in Sistan and Baluchestan province. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

Officials’ Reaction

Officials or government media did not directly address Mr. Dehvari's death. However, according to Mr. An'am Dehvari, following his brother's passing, some medical students organized a memorial ceremony at the Zahedan Faculty of Medical Sciences. A report including images of this event were also published on the faculty's website. However, the cause of Mr. Dehvari's death was listed as "cardiac arrest" in the report. Years later, without explanation, the report was removed from the faculty's website. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on October 20, 2023)

According to Mr. Anam Dehvari, following Emran's suspicious death, the family sought a meeting with the head of Ali Ibn Abi Talib Hospital, where Emran was employed. However, the head of the hospital declined the request. Additionally, Mr. Dehvari's family requested other hospital staff to review the cameras in the hallway leading to Mr. Dehvari's closet, to identify who had broken the door of his personal closet a few days before the incident. However, the hospital staff asserted that there were no cameras in that area. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

According to Mr. An'am Dehvari, despite the family consenting  to an autopsy, the forensic pathologist did not hand over the cause of death report to the family. The forensic authorities simply stated, "Unfortunately, we cannot give you an answer." Seven years have elapsed since the family's request, and the forensic doctor has yet to provide any explanation to the Dehvari family. Similarly, in Mr. Emran Dehvari's death certificate, which was issued one month after his passing on November 27, 2016, the cause of death was recorded as "unknown." (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on October 20, 2023, and ABC’s Archive documents)

According to Mr. An'am Dehvari, after the death of his brother Emran, one of Zahedan's judges informed the family that "pursuing this case would not yield any results for them." (YouTube channel of NourTV, December 28, 2016)

Familys’ Reaction

In the end, Mr. Emran Dehvari's family did not officially file a complaint about his death with judicial authorities. However, they diligently followed the forensic report and autopsy results over the years, yet received no conclusive findings. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023) Emran's brother voiced his frustration with the medical examiner's silence in a separate interview, stating, "If the autopsy indicated poisoning and the government was not responsible, they should have declared that Dr. Emran Dehvari was poisoned, prompting a criminal investigation to identify the perpetrator. But their silence and failure to disclose autopsy results leave no doubt about what occurred." (YouTube channel of NourTV, December 28, 2016)

Mr. An'am Dehvari elaborated on why the Dehvari family refrained from filing an official complaint regarding Emran's death, stating, "How can we file a complaint when the forensic pathologist hasn't provided any answers regarding the autopsy results?" He also pointed out the family's lack of trust in the judiciary, explaining, "In the past, our attempts to seek justice for our father's assassination, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, proved unsuccessful, with only a few innocent individuals being identified as the perpetrators." (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

Mr. Dehvari's family firmly believes that their son was extrajudicially killed, possibly through poisoning, attributing the government's apprehension toward his activities and social standing as the underlying cause. (YouTube channel of NourTV, December 28, 2016) Emphasizing that his brother "had no history of physical or underlying illness," Mr. An'am Dehvari commented on the government's motive for his brother's "murder," stating, "The Islamic Republic has consistently sought to suppress the civil activities of the Baloch people. Mr. Dehvari, as a religious activist, doctor, writer, and with extensive social connections and involvement, challenges this policy and perspective." He added, "The government feared the continuation and replication of Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari's activities through his son, potentially establishing him as a permanent figure." (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

Impacts on Family

The murders of Mr. Emran Dehvari and, prior to that, his father, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, profoundly affected the family members. According to Mr. An'am Dehvari, following the murder of their father, Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari, the primary responsibility of managing his father's mosques and shops fell on Emran. Therefore, after Emran's death, the family once again felt as if the ground had been pulled out from under them. Even after many years, the Dehvari family continues to grapple with the "trauma" of losing both father and son. (ABC’s Interview with An’am Dehvari on July 24, 2023)

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*"Sunnah Magazine" was launched in 2004 under the editorship of Mr. Sheikh Ali Dehvari. However, the magazine was banned after seven issues in April 2005 due to pressure from the Intelligence service.

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