Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Hossein Naji

About

Nationality: Iran
Religion: Baha'i
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: August 21, 1980
Location of Killing: Naft Street, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Enforced disappearance

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Detentions, interrogations, and trials: 1979-1980

Pre-trial detentions

The charges upon which the accused were arraigned were often extremely broad. Defendants generally had no access to legal counsel nor to their file and the evidence against them prior to the trial.

Trials

Witnesses might be called, or the statement of persons with relevant information read into the court’s record. Accusation witnesses could come forward the day of the trial to give evidence against the accused, but in most cases, defense witnesses were not allowed in court. There was no automatic right of a defendant to cross-examine witnesses or to know the source of the evidence against him. The defendant had an opportunity to state his side of the matter and attempt to refute what was said against him, but the final decision was solely up to the discretion of the religious judge.

Appeal processes

The judgments of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. The convicts were generally executed within a few hours of the judgment.

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1.

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion.

 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law.

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been

convicted or acquitted.

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment
  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Dr. Naji was a reputable physician, both in his own medical practice and at Tehran’s Misaghieh Hospital. News of his and the Hospital’s “special services and humanitarian efforts” had been published in several newspapers.

Information regarding the killing of Dr. Hossein Naji, son of Haj Gholamhossein, was obtained from documents published on the Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website (Date of research: July 23, 2021). Additional information about this case was obtained from an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with Shahin Milani, human rights activist and son of a disappeared member of the Baha’is Second Spiritual Assembly (June 12, 2017); the book Shohada-ye Amr-e Elahi (“Martyrs of the Baha’i Faith”) by Ariana Khadem-Mahmudi, Juxta Publications (2012); the book One Hundred and Sixty Years of Fighting the Baha’i Faith, by Fereydun Vahman, Sweden, Baran Publications (2010-11); the book Sahifeye Nur, Ayatollah Khomeini, Volume 17 (May 28, 1982); Jomhuri-e Eslami newspaper (January 27, 1982); Kayhan newspaper (October 19, 1981); Ettela’at newspaper (July 2, 1979, December 22, 1981); Andalib Magazine, Second Year, Volume 7, pages 49 to 52 (Summer 1983); Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website (July 23, 2021, June 3, 1980, June 17, 2019, August 23, 1980, October 23, 1980, November 1, 1980); BBC Persian website (October 11, 2015); Asoo website (August 9, September 6, and October 6, 2015). 

Mr. Naji was born in Tehran in 1924-25 into a Baha’i family. (The Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website, July 23, 2021). He was the son of a Shiite cleric who had converted to the Baha’i faith. Mr. Naji graduated from Tehran University Medical School. He was married and had a son and a daughter. Mr. Naji went to England on a military scholarship and studied at the London Royal Medical College between 1957 and 1961-62, and returned to Iran a cardiovascular specialist, and began treating patients in the Armed Forces and at the hospital. Mr. Naji was the first cardiovascular specialist who introduced the Iranian medical community to the procedure known as angioplasty. He later obtained another scholarship for medical research in the United States, and started his own private clinic in Tehran upon his return in 1964-65. (The Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website, July 23, 2021; Iran Wire, December 27, 2020). 

Dr. Naji was a reputable physician, both in his own medical practice and at Tehran’s Misaghieh Hospital. News of his and the Hospital’s “special services and humanitarian efforts” had been published in several newspapers. (Ettela’at newspaper, July 2, 1979). According to an Iran Wire report, in 1978-79, he retired from the military after 32 years, with the rank of colonel. Mr. Naji’s daughter has been quoted as saying that “the main reason why her father contented himself with the rank of colonel was that Dr. Ayadi, the Shah’s physician, had told her father that he wanted to present him to the Shah as his successor, but that the Shah’s doctor had to have the rank of brigadier-general … Since her father was not interested, he retired with the rank of colonel so that he would not have to accept the position of Physician to the Royal Court”. (Iran Wire, December 27, 2020). Dr. Naji was the Army Cardiac Center’s (I.C.C.U) Chief of Emergency Services; the Center was one of the Army’s more sensitive centers, with a great deal of responsibility. According to Mr. Mashalla Moshrefzadeh, a friend of Mr. Naji’s, his great wish was to leave the Armed Forces somehow because “he wanted to first emigrate and serve the Baha’i faith, and then continue treating patients”. (Andalib Magazine, 1983). Mr. Naji’s name was mentioned in a list of 168 Baha’is fired from the military, and according to a confidential letter from the Ministry of War and Defense to Sepah Bank (Servicemen Affairs Administration), published by the Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran, his monthly salary had been cut off. (The Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran, June 3, 1980). 

Mr. Naji’s name was mentioned in a list of 168 Baha’is fired from the military, and according to a confidential letter from the Ministry of War and Defense to Sepah Bank (Servicemen Affairs Administration), published by the Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran, his monthly salary had been cut off.

After the 1979 Revolution, suppression of the Baha’is intensified, especially the professionals. Misaghieh Hospital, where Mr. Naji was an active physician, was expropriated by the Islamic regime without a court order and the purge of Baha’is employed there began. Dr. Naji was among the physicians who were banned from working at the Hospital after the first few months of 1979. (Iran Wire, December 27, 2020). 

Mr. Mashallah Moshrefzadeh, one of Mr. Naji’s friends said that he was “an articulate and eloquent speaker with an extraordinary memory in memorizing [Baha’i] Holy Scripture and works”. (Andalib Magazine, 1983). 

Prior to leaving Iran, Mr. Naji was a member of the [city of] Rasht local Baha’i Spiritual Assembly. After migrating to England, he became a member of the Watford local Spiritual Assembly. Upon his return to Iran, he became a member of the Tehran Local Spiritual Assembly, and was subsequently elected to the Iran National Spiritual Assembly. (The Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website, July 23, 2021). 

A few months after the Islamic Revolution, Mr. Naji went to Germany to visit his children. Upon his return, unidentified individuals attacked his home, and since they were unable to find him, they beat his wife and took her to an unknown location. Ms. Vajdieh Naji was kept hostage at Evin Prison for 17 days so that her spouse would turn himself in. Mr. Naji made tremendous efforts to have his wife released in those days. (Iran Wire, December 27, 2020). 

In a letter published on the Iran Wire website, he confirmed that he had contacted Ahmad Khomeini, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Founder of the Islamic Republic, in order to follow up on his wife’s situation. In describing this phone call, Mr. Naji wrote: “I told him I was ready to be executed as a Baha’i in front of the hospital where his father was being treated, but that I was not willing to turn myself in to unidentified groups. I also said that I obeyed [the exigencies of] the State, in accordance with my religious beliefs, and that he therefore had to name the officials to whom I was supposed to surrender.” (Iran Wire, December 27, 2020). 

A few months after the Islamic Revolution, Mr. Naji went to Germany to visit his children. Upon his return, unidentified individuals attacked his home, and since they were unable to find him, they beat his wife and took her to an unknown location. 

Mr. Naji wrote letters to Ayatollah Khomeini, then-President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, then-Minister of Health Hadi Manafi, Ayatollah Qoddussi, Islamic Revolution Prosecutor General, etc., in which he described several attacks by armed individuals on his home and the arrest of his wife, and asked that the matter be prosecuted. The authorities did not pay attention to his request, however, and no official government organ accepted responsibility for his wife’s detention. According to Mr. Naji’s wife, several armed individuals came to their home four separate times. On one occasion, they came under the pretext of “finding weapons”; the other times, however, they had come looking for Mr. Naji. (A Forbidden Religion, Page 29; BBC Persian website, October 11, 2015). 

The Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Background

Authorities of the Islamic Republic have subjected the members of the Baha'i religious community of Iran (the largest minority, with approximately three hundred thousand members) [1] to systematic harassment and persecution, depriving them of their most fundamental human rights. The Baha'i religion is not recognized under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and Iranian authorities refer to it as a heresy. As a result, the Baha'is have been denied the rights associated with the status of a religious minority; they cannot profess and practice their faith and are banned from public functions. Discrimination under the law and in practice has subjected them to abuse and violence. [2]

They have been banned from any activities in the public realm, and their political, social, and economic rights are constantly violated. Baha’is are deprived of the right to education, particularly higher education, and are banned from holding jobs in the government or in government-affiliated entities. They are not even safe and secure in owning private businesses, and in many cases, their places of business have either been attacked by individuals and groups affiliated with the government or are shut down for refusing to work on religious holy days. The Iranian regime arrests Baha’is on trumped up charges on a regular basis. 

Persecution of Baha’is in Iran is not specific to the time of the Islamic Republic but it was in this era that it was amplified and institutionalized. During the Revolution itself, supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini attacked Baha’i homes and businesses and in certain instances, even committed murder. On the eve of his return from France to Iran, in response to a question regarding political and religious freedom of Baha’is under the rule of an Islamic government, Ayatollah Khomeini stated: “They are a political party; they are harmful and detrimental. They will not be acceptable.” The interviewer asked another question: “Will they be free to perform their religious rites?” The Ayatollah responded: “No.” Khomeini had previously “spoken of the Baha’i threat to the Shah’s regime, Islam, national unity, and national security” in various speeches. (Asoo website, October 6, 2015). 

Baha’i National Spiritual Assembly After the Islamic Revolution 

In the organizational structure of the Baha’i community, the institution of the National Spiritual Assembly is a body composed of nine individuals that are elected annually with the votes of adult Baha’is in each country. This institution tends to the affairs and issues of the Baha’i community on the national level. The National Spiritual Assembly has the responsibility of guiding, coordinating, and moving forward the activities of each country’s local spiritual assemblies, and establishing contact with Beit-al-Adl (“House of Justice”), the international council of the Baha’i faith, the highest decision-making authority in the world Baha’i community. 

In 1980 and 1981, the First, Second, and Third National Spiritual Assemblies, as well as local Baha’i spiritual assemblies in various cities, including Tehran, Yazd, Hamedan, and Tabriz, were severely persecuted and the majority of their members were executed. In “The Final Message of the Iran National Spiritual Assembly to the Friends of the Country”, the Third Baha’i National Spiritual Assembly, abiding by the principle of obeying the government, announced the closure of the Baha’i organizations, and at the same time, sent an open letter to two thousand well-known and high-ranking government figures asking an end to the arrest, detention, torture, execution, and injustice against Baha’is. (BBC Persian website, October 11, 2015). 

Judicial officials of the Islamic Republic have come up with [unreasonable and unacceptable] justifications for the persecution and the execution of the members of the National Spiritual Assemblies. In a speech on May 28, 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini said: “The Baha’is are not a religion, they’re a [political] party; it’s a party that was supported by Britain in the past, and now it’s being supported by America. They are spies.” (Sahifeye Noor, Volume 17, May 28, 1982).

The Baha’is deny the charge of relations with countries such as Israel, citing “the religious principle of ‘the requirement of staying out of politics’. They say that religious relations know no bounds, and that the Iranian Baha’i Spiritual Assembly has done nothing, and taken no action, against the Islamic Republic”. (Asoo website, August 9, 2015). 

It must be noted that the Beit-al-Adl was established in Haifa at a time where there was no such country as the state of Israel. The founders of the Baha’i faith, Baha’ollah in particular, had no choice but to leave Iran in the latter part of the 19thCentury under pressure and persecution, and to turn to Turkey and Iraq. 

Baha’ollah did not escape persecution under the Ottoman Empire either. He was imprisoned for a time in present day Turkey and was released in 1908. In 1909, Baha’ollah transferred the body of Ali Mohammad Baab – who had been executed in Iran in 1850 – to Beit-al-Adl. A short time before the start of the First World War, Baha’ollah settled as the leader of the Baha’is in Haifa, a city where Beit-al-Adl is located, and began to tend to the affairs and the issues of the Baha’i community. After World War I, when Palestine was under the British Mandate, the Baha’i community remained safe from persecution. (Boroumand Center research). 

Arrest and death of Mr. Hossein Naji 

On August 21, 1980, the First National Spiritual Assembly held a joint meeting with members of the Deputy Council, Yussef Abbasian Milani and Heshmatollah Rohani, in order to discuss the situation of imprisoned Baha’is in the cities of Yazd and Hamedan. The Assembly members’ concerns were justified because the members of these two cities’ Spiritual Assemblies, all of whom had been arrested in the previous weeks, were executed in 1980 and 1981. Around 4 o’clock in the afternoon of August 21, “armed Revolutionary Guards” attacked the Assembly, and took away Hossein Naji and the other members of the National Spiritual Assembly, Manuher Qa'em Maqami, Hushang Mahmudi, Ebrahim Rahmani, Abdolhossein Taslimi, Ata'ollah Moqarebi, Yussef Khorassani Qadimi, Kambiz Sadeqzadeh Milani, Bahiyeh Naderi, and the two members of the Deputy Council. There was no trace of them afterward, ever again. (Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website, July 3, 2018). 

Given the execution of the members of the Second Assembly and most of the members of the Third Assembly, which convened after the First, the Baha’i community has no doubt that they were all murdered. (Shohada-ye Amr-e Elahi, p. 156; BBC Persian website, October 11, 2015). 

There is no information regarding Mr. Hossein Naji’s burial site.

Officials’ Reaction 

The Islamic Republic authorities (official or not) never officially accepted responsibility for the arrest and execution of the members of the Baha’is First National Spiritual Assembly. Nevertheless, in a meeting the spouses of the disappeared had with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on September 2, 1980, the then-Head of the Parliament claimed that “these Baha’is are in detention for their participation in the Nojeh coup d’état”. These charges were vehemently denied by the Baha’is. One week later, on September 10, 1980, Rafsanjani stated that the order to arrest the 11 Baha’is had been issued, but that their families were not allowed to visit with them until the conclusion of preliminary investigations. He gave assurances that they would be freed if they were found to be innocent. On September 18, 1980, the country’s Prosecutor General announced that 9 Baha’i individuals had been arrested on charges of participating in the recent failed coup attempt. (The book One Hundred and Sixty Years of Fighting the Baha’i Faith, p. 426). 

Addressing the execution of the members of the Baha’is Second National Spiritual Assembly, Ahmad Tavakkoli, Minister of Labor and government Spokesman, stated: “Not only do we not execute Baha’is simply because they’re Baha’i, we also do not kill communists just because they’re communists. We do not consider holding a belief to be a crime. But if an individual, with any type of belief, wants to take action against the interests of the people, that individual will be tried and punished in accordance with the law. We will not allow people who take money from Israel and engage in espionage in Iran to remain in this country; we will deal with them in the harshest possible manner and it makes no difference if they are called Moslem or non-Moslem.” (Jomhuri Eslami newspaper, January 27, 1982). 

Additionally, Ayatollah Mohammadi Gilani, the Chief Shari’a Judge of the Central (Tehran) Islamic Revolutionary Courts stated this about Baha’is: “There are two kinds of Mortad (“apostates”), Fetri apostate and Melli apostate. Fetri apostate is one who was born into Islam, that is, one or both of his/her parents were Moslem at the time of birth, and Melli apostate is one whose birth was not in that fashion. The punishment for a Fetri apostate is death and his/her repentance will not be accepted.” (Kayhan newspaper, October 19, 1981). 

The anti-Baha’i statements of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Guardian High Scholar and founder of the Islamic Republic, such as “they are apostates … they must be eliminated” (Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website, June 17, 2019), as well as general policies where anti-Baha’ism has been institutionalized, alongside charges that were brought in the Baha’is Second National Spiritual Assembly trial, clarify to a great extent the motive for the killing of the members of the Baha’is First National Spiritual Assembly. 

A video of the trial session of 7 male members of the Baha’is Second National Spiritual Assembly has been published in recent years [3]. The defendants at this trial were faced with a wide spectrum of charges such as “waging psychological war and propaganda against the [Islamic Republic] Regime” which included collecting documentation and correspondence with international institutions for the purpose of seeking justice, as well as the content of the Baha’is National Spiritual Assembly’s correspondence in the 1960’s and not condemning Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians. (Asoo website, August 9, 2015). 

Follow ups on the attacks against the life and property of Baha’is, before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was done by members of local and national spiritual assemblies. Documenting the evidence of violations of Baha’is’ rights in various eras, members of these assemblies first corresponded with governmental authorities, and if their actions in seeking justice did not bear fruit, they would correspond with international institutions to seek remedies. The Islamic Republic authorities considered the Baha’is’ corresponding and working with officials of the previous regime, as well as their correspondence with international institutions, as propaganda against the Islamic Regime.

Familys’ Reaction

After four decades, family members of the Baha’is First National Spiritual Assembly still do not have any definitive information about the fate of their loved ones. Following up on their cases, they met with various officials of the Judiciary and Legislative Branches: While expressing a lack of knowledge as to what had happened, the latter stated that the government was not at fault in the kidnapping of these individuals, and attributed the actions to obstinate groups that did not answer to anyone. (Radio Zamaneh, December 21, 2013). The family members have stated that they had made great efforts in the first months after “the disappearance” of their loved ones to obtain information. Vajdieh Rezvani said: “ … We went everywhere you could possibly imagine: This prison, that prison, to Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Montazeri’s son, Ayatollah Behjat, Ayatollah Gilani, and they all said they did not know anything and had no information … ” (BBC Persian website, October 11, 2015). 

In a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, the then-leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated November 1, 1980, the families of the 11 detained Baha’is, including Ms. Vajdieh Naji (Mr. Naji’s spouse), alluded to the lack of news about their loved ones and emphasized that “the only reason they were arrested was because they were Baha’i”. They asked him to issue a decree to the effect that “the necessary investigations about these 11 individuals be conducted and that the means of their release” be secured. They further asked that “arrangements be made that these individuals’ family members be apprised of their place of detention so that they can visit them prior to their release, and stop worrying." (Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website). In a letter dated October 23, 1980, to Abolhassan Bani Sadr, President; Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, Minister of the Interior; Ayatollah Qoddussi, Revolutionary Prosecutor General; Ayatollah Mussavi Ardebili, Islamic Republic Prosecutor General; and Ayatollah Heshemi Rafsanjani, Head of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (“Majless” or Parliament), the families emphasized once again that the only reason for the arrest of the 11 individuals was that they were Baha’i, and asked that these officials order that “investigations be conducted into the manner and place of the aforementioned individuals’ arrest, and arrangements be made for their release.” (Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website). 

In a letter to Ayatollah Qoddussi, Islamic Republic Revolutionary Prosecutor General, dated August 23, 1980, the detainees’ families stated the names of the 9 detained members of the Baha’is First National Spiritual Assembly, and further stated that they had no news of where their loved ones were being detained, and added: “What we know for certain is that they were arrested for being followers of the Baha’i faith. Pursuant to [their] religious tenets, Baha’is are prohibited from interfering in political affairs, and consider obedience to the government a definitive obligation. It is self-evident and certain that any aspersion or slander, and any injustice, will not be to the Almighty’s liking.” (Archives of Baha’i Persecution in Iran website). 

After four decades, family members still do not have any information about the details of the events. According to the son of an Assembly member, however, ever since 1981, the time of the execution of the members of the Baha’is Second National Spiritual Assembly by firing squad, it was clear to the families that the members of the First Assembly had met with the same faith and “had been killed”. (Boroumand Center interview with Shahin Milani, June 12, 2017).

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[1] ‘Slow Death for Iran’s Baha’is’ by Richard N. Ostling, Time Magazine,20 February 1984. Also see ‘The Persecution of the Baha’is of Iran, 1844-1984, by Douglas Martin, Baha’i Studies,volume 12/13, 1984, p. 3. There is no information about the current number of Baha’is in Iran.
[2] The Islamic Republic Penal Code grants no rights to Baha'is, and the courts have denied them the right to redress or to protection against assault, murder, and other forms of persecution and abuse. In so doing, the courts have treated Baha'is as unprotected citizens or "apostates," citing eminent religious authorities whose edicts are considered to be a source of law equal to acts of Parliament. The Founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, made execution a punishment for the crime of apostasy and decreed that a Muslim would not be punished for killing an apostate. 
[3] The time between the members of the Baha’is Second National Spiritual Assembly’s arrest (December 13, 1981) and their trial (December 27, 1981) is about two weeks. The possibility has been advanced that the defendants spent these two weeks in solitary confinement. Furthermore, many legal defects have been attributed to said trial, including the fact that the judge began the session by introducing the defendants, and not himself. “We see in the video that the judge calls the National Spiritual Assembly’s report to the World Baha’i Headquarters fabricated and political. Therefore, issuance of a decision and sentence based on falsehoods and unlawful [conjecture] is clear evidence of the illegality and illegitimacy of the trial.” (Asoo website, September 6, 2015). 

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