Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Shahryar Mohammadi

About

Age: 28
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: November 18, 2022
Location of Killing: Ali Abad Square, Bukan, Azarbaijan-e Gharbi Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Extrajudicial shooting
Charges: Unknown charge

Human rights violations in this case

Extrajudicial killings

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979, with the murder of Parviz Sayyah Sina, an Anglican Bishop, and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 500 extrajudicial killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.(1)

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies. 

Documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion (The Netherlands, 2018) or arrest (Brussels, 2020; Turkey, 2021) of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial (Paris 1980 and 1991) and the evidence presented, revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant (the Mikonos Trial in Germany) has been issued for Iran’s then-Minister of Information, Ali Fallahian and the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikh Attar.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity who ordered the implementation of these crimes. (2). In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution. 

Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions, and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam (“one whose blood may be spilled, whose life can be taken, without the perpetrator incurring any punishment”) and their sentence is death regardless of where they are [and where you find them].” 

More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders” (Speech broadcast on the state-run Iranian Radio and Television on August 31, 1992, quoted from Asr Iran, August 17, 2006).

Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998 , which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders(3),” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

—--------------------------------------------

1) Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. ​​These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms.
2) Investigations into the murder of well-known personalities in France, Germany and Switzerland have yielded evidence and documentation showing that the officials and employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as accomplices and principals [in the killings]. In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information. 
3) A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”.
Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Shahryar Mohammadi had many dreams. One day, he got a tattoo that read “I dream of dying without dreams.

Joint explanation of the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (Network) and the "Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran (ABC): This case is a part of the collaborative documentation of the Kurdistan Human Rights Network and the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network intends to gradually document cases of extrajudicial executions of Kurdish citizens and activists. For this purpose, the network has used the experiences and research methodology of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, which has been active in the field of documenting human rights violations in Iran for many years. The report of this case and subsequent reports will be published in the "documentation" section of the Kurdistan Human Rights Network website and the "Omid Memorial" of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center. Some of the original and follow-up interviews used in this documentation were conducted by the Center, some by the Network, and some in collaboration.

Information regarding the case of Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi, son of Ali and Mina, was obtained from interviews with two people close to the family (February 06, 2022 and June 22, 2023) and several interviews with informed sources; (from March to August 2023). To complete the information about this case, news was obtained from the websites of Voice of America’s Persian division (February 6, 2023), Kurdpa (April 23, 2023), Kurdistan Media (December 28, 2022), BBC Persian’s YouTube channel (April 15, 2023), Hana Human Rights Organization (April 1, 2023), Iran Wire (April 25, 2023), Bultan News (April 26, 2023) and Tasnim News Agency (November 19, 2022).Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi was born on April 25, 1994, into a Sunni Kurdish family in the city of Bukan in West Azerbaijan province. He spent his childhood, adolescence and youth in this city. After finishing high school, Mr. Mohammadi entered Bukan Azad University and studied architecture. According to his relatives, he studied until the second semester of university, but then dropped out due to the family's financial problems. Mr. Mohammadi was a “kasebkar” (tradesman)* transporting goods with his private car (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).Mr. Mohammadi was interested in political activities and the Komala party. According to one of his relatives, in 2014, after Mr. Mohammadi's car, which was his work vehicle, was seized by the government, he along with his friend Mohammad Hassanzadeh (who was killed during the 2022 protests) went to Iraqi Kurdistan to join the Komala party. After about five months, following threats from the security forces and their putting pressure on his family, Mr. Mohammadi abandoned his party activities and returned to Iran (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

After returning to Iran, Mr. Mohammadi was repeatedly summoned and interrogated by security institutions such as the Information Ministry and the IRGC Information Organization (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).One year after Mr. Mohammadi's return to Iran, following a report from unknown persons, security officers went to his family’s home and took away his phone and computer RAM. They found pictures on Mr. Mohammadi's computer from the time when he was a (Komala) party member, showing him in Kurdish clothes and armed. This led to his arrest and the beginning of another round of interrogations. He was detained for about two months until the family managed to find his original interrogator to testify that Mr. Mohammadi's return to Iran was voluntary; he was then finally released on bail (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).Relatives of Mr. Mohammadi describe him as a "very calm, kind, supportive" and "athletic, hard-working and caring youth." According to one of his close relatives, Mr. Mohammadi "was an athlete, he practiced martial arts and received an award in this field. [He] believed in freedom and equality between men and women from a young age, and was a staunch opponent of compulsory hijab. [He] used to exercise and told his friends he would open a gym if the regime changed. He wanted to open a mobile phone shop. He always said that he would build a complex and let the needy live in it. He was full of unfulfilled dreams" (BBC Persian YouTube channel, April 15, 2023). According to another relative, Mr. Mohammadi’s "poverty and political beliefs did not allow Shahryar to have a comfortable life" (interview with an informed source, June 22, 2023). A person close to Mr. Mohammadi's family said that he "had many dreams. One day, he got a tattoo that read ‘I dream of dying without dreams’” Mr. Mohammadi used to work as a realtor before his death. (BBC Persian YouTube Channel, April 15, 2023).He was also known to people as a "noble, conscientious, and knowledgeable" person. Mr. Mohammadi cared about people's problems and helped solve them. A person who was close to Mr. Mohammadi during the 2022 protests considered him "one of the top leaders in Bukan" and said that after his murder, his friends no longer participated in the protests as they had done previously (Voice of America website, April 6, 2023; interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).During these protests, on November 15, 2022, a close friend of Mr. Mohammadi's named Mohammad Hassanzadeh, who was injured in the eye area, was killed. After Mr. Hassanzadeh’s murder, Mr. Mohammadi was involved in events that resulted in increased security force attention the details of his life. According to relatives, on the night of November 15, Mr. Mohammadi, who was worried that his friend's body would be confiscated by the security forces, went to the Qolipur Bukan hospital and secretly removed Mr. Hassanzadeh's lifeless body and transferred it to his native village for burial. On the same night, pictures were published on social media showing Mr. Mohammadi sitting next to Mr. Hassanzadeh’s body in a mosque building. In these pictures, Mr. Mohammadi's hands are bandaged. His relatives say that the reason for this was the injuries sustained from a fight with one of the security officers before the transfer of Mr. Hassanzadeh's body (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).Mr. Mohammadi also took several wounded people, who had been “directly shot” by government forces, to "underground doctors" on the evening of November 17 (Voice of America website, April 6, 2023).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The protests, which started in front of the hospital and continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried, were triggered by popular exasperation over the morality patrols, misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the resulting impunity for the violence used against detainees, as well as the mandatory veil in general. This protest, initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils and youth in general who chanted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at 19,603, of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.Widespread popular protests commenced in Iran following the state killing of Jina Mahsa Amini on September 16, 2022. The protests first sparked in Saqqez, Jina Mahsa Amini’s birthplace, at her funeral, then spread to other cities in Kurdistan and Iran. Bukan was among the cities that became a center of protest in solidarity with Saqqez, and during the months of the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests its streets and neighborhoods were the scene of constant dissatisfaction and strikes against the government. Of 123 Kurdish citizens who lost their lives in the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests, 17 were killed by security forces in Bukan.

Komala

Several remaining members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran established the Revolutionary Organization of this party in Iraq in the mid 1960s. Esma’il Sharifzadeh, Abdollah Mo’ini, and Molaavareh were among the leaders of this organization who, inspired by the Cuban Revolution, began an armed guerrilla struggle in Kurdistan. When this group was defeated in 1969 and several of its members were arrested, armed struggle was criticized and the Maoist trend overcomes. When some of its leaders were released in 1978, the Revolutionary Organization of Working People in Kurdistan – Komala was established. Based on Marxist theory, Komala was against the capitalists and landlords and encouraged workers and peasants in Kurdistan to an armed uprising against them and the central government. This organization considered the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) as the rich party and campaigned against it, resulting in several armed conflicts and hundreds dead. In 1982, Komala joined another Marxist group, Sahand, which was basically a theoretical group, and established the Communist Party of Iran. Then it became called the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran – Komala. Years later, this organization separated from the Communist Party of Iran and faced several schisms. The Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, led by Abdollah Mohtadi, Komala, and the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran led by Ebrahim Alizadeh are some of these factions.

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979 and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In most cases, there has not been much published, and local authorities have not issued arrest warrants. But documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm the theory of state committed crimes. In some instances, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion or arrest of Iranian diplomats. In a few cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial. The evidence presented revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant has been issued for Iran’s Minister of Information.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity that ordered the implementation of these crimes. Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam and their sentence is death regardless of where they are.” More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information, stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders.”

At the same time, various political, judicial, and security officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have, at different times and occasions, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy for these extrajudicial killings and in some cases their implementation. 

Read more about the background of extrajudicial killings in the Islamic Republic of Iran by clicking on the left hand highlight with the same title.

Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi’s threats and death

Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi was killed on the evening of Friday, November 18, 2022, during the protests, by shooting of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces.

According to one of Mr. Mohammadi's close relatives, it seems that he was identified and aroused security institution ire after the funeral ceremony of his friend, Mohammad Hassanzadeh, in Bukan (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

Mr. Mohammadi was chased by IRGC forces on the evening of November 18, after the protests of that day, while he was driving a private car; he was forced to stop in the dead-end alley of Falakeh Aliabad and was immediately hit by a volley of military-grade bullets by the security forces who were chasing him in three cars (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

According to relatives, there were other people with Mr. Mohammadi who finally managed to escape from the place, but Mr. Mohammadi was shot (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).According to other sources, security officers "closed Bukan from Falakeh Aliabad to Behzisti, surrounded Shahryar Mohammadi's car, targeted him with a machine gun, and his car was filled with holes" (Kurdpa, April 23, 2023).

According to one of the relatives, it seems that there was more than one informant in Mr. Mohammadi's circle. During the 2022 protests, in which he was active, he was on the move at night from the inner city towards Fakaleh Aliabad Bukan, one of the other protest centers, and he was chased by the IRGC due to their prior knowledge of his and his friends' activities in this area (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

According to the same source, after shooting at Mr. Mohammadi's car, the officers left the scene thinking that he was killed, but Mr. Mohammadi was "alive but injured and he called for his mother" (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023). According to some reports, "residents of the alley heard Shahryar's cries but did not dare to go and save him" (BBC Persian YouTube Channel, April 15, 2023).

About an hour after the shooting, Mr. Mohammadi's friends arrived at the scene and took him to the hospital, while he still had vital signs. When they arrived, a large number of security officers were present in the hospital. Mr. Mohammadi's mother also went to the hospital (Kurdpa, April 23, 2023). According to relatives, the officers told the doctors and hospital officials there, "Why did you take him to the operating room? Do you want to revive him? If you even bring him back to life, we will shoot him with the final bullet" (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).. It is not clear which institution the officers who made this threat were attached to.

After the doctors announced his death, there was a limited altercation between security officers and some members of Mr. Mohammadi's family in the hospital area, and one of the officers even shot Mr. Mohammadi's brother, Mr. Milad Mohammadi, twice in the leg with a shotgun as he was holding Mr. Mohammadi’s body. After Mr. Milad Mohammadi's resistance, "on the order of the security officers, they injected him with an anesthetic, put him on a bed and took him away" (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

In Mr. Mohammadi's burial permit, the cause of his death was listed as "death due to operation of military equipment outside of war" (Archive of ABC and KHRN).

Mr. Mohammadi’s body was buried that same night, in the presence of only his mother and two friends, in Bukan cemetery next to the body of his friend Mohammad Hassanzadeh (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023; Kurdpa, April 23, 2023).

The 40th day ceremony after Mr. Mohammadi's murder was held on December 27, 2022, "with a large presence of people in the public cemetery of Bukan city" (Kurdistan Media, December 28, 2022).

Officials’ Reaction

There were many reactions to the murder of Mr. Mohammadi from Iranian officials and state media.

After the body left the hospital, security officers threatened Mr. Mohammadi's mother that if she did not go alone with them to bury her son's body, he would be buried secretly (BBC Persian YouTube Channel, April 15, 2023).

After the murder of Mr. Mohammadi, government officers tried to prevent the normal funeral ceremony by threatening family members. The next day, during the funeral ceremony, government officers were stationed around the mosque (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023). Due to these restrictions, Mr. Mohammadi's family was only allowed to hold the funeral ceremony for one day (Kurdpa, April 23, 2023).

Mr. Mohammadi's family once again faced threats and restrictions on the eve of December 27, 2022, which was the time for the 40th day ceremony. However, the ceremony was finally held, without the presence of family members and with the participation of people and acquaintances (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023). Two days after the 40th day ceremony, family members and some relatives visited Mr. Mohammadi's grave under strict security measures (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

Mr. Mohammadi's family faces "restrictions imposed" by government forces when visiting the grave of their family member on normal days (Kurdpa, April 23, 2023).

Government officials even restricted Mr. Mohammadi's family from installing the tombstone they wanted. According to one of the relatives, "the family can't do anything, they can't even prepare the tombstone for him that he deserves and write the name of the martyr on it" (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

State media, citing "Colonel Heydari from West Azerbaijan Police Command Public Relations,” declared that Mr. Mohammadi’s murder occurred during a “fight.” He claimed that Mr. Mohammadi's killer was identified and then arrested in a "police strike operation" (Tasnim News Agency, November 19, 2022).

Bultan News, a website affiliated with the security institutions, also stated that the murder of Mr. Mohammadi was the result of "a street brawl" and "unrelated to the protests," and claimed that the "enemy" was "faking killings" by "inciting families and publishing films" (Bulletin News, April 26, 2023).

Familys’ Reaction

No information is available about the legal reaction of Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi's family to his murder.

After Mr. Mohammadi’s murder, his brother Mr. Milad Mohammadi released a video on social networks, chanting the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom," and stating that his brother "was martyred for the whole of Iran", saying: "We are Iranians, we will remain Iranians, and greetings to the honor of all the country of Iran!”

Mr. Mohammadi's family celebrated his 30th birthday on April 24, 2023, at his gravesite. Mr. Amjad Amini and Mrs. Mojgan Eftekhari, the parents of Ms. Jina Mahsa Amini, also attended the ceremony (Iran Wire, April 25, 2023).

Impacts on Family

The murder of Mr. Shahryar Mohammadi profoundly affected his family members, some of them became depressed and some of them had to change their place of residence (interview with a family member, February 6, 2023).

This murder especially affected Mr. Mohammadi's mother. One of the relatives said: "Shahryar's mother raised her three children tooth and nail for 15 years without any support. Shahryar was killed, Milad's life was destroyed, his mother suffered mental problems, his sister always endures these problems alone. They destroyed his family" (BBC Persian YouTube channel, April 15, 2023).

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*In Kurdistan, “kasebkar” is used to describe people who import illegal but common goods such as cigarettes, cloth, foodstuffs and electronic devices from the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan into Iranian Kurdistan with their cars. In practice, they do the same thing with a car that a “kolbar" does with his body.

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