Mr. Mohammad Sa'id Torkamanzehi was a primary school teacher and a skilled soccer player. He was religious and non-violent. The religious and national repression imposed by the government in Baluchestan prompted him to flee Iran, and this escape ultimately led him down a path that resulted in his death.

The news and information regarding the extrajudicial execution of Mr. Mohammad Sa’id Torkmanzehi, known as Mullah Moaz, the son of Jamal Khatun and Kheir Mohammad, were obtained through an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with one of his relatives (14 Nov 2021 and 27 June 2022), along with his friend and fellow party member (27 Nov 2021, 7 Dec 2021, 25 Nov 2023), and Fars news agency (21 and 25 April 2015). Additional information about this assassination was gathered from the official website of Jaish al-Adl Edalat News (11 May 2015), the official news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran-IRNA (22 and 23 April 2015), articles related to the Jama’at Tablighi movement*, and a religious question-and-answer search engine.

Mr. Torkamanzehi, born on January 21, 1969, in Saravan city of Sistan and Baluchestan province, was a Baloch and a Sunni religious person. He was married and had eight children. Serving as the principal of the elementary school in Bam Posht village of Saravan, he was not only an educator but also an athlete actively involved in football. Additionally, he managed a football club in Saravan City. A relative described him as religious, knowledgeable, and deeply engaged in religious activities. His religious journey began at the age of 15 when he joined the Jama’at Tablighi (Society of Preachers) movement. (ABC interview, 27 Nov 2021). Engaging in meetings, particularly with the youth, he highlighted the struggles and national-religious discrimination faced by the people of Sistan and Baluchestan. Actively involved, he traveled to different cities, including Tehran, Mashhad, and Turkmen Sahara, to address these issues. Consequently, he faced various forms of pressure from security forces, including restrictions on leaving Sistan and Baluchestan province. (ABC interview, 27 June 2021)

According to one of his relatives, in March 2006, security forces planned to arrest Mr. Torkamanzehi by raiding his home in Bam Posht village, but he was not present. After learning of this incident, he fled the country illegally and moved to Pakistan by the end of March of the same year. He settled in the city of Panjgur near the Iran-Pakistan border and continued his religious activities within the Jama’at Tablighi framework. Through his friends' mediation, he had several meetings with Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of Jondollah, and eventually, at Abdolmalek's request in 2007-2008, he joined Jondollah. According to his friend, he had no connection with Jondollah before fleeing to Pakistan. (ABC interview, 25 Nov 2023)

Mr. Torkmanzehi joined the Jeish-al-Adl organization after its establishment in 2012. From 2014 until his death, he served as the spokesperson for Jeish-al-Adl. During this period, he conducted interviews with various TV channels discussing the economic, social, and political situation of the Baloch people and the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the people of Sistan and Baluchestan. (ABC interview, 27 Nov 2023 and Edalat news, 21 April 2015). As a teacher in these two parties, he taught Farsi language to the children of the members of this organization. He instructed social and educational issues to the members of these parties. (ABC interview, 25 Nov 2023).

According to Mr. Torkamanzehi's friend, “he was a religious, well-spoken, well-mannered, and studious person. He was a straightforward individual and did not pay much attention to the safety of his life.” (ABC interview, 27 Nov 2023)

The Situation of Iran’s Baluch Population

Baluch ethnics make up one to three percent of the country’s population and the majority in Sistan and Baluchistan, where 64-77 percent of residents live below the poverty line. Despite having abundant gas, oil, gold, and marine resources, approximately two thirds of residents lack access to clean drinking water. Economic policies have caused Sistan and Baluchistan Province to remain one of the most deprived provinces in terms of education, health, and food. (Boroumand Center research).

Iran's Baluch minority are mostly Sunni Muslims, whereas the majority of Iran’s population are Shi'a Muslims. Policies and actions from authorities have been restrictive toward the practice of Sunni Islam, e.g. limiting and even blocking the construction of Sunni mosques in majority-Sh’ia areas (including Tehran), arbitrary closure of Sunni prayer halls and celebratory gatherings, and violence from security forces towards groups of Sunnis praying in public (Minority Rights Group; Human Rights Watch: Religious Minorities; Al-Monitor).

Baluch activists have reported that government repression of Sunni Baluch groups had increased since February 1994, when locals gathered at Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan, to protest the destruction of a Sunni mosque in Mashhad. Government agents reportedly fired shots into the crowd and detained several activists. Over the years, several religious and political personalities inside and outside the country have been killed, including four Sunni clerics, who died under suspicious circumstances between 1993 and 1995-96. (Boroumand Center and United Nations research; Baluch Campaign article, February 14, 2016). Some Baluch opponents consider the emergence of armed opposition groups to be the result of the central government’s policies, including the repression of religious as well as peaceful civil activities (1), and being denied access to jobs. (Boroumand Center research; Minority Rights Group).

Jondollah, Jeish-al-Adl

The Popular Resistance Movement of Iran, known as Jondollah, was established in 2003. This group declared its goal as the struggle for achieving the religious and national rights of Baluch and Sunni people in Sistan Va Baluchestan province in Iran and emphasized that it is not a separatist group. In 2005, this group began a series of military operations against Islamic Republic forces during which dozens of the regime’s forces were captured or killed. In response, the Islamic Republic arrested and executed dozens of members of this group; military operations continue in Sistan Va Baluchestan. In an interview with the media outside of Iran, the leader of this group, Abdolmalek Rigi, rejected the government’s labels of “terrorist” and “foreign agent” and claimed that they began their struggle against the Islamic Republic to replace it with “a popular regime that recognizes the rights of all humans.” The news of this arrest was published by the Intelligence Ministry of Iran on February 23, 2010, and the circumstance of his arrest is yet unknown. Abdolmalek Rigi was hanged in the Evin prison on June 20, 2010. In early 2011 a number of Jondollah’s members under the leadership of Sallahudin Farroughi established the Jeish-al-Adl organization, implementing organizational and structural changes and reconsidering some of their former methods. Jeish-al-Adl describes itself as a Sunni group emphasizing “federalism for Iran and self-rule for Baluchistan” as well as “armed struggle against the Islamic Republic.”

Jama’at Tablighi (Society of Preachers) movement 

The Jama’at Tablighi (Society of Preachers) movement is a non-political movement without party organization and by-laws, following the Sunnis. It was formed in 1926 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi in the Mewat province near Delhi, India, with the aim of the non-violent propagation of Islam. He believed that the Prophet of Islam promoted the reform and progress of Islamic society through individual reform rather than the establishment of an Islamic government.

This method became the fundamental preaching doctrine of the Jamaat, officially warning activists and missionaries of the Jama’at Tablighi against sectarian tendencies and any arguments with the audience during invitation and promotion. The main idea behind forming Jama’at Tablighi was to revive Islam and instill Islamic values among Muslims through invitation and promotion.

This movement believes in propagating Islam face-to-face without relying on new technology. Members of this movement, through small preaching groups, visit mosques and universities to promote a return to pure Islamic values. The educational program of Jama’at Tablighi includes teaching the correct recitation of the Shahada (Islamic oath and creed), and Salah (Islamic prayer), fostering respect for Muslims, dedicating time to learning the rules of religion and teaching these principles to others. The main principles of this movement include the negation of involvement in politics, self-improvement through austerity as a prerequisite for propaganda, individualization of others through the preaching method, adherence to the role of faith, negation of differences between Islamic sects, avoiding divisive issues, freedom of attendance for those interested in Jamaat programs from all Islamic sects, a sense of responsibility towards the fate of the infidels, avoiding luxury, and rejecting the use of media and new communication devices.

This movement initially originated in India and later expanded to various parts of the world, including Iran. Critics argue that the lack of stringent participation conditions and a formal registration mechanism for Jama’at Tablighi makes it susceptible to exploitation by extremist Islamic groups. They may use it as a cover to advance their ideological teachings and recruit members globally. The primary center of Jama’at Tablighi in Iran is situated in Zahedan city, with an active presence in other Sunni regions such as Qeshm Island, Bandar Khamir, Turkmen Sahara, Khaf, Taibad, Torbate Jam, Sanandaj, Saravan, and Bushehr.

According to one of his comrades, he was a sincere person with a kind demeanor, and he had a way of attracting everyone with his sweet language. 

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation.

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.  

The Threat and Death of Mr. Torkamanzehi

Mr. Mohammad Sa'id Torkamanzehi was shot and killed between 9 and 10 pm on April 7, 2015, after leaving the Darussalam Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan. (Fars news agency and Edalat News 21 April 2015).

According to a reliable source, Mr. Torkamanzehi faced pressure and threats from Iran's security forces due to his involvement in the Jama’at Tablighi movement. This included his efforts in communicating with young people, inviting them to Sunni teachings, and traveling to various cities in Iran for preaching. Before he left Iran, authorities restricted his travel to Zahedan city and the cities of Kurdistan province. (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

In 2006, the Saravan Intelligence Department attempted to arrest Mr. Torkamanzehi, but their efforts were unsuccessful. A reliable source told ABC in an interview: "One Friday in late March 2006, the security forces, posing as an Education Department Inspector and claiming to be inspecting schools in disadvantaged areas, went to the Bam Posht village school to apprehend him. However, Mr. Torkamanzehi was not present. Upon learning that the department's inspector had arrived for an inspection and a meeting, he grew suspicious as inspections do not typically occur on Fridays, an official holiday. He then fled to the border areas between Pakistan and Iran, evading arrest." (ABC interview 27 June 2022)

According to a person close to Mr. Torkamanzehi, in 2008, he faced numerous threats, including receiving threatening emails for his arrest and death, from Iranian security forces. One individual even claimed to be the governor of Saravan. In 2010 and 2013, the Iranian government allegedly hired several Baloch individuals to assassinate Mr. Torkamanzehi due to his TV interviews as the spokesperson of Jaish al-Adl. However, their attempts failed, and they were apprehended by Jondollah. These individuals confessed to receiving money and weapons from the Iranian government. (ABC interview 27 June 2022)

According to an informed individual, during Mr. Torkamanzehi's membership in Jondollah and Jaish al-Adl, the Iranian government regularly detained his relatives for varying durations, ranging from several days to several months, as a tactic to exert pressure on him. (ABC interview 27 June 2022)

Mr. Torkamanzehi's friend, in an interview with the Boroumand Center, described his assassination: "He attended the Isha prayer (night prayer) at Darussalam Mosque in the Banaras district of Karachi, Pakistan. Upon leaving the mosque and riding his motorcycle back home at 9:00 p.m., he was fatally shot from behind by two individuals on a motorcycle." The body of Mr. Torkamanzehi was buried in Karachi, Pakistan. (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

Mr. Torkamanzehi's family held an informal memorial ceremony for him despite the security forces' threat not to organize it, and many people participated in the event. (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

Officials’ Reaction

Reaction of Iranian officials

Following the assassination of Mr. Torkamanzehi, the Deputy of Internal Security at the Ministry of Intelligence, in an interview with the IRNA news agency, affirmed, "The strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Ministry of Intelligence in the region remains steadfast, and any incidents threatening security will not be tolerated." He also commented: "Sa'id Torkamanzehi, known as Mullah Moaz, the spokesperson of the Jaish al-Adl terrorist group, involved in numerous operations against the border guards of the Islamic Republic, had perished on April 7th this year between 9:00 PM and 10:00 PM near his residence in Karachi, Pakistan." (22 April 2015)

After the assassination of Mr. Torkamanzehi, the Fars news agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, alleged that, in his role as the spokesman for Jaish al-Adl, he communicated with intelligence officers from Saudi Arabia. The claim stated that several meetings took place in the cities of Quetta and Karachi in Pakistan and the Al-Arabiya news television channel was provided to Mr. Torkamanzehi for his interviews and promotional activities. (25 April 2015)

Simultaneously, according to an informed source, following Mr. Torkamanzehi's assassination, Iranian security forces contacted one of his relatives. They expressed condolences and stated, "We were not involved in this, and we did not desire such a fate for him. Our preference was for him to return to Iran." (ABC interview 27 June 2022)

The news of Mr. Torkamanzehi's murder was widely covered in both official and unofficial Iranian media. Some outlets suggested that his killing might be linked to internal disputes within Jaish al-Adl or conflicts between this organization and Jaish al-Nasr*** or Ansar al-Furqan****. (Fars news agency 21 April 2015, Irna news agency 22 April 2015)

The Fars news agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed in a report that Mr. Torkamanzehi had formally sought a letter of protection to return to Iran before his death. Additionally, it stated that he had sent his children to Iran. However, he was killed shortly after making this request. (25 April 2015)

According to one of Mr. Torkamanzehi's relatives, since his family returned to Iran, the security forces have been consistently contacting them and monitoring them in some way. (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

Reaction of Pakistani officials

According to Mr. Torkamanzehi's friend, Pakistan did not take any action in response to the assassination of Mr. Torkamanzehi. (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

Family’s Reaction

According to one of Mr. Torkamanzehi's relatives, his family in Pakistan did not take any action regarding his assassination and returned to Iran a year after this incident. Due to the security atmosphere created for the family members in Iran, they felt that pursuing legal action for the assassination of Mr. Torkamanzehi would pose greater risks to the family. The source also refuted Fars news agency's assertion that Mr. Torkamanzehi sought a letter of protection, clarifying that it was his son who made the request, not Mr. Torkamanzehi himself. (ABC interview 27 June 2022)

Impacts on Family

According to Mr. Torkamanzehi's friend, "His assassination had a significant impact on the family. They lost their breadwinner and faced economic challenges. His family was denied subsidies, and his children struggled to find government employment. In school, his children are labeled as the offspring of terrorists, and even in banks and government offices, they face such discrimination. These issues have deeply upset them, causing emotional distress, and have led to the breaking apart of his family." (ABC interview 27 Nov 2021)

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 * (1) Rameez A. (2021). Religious tourism: an insight into the Islamic tourism of Jama’at Tablighi. Epra International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research (Ijmr) (20210914): 149-153 149–153. https://doi.org/10.36713/epra8443 

**(2)Lone, A. (2018). Jama’at Tablighi: Ideological Structure. International Journal of Research in Social Sciences, 8, 1, pp.1001-1011

*** The Jaish al-Nasr organization was a faction that branched off from the Jaish al-Adl organization. Internal strife within Jaish al-Adl escalated after the hostage-taking incident involving five Iranian border guards in February 2014, which resulted in the execution of one guard. In May 2014, due to heightened internal disagreements, the political wing of Jaish al-Adl separated from the military wing. This schism led to the formation of another group named Jaish al-Nasr, under the leadership of Abdol Rauf Rigi. The primary point of contention was related to the execution of the border guard and differences in decision-making processes.

****Ansar al-Furqan is a Sunni Baloch militia group located in Sistan and Baluchestan province. It was established in 2013 through the amalgamation of the Movement of the Partisans of Iran (Harakat Ansar Iran) and Hizbul-Furqan.