Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Faraj Farzadnia

About

Age: 53
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: January 10, 1997
Location of Killing: IRGC's information Office, Esfahan, Esfahan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Enforced disappearance
Age at time of alleged offense: 53

About this Case

Mr. Farzadnia was a family man and a sportsman.  He was a retired employee of the Ministry of Education, and he was concerned about the rights of teachers.

Information on the disappearance and extrajudicial killing of Mr. Faraj Farzadnia, son of Ma’sumeh and Pir Ali, has been gathered from Abdorrahman’s Boroumand Center’s interview with an acquaintance of him (February 22 and 28, 2022, and March 4 and 5, 2022). Additional information was collected from the Radio Farhang Website (February 1, 2022) and Center for Parliamentary Research Website (September 7, 1997).

Mr. Faraj Farzadnia was born on September 1, 1944, in Abadan.  He was married and he had three children.  He had a bachelor’s degree in Psychology from Esfahan University (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). Mr. Farzadnia was a retired employee of the Ministry of Education (ABC Interview February 22 and March 5, 2022). He had been “sensitive to discrimination and injustice” since childhood. Before the revolution his political activities consisted of writing articles for publications and participating in leftist political meetings. After the January 1979 revolution, up until September 1980, and at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, he was the head of Abadan Education Department. At this time, he went to war at the front, and stayed there until the liberation of Khorramshahr in May 1982. He was injured during this time. Mr. Farzadnia was then transferred to Esfahan Area 3 Education Office as the Head of Accounting.  He was an honest person and was sensitive to the rights of teachers. He publicly voiced his opinion on discrimination in teacher gatherings and also in family gatherings. For instance, he had said, “Why are the children of government officials (like Hashemi Rafsanjani) abroad while the country is at war?” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

Mr. Farzadnia was interested in sports, especially walking and soccer. He would rent a field so that he could organize soccer tournaments for teachers, coaches, and retirees.  He had a good relationship with his family, particularly with his wife (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

From around 1995, Mr. Farzadnia established contact with his wife’s sister, who was a member of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization in Iraq. In January 1997, Mr. Farzadnia was summoned by telephone to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office. According to an acquaintance, Mr. Farzadnia would go to the Press Office every morning for about a week.  He would wait in the waiting room “that had no heating”, and he would go back home in the afternoon, without being told why he had been summoned.  Mr. Farzadnia finally told the Information Office agents, “I am not going to come here anymore. If you need anything, please let me know in writing.”  On January 9, 1997, a Peykan car with 4 passengers went to Mr. Farzadnia’s home.  One of the passengers introduced himself as an agent from the Esfahan Information Office Press Office and asked Mr. Farzadnia to appear at this office at 8am the next day.  Mr. Farzadnia’s wife asked the agent, “What has he done?” The agent answered, “He doesn’t need to have done anything. We have a few questions for him.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). 

Mr. Farzadnia had kidney problems (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO)

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) was founded in 1965. This organization adapted the principles of Islam as its ideological guideline. However, its members’ interpretation of Islam was revolutionary and they believed in armed struggle against the Shah’s regime. They valued Marxism as a progressive method for economic and social analysis but considered Islam as their source of inspiration, culture, and ideology. In the 1970s, the MKO was weakened when many of its members were imprisoned and executed. In 1975, following a deep ideological crisis, the organization refuted Islam as its ideology and, after a few of its members were killed and other Muslim members purged, the organization proclaimed Marxism as its ideology. This move led to the split of the Marxist-Leninist Section of the MKO in 1977. In January of 1979, the imprisoned Muslim leaders of the MKO were released along with other political prisoners. They began to reorganize the MKO and recruit new members based on Islamic ideology. After the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the MKO accepted the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and supported the Revolution. Active participation in the political scene and infiltration of governmental institutions were foremost on the organization’s agenda.  During the first two years after the Revolution, the MKO succeeded in recruiting numerous sympathizers, especially in high schools and universities; but its efforts to gain political power, either by appointment or election, were strongly opposed by the Islamic Republic leaders. (2) 

Forced Disappearance And Murder Of  Mr. Faraj Farzadnia 

On January 10 or 11, at 7-7:30 am, Mr. Faraj Farzadnia left home in his car, intending to go to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office, and he disappeared (ABC Interview, March 5, 2022). Since the Esfahan Information Office agents kept telling Mr. Farzadnia’s family for three months that he would be released from this office, they believe he was at this office, on Kamal Esma’il Street near Enqelab Square (ABC Interview, February 28 and March 5, 2022).  Several other people also disappeared at the same time as Mr. Farzadnia, at the Esfahan Information Office Press Office. These include Ms. Mahbubeh BahadoriMs. Zohreh MazaheriMs. Afsaneh (Parvin) TahmasebiMr. Mohammad Aqa Aqa'i, and Mr. Ahmad Aqa'i. (ABC Interview, February 28 and March 4, 2022).

In December 1996, Mr. Farzadnia went to the Press Office of Esfahan Information Office and was never heard from again. Information office agents denied his presence there. However, they several times interrogated and questioned his family for following up with the report of his disappearance.

According to available information, Mr. Farzadnia was one of the supporters of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization who disappeared during an operation named Alghadir. This operation was carried out by the Information Ministry of the Islamic Republic, with the goal of kidnapping and killing members and supporters of MKO. There is no information on him or on a number of other people from Esfahan who disappeared at the same time. Sometime before Mr. Farzadnia was abducted, thousands of prisoners were executed during the mass killings of the summer of 1988. (2)  Many of these were considered Mojahedin Khalq Organization ``leaders”. According to available information and comments made by responsible officials, Mr. Farzadnia and the rest of the missing people were probably killed by the same logic (Boroumand Center Research).

No trace of Mr. Farzadnia’s car has been found (ABC Interview, March 4, 2022). 

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979, with the murder of Parviz Sayyah Sina, an Anglican Bishop, and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 extrajudicial killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.(3)

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies. 

Documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion (The Netherlands, 2018) or arrest (Brussels, 2020; Turkey, 2021) of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial (Paris 1980 and 1991) and the evidence presented, revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant (the Mikonos Trial in Germany) has been issued for Iran’s then-Minister of Information, Ali Fallahian and the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikh Attar.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity who ordered the implementation of these crimes. (4). In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution. 

Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions, and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam (“one whose blood may be spilled, whose life can be taken, without the perpetrator incurring any punishment”) and their sentence is death regardless of where they are [and where you find them].” 

More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders” (Speech broadcast on the state-run Iranian Radio and Television on August 31, 1992, quoted from Asr Iran, August 17, 2006).

Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998 , which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders(5),” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

The Al-Qadir Program: Kidnapping and Murder of the MKO by the Ministry of Information

Revolutionary forces and institutions started killing political opponents and minorities beginning in the first months of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) members and supporters inside and outside Iran became a target and dozens of them were killed prior to the declaration of armed action by that Organization on June 20, 1981. (Boroumand Center research).

In their confessions given in the course of interrogations, most Serial Murders defendants alluded to the plan devised for the “kidnapping” and “elimination” of MKO members or supporters, called Al-Qadir, the primary responsibility for which lied with the “Elteghat (literally meaning picking, choosing, and combining concepts that are not always in conformity with each other) General Division”. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021). This Division – which was established in the Revolutionary Guards Corps prior to the declaration of armed action by the MKO and had subsequently been moved to the Ministry of Information – was one of the three divisions engaged in the analysis, pursuit, and clashes with groups opposed to the Islamic Republic, and charged with and responsible for dealing with Moslem groups such as the MKO, Forqan (6), and Arman-e Mostaz’afin (7). (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). According to a security official who spoke under an assumed name, the Elteghat Division functioned under the Ministry of Information’s Office of the Deputy for Security Affairs. “It also had the largest manpower, as there were between 150 to 200 employees of the Ministry’s Elteghat Division.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). Ali Ahmadi (Nazeri), who, according to Mehrdad Aalikhani, Head of the Ministry of Information’s New Left Office and one of the main defendants of the Serial Murders, was one of the “main people in the Al-Qadir Program”, had confirmed in his confession that “these types of activities (i.e. the murder of opponents) have been taking place for years and security and intelligence systems do have and do resort to such methods … These types of activities were customary in the Ministry of Information, and they presented no issues in practice”. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021).

According to Nasser Zarafshan, the attorney representing a number of the victims of the Serial Murders’ families, at least two different Deputyship offices of the Ministry of Information and three different General Divisions of said Ministry were involved in the killings. (Voice of America YouTube Channel, November 27, 2015). According to the confessions of Ministry of Information officials, the most important sections involved in the murder of MKO members and supporters were probably [the Ministry’s] Office of the Deputy for Security Affairs and the departments functioning under it, i.e. the Elteghat General Division and the Operations Division. (8)

According to a security official who spoke under an assumed name, the MKO started taking action in pulling out its forces from Iran around spring of 1982: “After we found out about this, we set up traps in the west of the country.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). According to another security official, Islamic Republic security agents had moles in the MKO starting as early as 1981: “The moles had infiltrated the Organization and had also been recruited by it.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). In an interview regarding the infiltration of information forces into opposition groups, Ali Fallahian, [then-President] Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Minister of Information, stated: “ … It wasn’t jinns and angels that provided us with information … In order to combat groups that engaged in the traffic of contraband; explosives; pornographic movies, pictures, and brochures; and in order to combat anti-revolutionaries and Monafeghin, we had no alternative but to infiltrate these groups …” (Kayhan, May 26, 2001). Although the mechanism for the kidnapping and murder of supporters and members of the MKO under the Al-Qadir Program is not clear, it seems, however, that one of its most important objectives was to prevent MKO members and supporters from joining the Organization in Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Available evidence also indicates that efforts were made by supporters and members of the MKO to leave the country through the Sistan and Baluchestan Province border. In a conversation with the Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, Bahram Noruzi, a commander in the Police Force, explained that he was stationed in the south of the country until around 1983, and said this about the MKO members and supporters’ exit route from Iran’s eastern border: “We received information that an exit route had begun from Zahedan, and an order [requiring us to edal with the issue]. Combating narcotics traffic was also an issue that we were dealing with. They issued a two-month mission deployment for me in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. That two-month mission lasted six years.” (Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, July 14, 2020).

In spite of the fact that this former police official has spoken about the arrest of MKO members who intended to leave the country (Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, July 14, 2020) and several witnesses have also talked or written about the imprisonment of these individuals (the book Na Zistan, Na Marg (“Neither Living Nor Dying”)), the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center’s research has identified individuals that were kidnapped and murdered by Ministry of Information agents as they were attempting to leave the country in that same period. (Boroumand Center research).

According to Mehrdad Aalikhani’s confession, the Ministry of Information was in possession of a building near Behesht Zahra Cemetery, the rooms and open spaces of which were used to kill the victims. He talked in his account about how Ministry of Information operatives killed one of the victims in that building “in a very professional and controlled manner”, without leaving a trace. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021). Abdorrahman Boroumand Center research indicates that a number MKO members and supporters and families of those executed, found [and would run into] each other at Behesht Zahra Cemetery. It is likely that Ministry of Information agents had established a constant presence at Behesht Zahra through this building, and that they used the Cemetery for the purpose of gathering information and secretly killing or burying members and supporters of the MKO if necessary. (Boroumand Center research).

The connection between, and the continuous nature of, the killings in the fall of 1998, in what came to be known as the Serial Murders, and the killing of people whose death aroused public indignation, brought to the fore [and in full] public view the issue of extrajudicial killings, even though these types of murders had long been a part of the Ministry of information’s annual plans and projects. The killing of members and supporters of the MKO was also one of these projects. It is not clear how many people were killed within the framework of the Al-Qadir Program, and under the project of the “[physical] elimination” of members and supporters of the MKO. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has the names of more than 30 individuals who are suspected to have been kidnapped and killed in the course of that Program. (Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021; the book Na Zistan, Na Marg; Boroumand Center research).

Officials’ Reaction

During the first days and weeks when Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of other individuals from Esfahan who had disappeared at the same time went to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office for information, they would be told, “We are interrogating.  They will be released in a few days.” About three months after Mr. Farzadnia disappeared, in March 1997, Information Office agents said they had no information about him or the other people who had disappeared at that office. They said, “Ask about their whereabouts from the person who told you they were here.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). When the families of the disappeared people persisted, the Esfahan Information Office agents took at least one of them into the Press Office building, interrogated them for their repeated inquiries about the fate of their relative, and told him, “We would not be afraid to tell you if they were here.  We would put them on trial, and if they were guilty and it was necessary, we would execute them.” (ABC Interview, March 5, 2022).

The provincial and local officials, such as officials from the governor’s office and the deputy governor’s office for political, security, and social services told Mr. Farzadnia’s family, “The Ministry of Information would not do such a thing, [to abduct somebody.]” According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, the deputy governor for political affairs was a former Education Department high school teacher, who knew Mr. Farzadnia well, and of course they did not get along at all.  [Mr. Farzadnia] would criticize the government officials in the presence of this person.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, not only did the Judiciary and Security officials fail to investigate the disappearance of Mr. Farzadnia, they summoned his family to the Information Office many times.  They forbid them to pursue the disappearance of Mr. Farzadnia and threatened: “You are slandering the Ministry information.  We will file a report on you.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

Familys’ Reaction

The family of Mr. Farzadnia reported his disappearance to Branch One “Criminal Division” of the Esfahan Police Department. Along with the families of the other disappeared people, they also consistently appealed to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office for about 6 months (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, up until September 1997, his family and the families of the other disappeared people appealed several times to the office of Esfahan Province political, security, and social services. They met with the governor of Esfahan and the deputy governor for political affairs. They also met with the regional governor and with the head of the Judiciary of Esfahan.  They appealed to the Press Office of the Revolutionary Guard, Press Office of the Security Forces, Military Prosecutor’s Office, and the Supreme Court. None of these offices gave them a satisfactory response (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

When the role of the Ministry of Information in the killings known as “serial killings” became public knowledge, Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of the other disappeared people corresponded through a third party with the Article 90 Commission of the Constitution of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (9).  They never received a response (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

Mr. Farzadnia’s family approached several lawyers in Esfahan, to pursue this case on their behalf. “But they were afraid to become involved.” Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of the other disappeared people corresponded with the lawyers working on the “serial killings” case, after these killings became public knowledge (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

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1) According to the testimonies of some of the political prisoners who were tried during the executions of the summer of 1988 in some of the prisons, the trials took place in a room in the prison after a few weeks of isolation during which prisoners were deprived of visitation, television and radio broadcasts, and outdoors time. In August and September, a three-member delegation composed of the public prosecutor, a religious judge, and a representative of the Ministry of Information asked prisoners questions about their views on Mojahedin, whether they would renounce their beliefs and if they were ready to cooperate against the Mojahedin. 
Based on what the answers were, the prisoners would have been charged with “counter revolutionary, anti-religion and anti-Islam” or “associated with military action or with various [opposition] groups based near the borders” and would be sentenced to death.   The authorities never informed prisoners about the delegation’s purpose and the serious implications of their responses. According to survivors, during the summer of 1988 a large number of prisoners sympathizing with the Mojahedin or Leftist groups were executed for not recanting their beliefs.  
Relatives of political prisoners executed in 1988 refute the legality of the judicial process that resulted in thousands of executions throughout Iran. In their 1988 open letter to then-Minister of Justice Dr. Habibi, they argue that the official secrecy surrounding these executions is proof of their illegality. They note that an overwhelming majority of these prisoners had been tried and sentenced to prison terms, which they were either serving or had already completed when they were retried and sentenced to death.
In their letters to the Minister of Justice (1988) and to the UN Special Rapporteur visiting Iran (February 2003), the families of the victims refer to the authorities’ accusations against the prisoners – accusations that may have led to their execution. These accusations include being “counter-revolutionary, anti-religion, and anti-Islam,” as well as being “associated with military action or with various [opposition] groups based near the borders.” 
An edict of the Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, reproduced in the memoirs of Ayatollah Montazeri, his designated successor, corroborates the reported claims regarding the charges against the executed prisoners. In this edict, Ayatollah Khomeini refers to members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization as “hypocrites” who do not believe in Islam and “wage war against God” and decrees that prisoners who still approve of the positions taken by this organization are also “waging war against God” and should be sentenced to death.   
The same letter, rebutting the accusation that these prisoners (from inside the prison) had collaborated with armed members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization in clashes with armed forces of the Islamic Republic, states that such claims “are false, considering the circumstances in prisons; for our children faced most difficult conditions [in prison, with] visitation rights of once every 15 days, each visitation lasting ten minutes through a telephone, from behind the glass window, and were deprived of any connection with the outside world. We faced such conditions for seven years, which proves the truth of our claim.” 
The details regarding the execution sentence are not available.  Months after the executions, prison authorities informed the families about the executions and handed in the victims’ belongings to their families.  The bodies, however, were not returned to them.  The bodies were buried in mass graves and the locations are not known to the families.  Authorities warned the families of prisoners against holding memorial ceremonies.
2) The exclusion of MKO members from government offices and the closure of their centers and publishing houses, in conjunction with to the Islamic Republic authorities’ different interpretation of Islam, widened the gap between the two. Authorities of the new regime referred to the Mojahedin as “Hypocrites” and the Hezbollahi supporters of the regime attacked the Mojahedin sympathizers regularly during demonstrations and while distributing publications, leading to the death of several MKO supporters. On June 20, 1981, the MKO called for a demonstration protesting their treatment by governmental officials and the government officials’ efforts to impeach their ally, President Abolhassan Banisadr. Despite the fact that the regime called this demonstration illegal, thousands came to the streets, some of whom confronted the Revolutionary Guardsmen and Hezbollahis. The number of casualties that resulted from this demonstration is unknown but a large number of demonstrators were arrested and executed in the following days and weeks. The day after the demonstration, the Islamic Republic regime started a repressive campaign – unprecedented in modern Iranian history. Thousands of MKO members and sympathizers were arrested or executed. On June 21, 1981, the MKO announced an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic and assassinated a number of high-ranking officials and supporters of the Islamic regime.
In the summer of 1981, the leader of the MKO and the impeached President (Banisadr) fled Iran to reside in France, where they founded the National Council of Resistance. After the MKO leaders and many of its members were expelled from France, they went to Iraq and founded the National Liberation Army of Iran in 1987, which entered Iranian territory a few times during the Iran-Iraq war. They were defeated in July 1988 during their last operation, the “Forugh Javidan” Operation. A few days after this operation, thousands of imprisoned Mojahedin supporters were killed during the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Ever since the summer of 1981, the MKO has continued its activities outside of Iran. No information is available regarding members and activities of the MKO inside the country. 
In spite of the “armed struggle” announcement by the MKO on June 20, 1981, many sympathizers of the organization had no military training, were not armed, and did not participate in armed conflict.
3) Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms.
4) Investigations into the murder of well-known personalities in France, Germany and Switzerland have yielded evidence and documentation showing that the officials and employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as accomplices and principals [in the killings]. In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information. 
5) A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”.
6) Forqan was formed in 1977 by a group of Ali Shari’ati’s followers with a modern interpretation of the Qoran and Islamic ideology. It is not clear whether or not the group was armed, but it went underground soon after its formation. Based on documents available in the archives of the Islamic Revolution Documentation Center (gathered and reported by Ahmad Gudarzi on Bacheha-ye Ghalam website), this group opposed from the onset of the Revolution the involvement of the clergy in the government and the particular interpretation of Islam later implemented by the Islamic Republic authorities. In its short period of post-revolutionary activity, the group was accused of involvement in several assassinations and armed robberies, the first one reportedly as early as May 1979, only a couple of months after the triumph of the Revolution. Based on the above mentioned report, most of the known members of the group were executed or killed in clashes with Islamic Revolutionary Committee forces, which led to the total elimination of the group in January 1980.
7) Arman-e Mostaza’fin Organization was founded in the summer of 1976 before the Islamic Revolution. This organization, just like the MKO, were followers of Mohammad Ali Shariati’s ideology, and started their ideological activities after the revolution by publishing a magazine called “Arman or Payam-e Mostaz’afin”. There are a few members in this group and they were mainly active in Dezful (in Khuzestan Province). They were against armed struggle and their ideological activities lasted until February 1982 when their leaders and members were arrested. Although the leaders were not executed, some of the members were executed in different cities.
8)  Mehrdad Aalikhani, one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case, had stated in his confession that, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs in the years 1989 to 1998, had told him: “If you ever leave, be careful not to talk about the work you’ve done in the past; leave those tasks alone.” (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021).
9) The Article 90 Commission is one of the specialized commissions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly whose task is to implement Article 90 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to this article "Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the executive power or the judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly. The Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply."

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