Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Nika Shakarami

About

Age: 17
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: September 21, 2022
Location of Killing: Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Other extrajudicial method
Charges: Unknown charge

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

 

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1.

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion.

 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law.

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been

convicted or acquitted.

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment
  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Nika Shakarami was talented and full of life. Her dream was to live in a country where she will be free.  She was also known to be fearless, which worried her friends and family. )

The information regarding the extrajudicial execution of Ms. Nika Shakarami, daughter of Nasrin and Abbas Shakarami, was obtained through interviews conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC) with an informed source on three different occasions (March 24 and November 9, 2023, and January 22, 2024). To compile a comprehensive case, various sources were consulted, including the family members' social media pages, the archive of the IRIB 20:30 TV program (Wednesday, October 5, 2022), the investigative report by CNN news in English (October 7, 2022), the German-language newspaper “Die Zeit” (November 18, 2022), and the websites of IRIB news agency (October 5, 2022), Mizan news agency (October 26 and November 23, 2022), Fars news agency (October 4, 2022), Tasnim news agency (October 4, 2022), Voice of America (October 3 and 5, 2022), Independent Persian (October 15, 2022), Radio Zamaneh (September 30, 2022), Kayhan London (October 4, 2022), BBC Persian (October 10, 2022), Etemad newspaper (October 10, 2022), Radio Farda (October 6, 2022), and Euronews (December 27, 2022).

Nika Shakarami was born on October 2, 2005, in Khorramabad, Lorestan province (Mizan news agency, November 23, 2022). She, along with her family, moved from Khorramabad to Karaj in the summer of 2019. Nika completed middle school in a leading government school in the Fardis Karaj neighborhood. For her high school education in painting, she attended Vahdat Vocational School in Fardis Karaj during the coronavirus pandemic (ABC interview, March 24, 2023).

In 2021, Nika moved from Karaj to Tehran. She worked at a café near Enghelab Square. (ABC interview with an informed source on January 22, 2024, Radio Zamaneh, September 30, 2022). During the last year of her life, she resided with her aunt, Mrs. Atash Shakarami, in a house near Keshavarz Boulevard in Tehran. Mrs. Atash Shakarami, also a painter, played a significant role in nurturing Nika's interest in painting. “Nika was the second child of the family, and had several artistic qualifications. She was good at drawing, sketching, designing, and ….. She was even good at cooking. She was so good at drawing that could easily draw a portrait of a person at a very first encounter.” (London Kayhan website, October 04, 2022).

Nika's parents were both from Khorramabad, one of the cities in Lorestan province. Nika’s father passed away in 2014 due to heart disease when Nika was only 8 years old. According to a family member, Nika's father was well-liked among his relatives. He worked as a contractor and led a modest and ordinary life. Nika's mother, Nasrin Shakarami, is also an artist and a housewife. All members of Nika's mother's family are involved in art (Kayhan London, October 4, 2022).

Family members and friends of Nika, including her mother, sister, aunt, and friends from school and social media, have portrayed her as an independent, joyful, and energetic teenager. They described her as being "full of intelligence, ability, and talent," navigating the paths of independence to alter the societal norms and "arrangement of the walls." Growing up in an environment without common social constraints, Nika was sensitive to political and social matters. She dreamed of leading an independent life and aspired to emigrate from Iran. Nika opposed the compulsory hijab and possessed a fighter's spirit, quick to anger. Described as motivated and bold, she was known for encouraging her friends. Following the onset of Jina (Mahsa) Amini's protests in the fall of 2022, Nika actively joined the ranks of the protesters. (Voice of America October 5, 2022), (BBC Persian and Etemad newspaper October 10, 2022). According to her mother, Mrs. Nasrin Shakarami, "Nika opposed the guidance patrol (Islamic religious police force). As a teenager, she resisted the pressure exerted by the patrol officers on her and her peers. Her motivation for attending protest gatherings was centered around the issues of the guidance patrol and the demands of women and youth. Despite my repeated requests for her not to go to the rallies, her courage led her to actively participate in the demonstrations." (Etemad newspaper, October 10, 2022).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The news of her death triggered protests, which started with a widespread expression of outrage on social media and the gathering of a large crowd in front of the hospital,continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried. Popular exasperation over the morality patrols and the veil in general, aggravated by misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the impunity generally granted to state agents for the violence used against detainees led to months of nationwide protests. Initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils, and youth in general, protesters adopted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” chanted during Amini’s burial. The protest rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. 

The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Security forces shot protesters outside and worshipers inside the Mosala prayer hall. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.

By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at a minimum at 22,000 , of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them or offered them rewards to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Ms. Nika Shakarami’s Extrajudicial Execution

Nika Shakarami went missing on September 20, 2022, after taking part in street protests. According to her mother, she had several brief calls with her that day, but the last call occurred at 11:40 p.m. on September 20. Describing the call, Nika's mother mentioned it was filled with background noise, including the sound of Nika gasping, suggesting she might have been running from officers. (Mrs. Nasrin Shakarami's video message to Radio Farda and interview with Iran International TV on October 6, 2022.)

The only remaining trace of Nika is her messages exchanged with her aunt and some friends on the last day, centering around her involvement in the protests and her unwavering commitment to future demonstrations. Furthermore, videos from the protests that night in Tehran, disseminated by CNN and the Twitter account "1500Tasvir," depict Nika wearing a black head-to-toe cover with a backpack. She can be observed shaking a burning scarf atop a trash can in the footage. Moments later, she takes another scarf and sets it on fire in front of fellow protesters. In another video captured at 8:37 on September 20, Tehran time, Nika is seen taking cover behind a white car in the city's traffic. She shouts to the driver, saying, "Don't move... Don't move." (CNN news agency October 7, 2022)

A German friend of Nika named Nele, residing in Leipzig, has been in contact with her since April 2021. In an interview with the German newspaper "Die Zeit," Nele reported that Nika called her in the early hours of September 30. According to Nele, the call was made from a quiet location where the sounds of cars and protesters were absent. During this conversation, Nika shared details about the harsh treatment of protesters and witnessing scenes of violence against them. Nika also mentioned her active participation, admitting to throwing stones at the police and even hitting them with an unclear object, possibly a tree branch or a piece of wood. Additionally, Nika informed her that one of her friends, who had recorded several videos of the protests using her cellphone, including footage of Nika, had been arrested. However, Nika managed to escape from the location by entering a stranger's car. During the conversation, Ms. Shakarami emphasized her intention to attend the demonstration the next day. In this interview, Nele recalled Nika saying, "Many people who had considered emigrating before are now choosing to stay in Iran and fight for their freedom." As per the report from the "Die Zeit" reporter, who examined Nele's phone and WhatsApp messages, the final message from Ms. Shakarami seen on Nele's phone was sent at 4:40 in the morning in Iran. Following this, Nele's subsequent messages went unanswered. (Persian translation of the article from "Die Zeit," featuring an interview with Luisa Hommerich, conducted on November 18, 2022, and November 9, 2023.)

According to Nika's account of the events that night, as shared with her friend Nele, one of Nika's fellow protesters had been arrested several hours earlier with her phone, which held videos of Nika participating in protests. Security forces probably traced Nika through her phone, ultimately locating her in the early morning of September 21, specifically after 4:40 a.m. Nika's body was found a few hours later, reportedly around 7:30 a.m., by residents of a building at Tehran's "Amir-Akram Crossroads." Permission to transport Nika's body to the forensic pathologist was granted on September 21 by the Behesht-e Zahra Organization. In the documentation, she was labeled as "Unknown" and was found without a backpack, identification documents, as well as various items such as cash, documents, ornaments, and others. Following the crime scene investigation regulations, bodies lacking crime scene-related tools are sent to forensic medicine. The Police Criminal Investigation Department's crime investigation group is responsible for delivering and managing other tools discovered at the crime scene. (Musa Barzin, ABC's lawyer, and legal advisor) In the burial permit issued by the municipality on September 29, the date of Nika's death was officially recorded as September 21. (Documents published in Mizan news agency, October 26, 2022)

In the days following September 20, Ms. Shakarami's family members made extensive efforts to locate Nika. Atash Shakarami, Nika's aunt, publicly announced her niece's disappearance on her Instagram page on September 26. Nika's mother, Nasrin Shakarami, stressed that her daughter had a birth certificate and a cell phone with her. She mentioned, "We suspected she was detained, and we visited prisons, the Police Criminal Investigation Department, and various locations, but received no answers." During these efforts, someone checked Nika's national number and confirmed that she was arrested by the IRGC and undergoing interrogation. (Interview with Iran International, 6 October 2022 - Euronews, 7 December 2022) Ultimately, a week later, the family successfully filed a formal report of Nika's disappearance. After nine days of uncertainty, her mother and uncle identified Nika's dead body at Tehran's Kahrizak morgue on September 29.

The burial permit issued by the Behesht-e Zahra Organization, linked to Tehran Municipality, for the Khorramabad cemetery, indicates that Nika Shakarami's cause of death was "multiple injuries caused by being struck with a hard object" (ABC documents archive). According to a reliable source, the death certificate and forensic medical certificate, which were reviewed by the family's lawyer five weeks after Ms. Shakarami's death, specify the cause of death as "multiple blows to the head and face with a hard object" (interview with an informed source by ABC, March 24, 2023). On October 3, 2022, Ms. Shakarami was buried in the presence of numerous armed security officers in the cemetery of Hayat ol Gheyb village, located 40 kilometers from Khorramabad, without the presence of her mother (Persian BBC, October 6, 2022). At the memorial ceremony, 40 days after her death on October 27th, held at her grave in the Hayat ol Gheyb cemetery in Lorestan, security forces attacked and fired shots at participants (Iran International, October 28, 2022). 

Officials’ Reaction

From the beginning of media coverage surrounding Ms. Shakarami's death, government officials and state media actively responded to the case, attempting to portray her murder as a result of falling from a building. Their reactions included broadcasting a "TV Documentary" featuring forced confessions, publishing numerous reports challenging existing documents, engaging in document forgery, exerting influence, and imposing severe restrictions on the funeral.

According to Nika's mother, the Police Criminal Investigation Department showed them photos from the day Nika's dead body was found, with the date recorded as September 20 (Euronews, December 27, 2022 - Aida Shakarami's Instagram, March 18, 2023). However, a few weeks later, Mohammad Javad Shafiei, the investigator of the fifth investigation branch of Tehran's 2727 District Prosecutor's Office, confirmed the discovery of Nika's cell phone. He emphasized that "no information about her identity was obtained during the inspections". He mentioned, "Ms. Shakrami's mobile phone was also found at the scene, in airplane mode, playing music." (Mizan news agency, October 26, 2022). Meanwhile, the authorities kept Nika's family uninformed from September 20 to October 1, and some of Nika's belongings, including her mobile phone, computer, and birth certificate, were never returned to the family. (Interview with an informed source by ABC, November 9, 2023)

Despite Nika's mother being her official guardian, authorities denied the family's request to bury her in Salehin Cemetery in Khorramabad. They argued that a burial in Khorramabad would be "risky and attract attention." Consequently, security forces relocated Nika's body 40 kilometers away and buried her without the family's knowledge or the mother's permission. In an interview with the Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, Ms. Shakarami's maternal uncle explained that the Security Council meeting took place in the presence of Nika's family. During this meeting, efforts were made to present their reasons and persuade the family not to bury her in Khorramabad for security reasons. While her father's relatives welcomed this proposal, they insisted that Nika's burial was contingent upon her mother's consent, which she opposed. (Tasnim News Agency, October 6, 2022).

IRGC Intelligence agents arrested Mohsen Shakarami, Nika's uncle, shortly after his burial on October 3rd. A few hours later, they also apprehended Atash Shakarami, Nika's aunt, who played a crucial role in making the news of her murder public. Atash Shakarami underwent relentless interrogation for approximately 48 hours, during which the agents sought to extract the confessions they desired. (BBC Persian and Etemad newspaper, October 10, 2022).

The day following Ms. Shakarami's burial, the Tehran prosecutor declared the "initiation of a judicial case within the Criminal Crimes Prosecutor's Office" to investigate her "death." (Fars news agency, October 4, 2022) Government media sources have reported the arrest of eight workers from a commercial building in connection with Nika's death. (Tasnim News Agency, October 4, 2022) The building in question is reportedly located at "Amir Akram Crossroads," the very site where, according to authorities, Mrs. Shakarami's body was found at 7:30 am on September 20. Described as being in the final stages of construction, this building accommodates two clothing manufacturers where workers were actively working and providing security. (IRIB news agency, October 5, 2022).

On the evening of October 5, a brief television documentary was broadcast during the 20:30 news segment on IRIB. The documentary attempted to establish that Ms. Shakarami was thrown from a 5-story building near her aunt's house. The report utilized footage from a CCTV camera, showing a teenage girl entering a building with a mask covering her face and a brimmed hat. The claim made in the documentary suggests that this individual is Nika Shakarami. In this program, recorded during Atash Shakarami's arrest and questioning, she confirmed that the person seen in the video is indeed Nika Shakarami. Ali Salehi, Tehran's public and revolutionary prosecutor, also asserted in the same program that the forensic medical certificate specifies Nika's cause of death as resulting from "fractures in the head and neck, and other body parts," rather than injuries resulting from assault and battery or gunshots. Mohammad Shahriari, the head of the Criminal Prosecutor's Office of Tehran province, emphasized that Ms. Shakarami's body was taken to forensic medicine and initially labeled as an "unknown person." According to him, "During autopsy tests and the examination of the body, indications of multiple fractures in the pelvis, head, upper and lower organs, hands, and feet were observed, particularly in the pelvis. These findings strongly suggest that the person was thrown from a height. Our inquiries have confirmed that this indeed occurred." (IRIB news agency, October 5, 2022)

Nika's aunt was released after 48 hours of interrogation but continued to be closely monitored for an extended period. Security forces exerted control by overseeing her movements, and phone activities, and restricting her from engaging on social media. Mohsen Shakarami, Nika's uncle, received a temporary release on bail after four days of detention. However, several months later, he faced charges, including "disturbing public opinion" and "inciting people to come to the streets." Despite periodic summons to address Ms. Shakarami's case, he endured ongoing pressure. The authorities aimed to compel Shakarami's family to close the case by publicly announcing that their daughter had died by suicide. (ABC’s Interview with an informed source, March 24, 2023)

The security forces' pressure on the family and relatives persisted for an extended period leading up to the first Memorial Day commemorating Ms. Shakarami's death. On September 20, 2023, Aida Shakarami, Nika's sister, conveyed on her Instagram: "The security atmosphere has taken hold of Hayat ol Gheyb cemetery. Several compatriots who intended to participate in Nika's Memorial Day have been summoned, arrested, and warned that they lack the right to attend the event. Furthermore, anonymous individuals have threatened us, stating that if we decide to be present at the grave, my mother will be arrested. They urged us to prioritize my safety as I am her only daughter. Due to security pressure and to prevent potential harm to participants, Nika's mother has decided to cancel the Memorial Day for her daughter." (Nasrin Shakarami’s Instagram, September 20, 2023)

Familys’ Reaction

In the initial days following the murder of Ms. Shakarami, a formal complaint was filed in the criminal court. The Shakarami family engaged a lawyer to manage this case. (ABC’s Interview with an informed source, March 24, 2023) In an interview with one of Iran's media outlets, Shakarami's mother emphasized the importance of her daughter's presence at protest gatherings and called for an investigation into the uncertainties surrounding her daughter's case. She stated, "Those responsible for this tragic incident should acknowledge their responsibility. I desire a thorough and transparent investigation into the ambiguities surrounding Nika's case, free from any external pressures." (Etemad newspaper, October 10, 2022)

Shakarami's family vehemently refuted the assertions made by official media and government officials concerning Nika's death. Nika's mother, Nasrin Shakarami, emphasized, "I saw my daughter's body numerous times after receiving her deceased remains. "Her body exhibited no damage, without any fractures or bruises on her arms and legs," she stated. "She was struck forcefully, resulting in a crushed skull and a broken jaw." (Euronews, December 27, 2022). According to a reliable source, Nika's uncle, who inspected the body during the burial, underscored that he did not observe any indications of broken bones in the body, suggesting that Nika was thrown from a height location. (ABC’s Interview with an informed source, March 24, 2023) At the police station, Nika's uncle was presented with only one photo. In the image, Nika was depicted lying on the ground with her water bottle and mobile phone beside her. According to Nika's family, upon examining the photo, it was apparent that the arrangement of the body and the items next to it was highly abnormal. It appeared to be entirely staged and deliberately arranged. (Kayhan London, October 4, 2022)

Shakarami's family eventually "withdrew" from the case upon realizing that the government's intention in pursuing legal action was merely to create a narrative. They resisted the pressure from authorities urging them to conclude the case by declaring that their daughter had committed suicide in the past. As of one year after Nika Shakarami's death, the case remains open and unresolved. The family conveyed to the criminal court and the case lawyer that they had no intention of continuing with the case. Their decision was based on a fundamental lack of belief in the legitimacy of the judicial system. Additionally, they chose not to take action to officially close the case, as doing so would require adopting the government's narrative, whether it be acknowledging suicide or attributing the death to a hypothetical individual. In essence, the family decided to "abandon" the case initiated by the government. (ABC’s Interview with an informed source, March 24, 2023)

Impacts on Family

Mrs. Nasrin Shakarami expressed that the "unjustified accusations" linked to her child's murder are "more painful than the distress caused by her absence." (Etemad newspaper, October 10, 2022)

The murder of Nika profoundly affected Atash Shakarami, Nika's aunt, on a spiritual level. According to a reliable source, she was unable to resume work after her niece's tragic murder. (ABC’s Interview with an informed source, March 24, 2023)

Ambiguities of the Case

What is evident is the absence of definite and documented information regarding the details of Nika Shakarami's death. However, by examining the persisting ambiguities in this case, undeniable parallels emerge with the prevalent pattern of the Islamic Republic concealing and distorting information related to homicides. Some of the questionable ambiguities in this case include:

1-     Despite Mohammad Javad Shafiei, the investigator of the 5th investigation branch of the 27th District Prosecutor's Office of Tehran, clearly stating that Nika Shakarami's mobile phone was found next to her body and in music mode at the time of discovery, making the process of identifying the body and contacting her family seemingly straightforward, Nika was still taken to the Kahrizak morgue under the designation of “unknown”. Shockingly, it took over a week after her death for the family to be notified. Compounding the mystery, Nele, Nika's German friend, reports that Nika's social media accounts, including WhatsApp and Instagram, were deleted from her phone on the same night – potentially erasing crucial evidence of her last calls and messages. (Iran-emrooz, November 14, 2023) Despite this, the Police Criminal Investigation Department refuses to return personal belongings, such as Nika's mobile phone and computer, to the family.

2-     Although the forensic medical certificate is the sole official and scientific document that can precisely describe the manner and time of death, it has never been provided to Shakrami's family. The family's lawyer mentioned in an interview on November 16, nearly two months after Nika's death, "The forensic medical certificate has not been legally served to me yet." (VokalaPress News Website, November 16, 2022)

3-     The arrest of Nika Shakarami's uncle and aunt by the Ministry of Intelligence, along with obtaining a TV interview from them while they were under arrest, suggests that the security apparatus aimed to manipulate public opinion. These interviews were conducted under pressure and with a specific agenda. Mrs. Atash Shakarami, Nika's aunt, later addressed the issue on her Instagram page, a few months after the interviews. She clarified that the content presented was misleading, stating, "Anyone with even a basic understanding of media can see how a simple edit can distort a two-hour conversation into a 30-second video that misrepresents the reality of what was said. I never asserted anywhere that Nika committed suicide."

4-     In the interviews with judicial and law enforcement officials, there has been a consistent emphasis on the absence of bullet marks indicating that Nika Shakarami was killed during the protests. However, numerous cases exist where individuals have been injured or killed, not only by law enforcement officers using firearms but also because of physical violence during detention.

5-     Over a year since the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, the government's investigation into the murder has yielded no results. Meanwhile, media outlets affiliated with the government have attempted to portray Nika’s death as a suicide. This portrayal comes despite Nika's active presence at the protests an hour before her death and her communication with a friend (Nele), expressing an intention to continue participating in the protests in the following days. Additionally, her choice, along with other young people, to refrain from emigration after the recent protests, signaling hope for the future, remains unconvincing in light of the circumstances.

6-     According to a resident from the area where Nika's body was found, security forces, while collecting CCTV footage from residents of the alley, arrested several neighbors. Subsequently, these neighbors were released after paying substantial bail and agreeing to remain silent about the incident. In another report received by the Boroumand Center, it was mentioned that in the building near where the body was found, there is an apartment that security forces have been visiting for years. While this information cannot be independently verified, the Boroumand Center has received similar reports over the years from various sources. These reports suggest the existence of regular houses in Tehran being used by intelligence officers for interrogation purposes.

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