was killed in suspicious circumstances. His family has raised questions about the failure to identify his murderer and the fact that he was killed at a time when was being repeatedly summoned by security officials.

Information about Mr. Mohammad Javad Parandakh was published on the websites of IRNA- Islamic Republic News Agency (September 19, 2009), Moje Sabze Azadi (September 19, 2009), Jonbeshe Rahe Sabz (August 28, 2009), Committee of Human Rights Reporters (September 22, 2009), E’temade Melli (August 28, 2009), Fars News Agency (September 2, 2009), Ensaniat- Human Rights Organization in Kurdistan (August 27 and 28, 2009), Kermanshah-Javid (August 31, 2009), Ta’amolate-Dudi Weblog (August 28, 2009), Ghasr News (August 28, 2009), and a report from Green Innocent Martyrs’ website. Additional information in this regard was obtained through Abdorrahman Boroumand Center research, Abdorrahman Boroumand Center interview (September 2, 2009), and Rooz Online website (August 24, 2010).Mr. Akhtarzand was born in December 18, 1976 in Esfahan. After his father passed away, he became the only breadwinner of the family. His distinct points of view on social and political issues were remarkable to his friends.

Mr. Parandakh was born in Gilan-e Gharb, Kermanshah, in 1986. He was a senior petro-chemical engineering student at the Technical University of Isfahan. According to his brother, Mr. Parandakh was a happy and optimistic young man who was interested in cultural and social activities such as publishing a Kurdish newsletter rather than in political matters. Mr. Parandakh cared a lot about the Kurdish language and traditional clothes, so much that he wore traditional Kurdish dress while in university (Rooz Online).

Mr. Parandakh cared a lot about the Kurdish language and traditional clothes and he wore traditional Kurdish dress while in university.

2009 Election Background

Election returns from Iran’s June 12th, 2009, presidential election declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 62.63 percent of the vote.  Following the announcement, citizens disputing these official results demonstrated in the streets.  Text messaging services were disrupted starting at 11:00 p.m. on the night before the election and remained unavailable for nearly three weeks, until July 1st. On Election Day, the deputy chief of Iranian police announced a ban on any gathering of presidential candidates’ supporters throughout the country.  The same evening, security forces made a “show of strength,” increasing their presence in Tehran’s public squares to “reinforce security at polling stations.”  Officials at election headquarters began reporting results soon after midnight, despite a statement from the Minister of the Interior that the first returns would not be announced until after the morning prayer (around 4:00 a.m.).

Many supporters of other presidential candidates came out into the streets on June 13th, once the results were made public, to protest what they believed to be a fraudulent election.  Candidates Mir Hossein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Mohsen Reza’i, Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the race, contested the election, alleging many instances of fraud.  They filed complaints with the Council of Guardians, the constitutional body charged with vetting candidates before elections take place and approving the results afterwards, requesting an annulment and calling for a new election.  Before the Council of Guardians could review their claims, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.  In the meantime, many people active in Karubi’s and Musavi’s campaigns were arrested.

On June 15th, unprecedented demonstrations filled the streets of central Tehran, in which an estimated three million protestors participated, according to statements attributed to the mayor of Tehran.  As the demonstrations were ending, paramilitary forces attacked the marchers, injuring and killing several people.  To prevent such news from being broadcast, the Iranian government expelled foreign journalists from the country and banned news agencies from reporting on the events.  Over the next three days, protesters took part in peaceful demonstrations in Tehran.  The repression entered a new phase on June 19th after Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon, in which he announced his support for Ahmadinejad and warned protestors that they were responsible for any disorder and its consequences. Amnesty International stated that the speech gave “legitimacy to police brutality.”  The next day and thereafter, police and plainclothes paramilitary groups attacked the protesters.  Public gatherings of any kind were declared illegal, and police, motorcycle-riding special units wearing black uniforms and helmets, and plainclothes agents brutally enforced this restriction.

Individuals in civilian clothing, commonly referred to as plainclothes forces, are used in the Islamic Republic to disrupt political and trade union activities, student events and gatherings, electoral initiatives, and protests.  Armed with sticks and clubs, and sometimes with chains, knives, batons, or firearms, they emerge when the state decides to suppress dissent.  These plainclothes forces move about freely, violently beating protesters and arresting them, while the police passively look on or actively cooperate with them.

There is little information on the command structure and organization of such groups, whose members wear ordinary clothing rather than official uniforms and may be affiliated with the ministry of information, influential political groups, or the armed forces. Following the post-election demonstrations in June 2009, pictures of some plainclothes agents were posted on internet websites.  Internet users helped to identify some of them and provided evidence that these individuals were affiliated with the Basij paramilitary groups, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and state intelligence forces. On September 16, 2009, a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Tehran confirmed the active and decisive role of Basij forces in the repression of the demonstrations, saying, “Basijis, through their presence in recent events, have blinded the eyes of the conspirators, and they should be appreciated… The enemies of Islam wanted to make the air dusty and to exploit the recent events, but thank God, through the enlightenment of the Honorable Leader we were victorious against this conspiracy.” He also emphasized, “The zealous youth of [the] Basij, believers in the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, are the second and third generations of the Revolution.  They have been successful in this stage and victorious on this battlefield.”

When personal property was damaged during the protests, government authorities and state-run radio and television programs accused the demonstrators of vandalism and justified the repression.  At the same time, however, footage posted online showed security forces destroying and damaging property on side streets and in uncongested areas away from the protests.  Moreover, in a public gathering in Tehran on October 20th, the chief of Iranian police conceded that police had destroyed and damaged property and accepted responsibility for it.

The precise number of citizens injured, killed, or disappeared in the post-election violence is not known.  According to various reports, there were hundreds of victims in demonstrations throughout the country.  More than seventy names have been reported.  It is said that officials have threatened victims’ family members, demanding their silence and that they refrain from giving interviews.  Reports also allege that returning a victim’s body to a family has been made conditional upon their agreement to change the cause of death listed on the coroner’s certificate to that of a heart attack or some other natural cause — thus foregoing the right to file a complaint — as well as the family's agreement not to hold memorial services for the loved one.

According to government statements, more than 4,000 people were arrested throughout Iran in the weeks following June 12th. Many have been held at the Kahrizak Detention Center, where prisoners’ rights and minimum hygiene standards were typically ignored.  Numerous reports of violence, including the torture and rape of detainees, have been published.  State reports and testimonies confirm that a number of detainees at Kahrizak died in custody due to beatings, difficult and unbearable prison conditions, and torture.

A representative of the Majles along with the head of the Intelligence Office of Gilan-e Gharb, visited Mr. Parandakh's home and requested that the family declare Mr. Parandakh's cause of death to be a driving accident.

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Mr. Mohammad Javad Parandakh’s Death

After the 2009 presidential election, Mr. Parandakh, along with many other students, participated in student demonstrations at Isfahan University protesting the result of the election. He then returned to his hometown in Gilan-e Gharb. After a few days, on July 15, 2009, following a phone call from the Intelligence Office of Gilan-e Gharb, Mr. Parandakh’s father appeared at the office. Mr. Parandarkh’s father was informed that the Intelligence Office in Isfahan had issued a summons for Mohammad Javad charging him with arson and destruction of public property and commanded him to appear before the office on July 19, 2009. Mr. Parandakh was temporarily released on a bail of 300 million Rials. Mr. Parandakh, along with his father, went to Isfahan on the assigned date. He was ordered to appear again on August 24, 2009. On the second appearance in the Intelligence Office of Isfahan, he was interrogated for two consecutive days. On the morning of the third day (August 26, 2009), he left home for the Intelligence Office. Around 10:00 AM, Mr. Parandakh’s father received a phone call from the Intelligence Office and was informed that Mohammad Javad had not appeared for interrogations. His father started looking for him on nearby streets and, after a while, found Mr. Parandakh’s body under a pedestrian bridge. Mr. Parandakh’s body was transferred to the forensic medicine office which, after half an hour, released a report indicating that he died of a fractured skull as a result of being hit in the head. Mr. Parandakh's body was buried in his hometown, Gilan-e Gharb.

It has been reported that Mr. Parandakh had been subjected to torture and rape during interrogations and had committed suicide due to a psychological problem caused by such treatment (Abdorrahman Boroumand Center research and interview and Moje Sabze Azadi). 

It has been reported that Mr. Parandakh had been subjected to torture and rape during interrogations and had committed suicide due to a psychological problem caused by such treatmen.

Officials’ Reaction

A representative of the Majles who was a member of the parliamentary follow-up committee for post-election events, along with the head of the Intelligence Office of Gilan-e Gharb, visited Mr. Parandakh's home and requested that the family declare Mr. Parandakh's cause of death to be a driving accident (Moje Sabze Azadi and Rooz Online).

However, news agencies close to the government claimed that Mr. Parandakh was one of the leaders of the disturbances and clashes at the Technical University of Isfahan. They reported that after an argument with his father, he went up to a pedestrian bridge and in a state of madness committed suicide (IRNA, Fars News Agency, and a report from Green Innocent Martyrs’ website).

Mr. Parandakh’s family was under pressure from security agencies for holding an appropriate funeral and even talking about their child’s death (Ensaniat- Human Rights Organization in Kurdistan, and E’temade Melli).

Family’ Reaction

Mr. Parandakh’s family considered the circumstance of his death, the failure to identify his murderer, and the fact that he was killed at a time when was being repeatedly summoned by security officials to be very suspicious and uncertain (Jonbeshe Rahe Sabz).

One year after Mr. Parandakh’s death, his brother declared that Mr. Parandakh had not committed suicide and that the family’s complaint against intelligence officers and the judge in Mohammad Javad’s case had produced no results.

During Mr. Parandakh’s investigation sessions, his family frequently communicated with the parliament representative for their hometown and a member of the parliamentary follow-up committee for post-election events, who had promised the family Mr. Parandkhah’s release, though he apparently did not help them at all (Kermanshah-Javid).

One year after Mr. Parandakh’s death, his brother, Mr. Mohammad Sadeq Parandakh, stated that his parents were forced to remain silent during the past year due to the pressures of security agents and to protect the life of their only remaining child, Mohammad Sadeq himself. Mr. Mohammad Sadeq Parandakh declared that his brother had not committed suicide and that the family’s complaint against intelligence officers and the judge in Mohammad Javad’s case had produced no results. He argued that Mohammad Javad was harassed severely during the investigations, and explained: “They threatened to kill him. Therefore, my brother told my father that they would kill him sooner or later and they charged him with thousands of false accusations, when all he had done was to chant in the streets”. According to Mr. Parandakh's brother, all his civil activities, including publication of newsletters and even wearing traditional Kurdish dress in the university were mentioned as charges against him and he was interrogated regarding them. Mr. Mohammad Sadeq Parandakh offered more explanation of the moment his father found his brother’s body: “According to my father, there were three holes in my brother's head. This while every witness was saying that first of all, it was not possible for my brother to fall down from that bridge, because the bridge was covered, and secondly, that falling down that bridge would shatter his read rather than just creating three holes” (Rooz Online).