Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Mohammad Kia Kiamehr

About

Age: 34
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: May 24, 2016
Location of Killing: Central Prison (Nedamatgah), Karaj, Alborz Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Hanging
Charges: Drug possession
Age at time of alleged offense: 30

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

The judge decided about the fate of Mohammad Kia Kiamehr (Khezr) without evidence relying only on his own knowledge (the knowledge of the judge). Muhammad was Sunni.

The news of the execution of Mr. Mohammad Kiya (known as Khezr) Kiamehr, son of Karim, along with three other individuals* was obtained from Iran newspaper (June 21, 2016). Additional information was drawn from Abdorrahman Bouroumand Center’s investigation, based on the review of case documents, interviews with informed sources (August 23, 2018, September 15, 2018, and May 22, 2022). 

According to available information, 35-year-old Mr. Kiamehr was born in HaMr.an village of Sardasht in West Azerbaijan and lived in Tehran's Sadeqieh (Aryashahr) area and was engaged He studied up to fifth grade and was a builder and bought and sold houses in Karaj, Alborz Province. Mr. Kiamehr was also licensed to import and export ceramic tiles to Iraq. (Interview with an informed source - August 23, 2018). 

The case of Mr. Kiamehr was related to a 2011 drug-related crime. 

Arrest and detention 

According to an informed source, in June, July and August 2011Mr., 10 to 12 anti-narcotics agents entered Mr. Kiamehr’s construction site in the Mardabad area of Karaj  with several people in plain clothes, and according to the testimony of Mr. Kiamehr and the workers who were present, arrested him after beating, slapping, and kicking him, which resulted in a broken arm. During his arrest, one of the officers even told him: "You ought to be executed given that you’re Sunni." Mr. Kiamehr's house was also searched on the day of his arrest. The agents found no evidence but took his Peugeot (automobile). Finally, the agents took Mr. Kiamehr to the Narcotics Control Department in Karaj. (ABC interview – Sep. 15, 2018) 

Mr. Kiamehr stayed in this detention center for 18 days but was not allowed to visit or make phone calls and was constantly interrogated. The interrogators beat him to get a confession. 

After being interrogated, Mr. Kiamehr was transferred to ward three of Karaj Central Penitentiary, where prisoners using drugs were held. He was allowed visitors, only behind the cubicle once a week and in person once every two weeks. His lawyer met with him only once to sign a power of attorney. (ABC interview – Sep. 15, 2018) 

Mr. Kiamehr was in prison for five years. On May 21, 2016, he visited with his family for the last time. 

The agents of the anti-narcotics headquarters arrested him while beating, slapping, and kicking him, which resulted in a broken arm.

Trial 

The second branch of the Karaj Islamic Revolutionary Court tried Mr. Kiamehr in three sessions. He had two lawyers during the trial, but the judge did not allow them to speak and they had to submit a defense brief to the judge. (ABC interview – Sep. 15, 2018) 

Charges 

The Islamic Revolutionary Court of Karaj charged Mr. Kiamehr and his co-accused with "complicity in the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances and possession of narcotics." (Judgment of the Islamic Revolution Court of Karaj – May 27, 2014) 

In a situation where minimum procedural guarantees are not observed, and the defendants are deprived of a fair trial, the accuracy of the crimes attributed to them is uncertain. International human rights organizations point to reports that, in some cases, the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran falsely accuse their opponents (including political, civil, union, or minority activists) of drug trafficking or committing public and sexual crimes and execute them alongside ordinary criminals. Thousands of people accused of drug trafficking have been sentenced to death based on a judicial process inconsistent with international standards. Among them were those executed based on the 1987 law, which imposed the death penalty on traffickers who possessed a certain amount of drugs (5 kilograms of hashish or opium, more than 30 grams of heroin, codeine, or methadone). The number of people sentenced to death based on false accusations is unclear. 

Evidence of Guilt 

The evidence against Mr. Kiamehr, his co-accused's confessions, the defendant's fiancé's statements, the finding of a blue notebook, the anti-narcotic police agent’s statements, the discovery of a sample of (ephedrine) pills in Mr. Kiamehr's car, and the discovery of two kilos and 800 grams of methamphetamine-type psychoactive substances and the storage of one kilo and 300 grams of ephedrine tablets from prefabrication to produce psychoactive substances. Alborz province anti-narcotics agents had discovered the above mentioned industrial drug manufacturing workshop along with ephedrine bottles and tablets in the home of the primary defendant, Mr. Mohsen Danahur. (Karaj Islamic Revolution Court judgement - May 27, 2014) 

According to the Karaj Islamic Revolutionary Court, the confessions of the primary defendant and the discovery of some psychotropic substance pills in Mr. Kiamehr's car were the court's evidence for his participation in the production of psychotropic substances. The court also referred to the contents of a blue notebook which contained the method of making psychotropic substances, and Mr. Kiamehr's fiancé statement about having witnessed Mr. Danahurr giving a package containing five hundred thousand Tomans to Mr. Kiamehr. (Judgment of the Islamic Revolution Court of Karaj - June 6, 2014) 

International human rights organizations have repeatedly condemned the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government for the systematic use of severe torture and solitary confinement to extract confessions from prisoners and have questioned the reliability of the confessions obtained from the accused under pressure. 

Defense 

Based on available information, there is no convincing evidence against Mr. Kiamehr, and he has denied his relationship and cooperation with the primary defendant. On July 25, 2015, in a letter to the Supreme Court, the primary defendant requested that Mr. Kiamehr’s charges be dismissed. In this letter, he wrote that his statements and confessions “in different stages of the proceedings in the case of Mr. Mohammad-Kia Kiamehr, son of Karim, against him, were pure lies, and the allegation of his participation in the preparation and possession of narcotic drugs was unjust, unacceptable and contrary to the truth.” He also stressed that “I feel nothing but regret for attributing the [ownership of the] methamphetamines to him, which has caused him humiliation and indignity, and led to his condemnation.” (Mr. Danahur's official letter to the President of the Supreme Court – July 28, 2015). 

In his defense, Mr. Kiamehr's lawyer pointed to the dearth of evidence and court investigation against his client and asked the court to acquit him. Based on the defense brief on file at the Boroumand Center, he wrote to the prosecutor protesting the indictment issued by branch two of the Islamic Revolution Court: 

"At first glance, it seems that the honorable judge has decided to issue a decision by relying on his knowledge, the ‘knowledge of the judge’**. However, it is necessary to consider the conditions of citing the judge's knowledge. "Knowledge" is also equivalent to "certainty" and “satisfied” in terms of principles and jurisprudence. It is the opposite of "suspicion", and it appears that the documents referenced by the esteemed judge usually do not create certainty that a crime has been committed. Until there is no certainty, the principle of acquittal must be applied. A death sentence cannot be issued based on speculation. 

"In the sixth line of the issued ruling, it is mentioned that the ‘discovery of psychoactive substances’ does not imply participation in the manufacture and production of psychoactive methamphetamine substances." He adds: "In the sixth line, ‘extensive investigations by drug enforcement agents’ were also mentioned as one of the pillars of the verdict. So, the question raised is, on which page of the case and investigation has the client's manufacture and production of psychoactive substances been confirmed and identified?” 

"First and foremost, the primary defendant's statements (who is the defendant himself) cannot imply the commission of the crime of participation in the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances by the accessory defendant; and second, the confession of the primary defendant, based on the meaning of the word ‘confession’, which is indeed "news which is to one's own detriment" only refers to the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances by the primary defendant and not the accessory defendant (i.e. the client). In addition, in writing, the primary defendant admitted once in prison that he lied, and the accused accessory was not involved in the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances. But following this written confession, once again in court, he said that he had been deceived, and as a result, he declared his statements against the accessory accused to be lies. It is worth noting that, at present, the primary accused is willing to testify again that he lied that the accessory accused participated with him in manufacturing and producing psychoactive substances. 

The primary accused is now saying that he has a guilty conscience and that he caused the client's death sentence to be issued with his lie. Hence, for the sake of God almighty, he requests the proper judicial authority to order his statements to be heard once more. And regarding the discovery of the blue notebook, he also says that his client has denied the attribution of this notebook and its handwriting to himself and "requests to be referred to an expert to clarify the truth, in that it was the court did not effectuate this request and secondly, the contents of this notebook also, do not imply the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances by my client." 

The Defense brief also rejected the "narcotics agent's statement", which was mentioned among the documents in the judge's knowledge. He said: "The reality is that the said agent claimed that he heard from behind the door that the accessory accused told the primary accused ‘, You take responsibility for everything; I will solve your problem if I am released’. To begin with, it is unclear what the phrase ‘you take responsibility for everything’ means. Ephedrine tablets or psychedelic production, or both? Therefore, it cannot simply be said that the accessory defendant meant to take responsibility for the manufacture and production of psychedelic drugs. Secondly, the methods of acquiring knowledge must be conventional; hearing someone's voice from behind a door is not a conventional way to rationalize proof of guilt and sanctification of the principle of innocence. How is it known that the primary accused did not tell the accessory that ‘you should take responsibility for everything’? How is the agent mentioned above sure that the voice was the voice of the accessory when he did not see his face? 

"In the eighth line of the issued verdict: "The phrase ‘discovery of a sample of uncovered pills from the defendant's car’ is stated that firstly, the discovery of a sample of these pills in the defendant's car does not indicate anything special and does not indicate the manufacture and production of psychoactive substances at all; and secondly, these pills also have medicinal properties and are used by bodybuilders. Discovering a sample of them in a person's possession does not indicate the production of methamphetamine." 

At the end of the defense, Mr. Kiamehr's lawyer asked for an acquittal and removal of the confiscation of his client’s assets: "Given that the client has a license to import and export ceramic tiles to Iraq, and his current assets are the result of around-the-clock efforts in the mentioned field, the confiscation of these properties as the proceeds of crime does not seem fair. Because firstly, the client has only committed the crime of possessing ephedrine tablets, and the said property cannot be the result of this crime. all of the evidence and documentation and bills of transactions proving engagement in commercial transactions and engagement in the business of import and export of ceramics and tiles by my client were attached to the case file at trial. There is therefore no doubt that these assets were not obtained as a result of the commission of the crime and are the fruit of my client’s relentless efforts and work. Consequently, we request that these assets be released." (Defense text of Mr. Mohammad-Kia Kiamehr’s lawyer). 

In an interview with the Iran newspaper, the Karaj General and Revolutionary Prosecutor stressed that Mr. Kiamehr and other defendants had "multiple criminal charges, including drug trafficking". In contrast, in the Karaj Islamic Revolution Court, Mr. Kiamehr specifies that Mr. Kiamehr does not have a criminal record. (Islamic Revolution Court of Karaj judgement – May 22, 2014)

Judgment 

On September 7, 2014, relying on Article 211 (judge's knowledge), the judge at Branch 2 of the Islamic Revolution Court of Karaj convicted Mr. Mohammad Kia Kiamehr. Based on paragraph six of article eight of the law amending the law on combating narcotic drugs and paragraph three of articles five and four additions of the amendment law ***, for participation in the manufacturing, production and possession of psychoactive substances, he was sentenced, on the one count, to execution and confiscation of property resulting from the same crime, and for involvement in possession of ephedrine drugs to two years of imprisonment and 45 lashed and paying a fine of 20 million Rials. This ruling was approved by the Supreme Court. 

Mr. Mohammad Kia Kiamehr was hanged along with three others on May 24, 2016, at the Karaj Central Prison, without his family or lawyer present. 

Before the court’s ruling, the anti-narcotics agents had already confiscated Mr. Kiamehr's house and car. Mr. Kiamehr’s body was handed over to his family and buried in his hometown of HaMr.an village.

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* Mika'il Shahbazi, Gholamreza Ahmadi, Ruhollah Roshangar.
** Mr. Kiamehr's lawyer explains in this regard: "Article 211 of the Islamic Penal Code approved in 1392 (2013) defines the knowledge of a judge: "The knowledge of a judge is the certainty obtained from the detailed documentation presented to him. In cases where the document of the verdict is the knowledge of the judge, he is obliged to explicitly stipulate the presumption and the documented judge-made laws about his knowledge in the verdict. Methods of obtaining knowledge of the judge in a criminal incident concerning the time and place of the crime are two groups. The first part of the investigation is when the knowledge of the judge is acquired outside of the investigation and trial sessions, which is not so in the present case; but the second part is the investigation when the judge, after considering the complaint plan and reasons, the evidence and proofs of the accusation and listening to the defendant's defenses and arguments and the evidence of the accusation and by fully examining the contents of the case and their reasons and listening to the statements of the parties to the case, it will be known whether the documents of the crime against the accused are correct or not. In the notation to article 211 of the new Islamic Penal Code, it is stated that cases such as expert theory, site inspection, local investigations, informed statements, reports of bailiffs and other evidence and presumption that are usually informative can be considered as documents of the judge's knowledge and from this note it can be understood that the document of knowledge of a judge is generic and not subjective. These documents should be informative for every other judge.” 
*** Article 8, paragraph 2 of the law on the amendment of the anti-narcotics law: more than 30 grams, execution and confiscation of property resulting from the same crime. Article 5, Paragraph 3 and 4 of the addendum: more than one gram to four grams, from eight million to twenty million rials fine, two to five years imprisonment, and thirty to seventy lashes.

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