Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Faraj Farzadnia

About

Age: 53
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: January 10, 1997
Location of Killing: IRGC's information Office, Esfahan, Esfahan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Enforced disappearance
Age at time of alleged offense: 53

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Mr. Farzadnia was a family man and a sportsman.  He was a retired employee of the Ministry of Education, and he was concerned about the rights of teachers.

Information on the disappearance and extrajudicial killing of Mr. Faraj Farzadnia, son of Ma’sumeh and Pir Ali, has been gathered from Abdorrahman’s Boroumand Center’s interview with an acquaintance of him (February 22 and 28, 2022, and March 4 and 5, 2022). Additional information was collected from the Radio Farhang Website (February 1, 2022) and Center for Parliamentary Research Website (September 7, 1997).

Mr. Faraj Farzadnia was born on September 1, 1944, in Abadan.  He was married and he had three children.  He had a bachelor’s degree in Psychology from Esfahan University (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). Mr. Farzadnia was a retired employee of the Ministry of Education (ABC Interview February 22 and March 5, 2022). He had been “sensitive to discrimination and injustice” since childhood. Before the revolution his political activities consisted of writing articles for publications and participating in leftist political meetings. After the January 1979 revolution, up until September 1980, and at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, he was the head of Abadan Education Department. At this time, he went to war at the front, and stayed there until the liberation of Khorramshahr in May 1982. He was injured during this time. Mr. Farzadnia was then transferred to Esfahan Area 3 Education Office as the Head of Accounting.  He was an honest person and was sensitive to the rights of teachers. He publicly voiced his opinion on discrimination in teacher gatherings and also in family gatherings. For instance, he had said, “Why are the children of government officials (like Hashemi Rafsanjani) abroad while the country is at war?” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

Mr. Farzadnia was interested in sports, especially walking and soccer. He would rent a field so that he could organize soccer tournaments for teachers, coaches, and retirees.  He had a good relationship with his family, particularly with his wife (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

From around 1995, Mr. Farzadnia established contact with his wife’s sister, who was a member of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization in Iraq. In January 1997, Mr. Farzadnia was summoned by telephone to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office. According to an acquaintance, Mr. Farzadnia would go to the Press Office every morning for about a week.  He would wait in the waiting room “that had no heating”, and he would go back home in the afternoon, without being told why he had been summoned.  Mr. Farzadnia finally told the Information Office agents, “I am not going to come here anymore. If you need anything, please let me know in writing.”  On January 9, 1997, a Peykan car with 4 passengers went to Mr. Farzadnia’s home.  One of the passengers introduced himself as an agent from the Esfahan Information Office Press Office and asked Mr. Farzadnia to appear at this office at 8am the next day.  Mr. Farzadnia’s wife asked the agent, “What has he done?” The agent answered, “He doesn’t need to have done anything. We have a few questions for him.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). 

Mr. Farzadnia had kidney problems (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO)

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) was founded in 1965. This organization adapted the principles of Islam as its ideological guideline. However, its members’ interpretation of Islam was revolutionary and they believed in armed struggle against the Shah’s regime. They valued Marxism as a progressive method for economic and social analysis but considered Islam as their source of inspiration, culture, and ideology. In the 1970s, the MKO was weakened when many of its members were imprisoned and executed. In 1975, following a deep ideological crisis, the organization refuted Islam as its ideology and, after a few of its members were killed and other Muslim members purged, the organization proclaimed Marxism as its ideology. This move led to the split of the Marxist-Leninist Section of the MKO in 1977. In January of 1979, the imprisoned Muslim leaders of the MKO were released along with other political prisoners. They began to reorganize the MKO and recruit new members based on Islamic ideology. After the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the MKO accepted the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and supported the Revolution. Active participation in the political scene and infiltration of governmental institutions were foremost on the organization’s agenda.  During the first two years after the Revolution, the MKO succeeded in recruiting numerous sympathizers, especially in high schools and universities; but its efforts to gain political power, either by appointment or election, were strongly opposed by the Islamic Republic leaders. (2) 

Forced Disappearance And Murder Of  Mr. Faraj Farzadnia 

On January 10 or 11, at 7-7:30 am, Mr. Faraj Farzadnia left home in his car, intending to go to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office, and he disappeared (ABC Interview, March 5, 2022). Since the Esfahan Information Office agents kept telling Mr. Farzadnia’s family for three months that he would be released from this office, they believe he was at this office, on Kamal Esma’il Street near Enqelab Square (ABC Interview, February 28 and March 5, 2022).  Several other people also disappeared at the same time as Mr. Farzadnia, at the Esfahan Information Office Press Office. These include Ms. Mahbubeh Bahadori, Ms. Zohreh Mazaheri, Ms. Afsaneh (Parvin) Tahmasebi, Mr. Mohammad Aqa Aqa'i, and Mr. Ahmad Aqa'i. (ABC Interview, February 28 and March 4, 2022).

In December 1996, Mr. Farzadnia went to the Press Office of Esfahan Information Office and was never heard from again. Information office agents denied his presence there. However, they several times interrogated and questioned his family for following up with the report of his disappearance.

According to available information, Mr. Farzadnia was one of the supporters of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization who disappeared during an operation named Alghadir. This operation was carried out by the Information Ministry of the Islamic Republic, with the goal of kidnapping and killing members and supporters of MKO. There is no information on him or on a number of other people from Esfahan who disappeared at the same time. Sometime before Mr. Farzadnia was abducted, thousands of prisoners were executed during the mass killings of the summer of 1988. (2)  Many of these were considered Mojahedin Khalq Organization ``leaders”. According to available information and comments made by responsible officials, Mr. Farzadnia and the rest of the missing people were probably killed by the same logic (Boroumand Center Research).

No trace of Mr. Farzadnia’s car has been found (ABC Interview, March 4, 2022). 

Background of Extrajudicial Killings by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979, with the murder of Parviz Sayyah Sina, an Anglican Bishop, and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 540 extrajudicial killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.(3)

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies. 

Documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion (The Netherlands, 2018) or arrest (Brussels, 2020; Turkey, 2021) of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial (Paris 1980 and 1991) and the evidence presented, revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant (the Mikonos Trial in Germany) has been issued for Iran’s then-Minister of Information, Ali Fallahian and the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikh Attar.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity who ordered the implementation of these crimes. (4). In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution. 

Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions, and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam (“one whose blood may be spilled, whose life can be taken, without the perpetrator incurring any punishment”) and their sentence is death regardless of where they are [and where you find them].” 

More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders” (Speech broadcast on the state-run Iranian Radio and Television on August 31, 1992, quoted from Asr Iran, August 17, 2006).

Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998 , which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders(5),” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

The Al-Qadir Program: Kidnapping and Murder of the MKO by the Ministry of Information

Revolutionary forces and institutions started killing political opponents and minorities beginning in the first months of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) members and supporters inside and outside Iran became a target and dozens of them were killed prior to the declaration of armed action by that Organization on June 20, 1981. (Boroumand Center research).

In their confessions given in the course of interrogations, most Serial Murders defendants alluded to the plan devised for the “kidnapping” and “elimination” of MKO members or supporters, called Al-Qadir, the primary responsibility for which lied with the “Elteghat (literally meaning picking, choosing, and combining concepts that are not always in conformity with each other) General Division”. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021). This Division – which was established in the Revolutionary Guards Corps prior to the declaration of armed action by the MKO and had subsequently been moved to the Ministry of Information – was one of the three divisions engaged in the analysis, pursuit, and clashes with groups opposed to the Islamic Republic, and charged with and responsible for dealing with Moslem groups such as the MKO, Forqan (6), and Arman-e Mostaz’afin (7). (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). According to a security official who spoke under an assumed name, the Elteghat Division functioned under the Ministry of Information’s Office of the Deputy for Security Affairs. “It also had the largest manpower, as there were between 150 to 200 employees of the Ministry’s Elteghat Division.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). Ali Ahmadi (Nazeri), who, according to Mehrdad Aalikhani, Head of the Ministry of Information’s New Left Office and one of the main defendants of the Serial Murders, was one of the “main people in the Al-Qadir Program”, had confirmed in his confession that “these types of activities (i.e. the murder of opponents) have been taking place for years and security and intelligence systems do have and do resort to such methods … These types of activities were customary in the Ministry of Information, and they presented no issues in practice”. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021).

According to Nasser Zarafshan, the attorney representing a number of the victims of the Serial Murders’ families, at least two different Deputyship offices of the Ministry of Information and three different General Divisions of said Ministry were involved in the killings. (Voice of America YouTube Channel, November 27, 2015). According to the confessions of Ministry of Information officials, the most important sections involved in the murder of MKO members and supporters were probably [the Ministry’s] Office of the Deputy for Security Affairs and the departments functioning under it, i.e. the Elteghat General Division and the Operations Division. (8)

According to a security official who spoke under an assumed name, the MKO started taking action in pulling out its forces from Iran around spring of 1982: “After we found out about this, we set up traps in the west of the country.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). According to another security official, Islamic Republic security agents had moles in the MKO starting as early as 1981: “The moles had infiltrated the Organization and had also been recruited by it.” (Tasnim News Agency, June 24, 2019). In an interview regarding the infiltration of information forces into opposition groups, Ali Fallahian, [then-President] Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Minister of Information, stated: “ … It wasn’t jinns and angels that provided us with information … In order to combat groups that engaged in the traffic of contraband; explosives; pornographic movies, pictures, and brochures; and in order to combat anti-revolutionaries and Monafeghin, we had no alternative but to infiltrate these groups …” (Kayhan, May 26, 2001). Although the mechanism for the kidnapping and murder of supporters and members of the MKO under the Al-Qadir Program is not clear, it seems, however, that one of its most important objectives was to prevent MKO members and supporters from joining the Organization in Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Available evidence also indicates that efforts were made by supporters and members of the MKO to leave the country through the Sistan and Baluchestan Province border. In a conversation with the Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, Bahram Noruzi, a commander in the Police Force, explained that he was stationed in the south of the country until around 1983, and said this about the MKO members and supporters’ exit route from Iran’s eastern border: “We received information that an exit route had begun from Zahedan, and an order [requiring us to edal with the issue]. Combating narcotics traffic was also an issue that we were dealing with. They issued a two-month mission deployment for me in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. That two-month mission lasted six years.” (Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, July 14, 2020).

In spite of the fact that this former police official has spoken about the arrest of MKO members who intended to leave the country (Islamic Revolution Documents Center website, July 14, 2020) and several witnesses have also talked or written about the imprisonment of these individuals (the book Na Zistan, Na Marg (“Neither Living Nor Dying”)), the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center’s research has identified individuals that were kidnapped and murdered by Ministry of Information agents as they were attempting to leave the country in that same period. (Boroumand Center research).

According to Mehrdad Aalikhani’s confession, the Ministry of Information was in possession of a building near Behesht Zahra Cemetery, the rooms and open spaces of which were used to kill the victims. He talked in his account about how Ministry of Information operatives killed one of the victims in that building “in a very professional and controlled manner”, without leaving a trace. (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021). Abdorrahman Boroumand Center research indicates that a number MKO members and supporters and families of those executed, found [and would run into] each other at Behesht Zahra Cemetery. It is likely that Ministry of Information agents had established a constant presence at Behesht Zahra through this building, and that they used the Cemetery for the purpose of gathering information and secretly killing or burying members and supporters of the MKO if necessary. (Boroumand Center research).

The connection between, and the continuous nature of, the killings in the fall of 1998, in what came to be known as the Serial Murders, and the killing of people whose death aroused public indignation, brought to the fore [and in full] public view the issue of extrajudicial killings, even though these types of murders had long been a part of the Ministry of information’s annual plans and projects. The killing of members and supporters of the MKO was also one of these projects. It is not clear how many people were killed within the framework of the Al-Qadir Program, and under the project of the “[physical] elimination” of members and supporters of the MKO. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has the names of more than 30 individuals who are suspected to have been kidnapped and killed in the course of that Program. (Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021; the book Na Zistan, Na Marg; Boroumand Center research).

Officials’ Reaction

During the first days and weeks when Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of other individuals from Esfahan who had disappeared at the same time went to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office for information, they would be told, “We are interrogating.  They will be released in a few days.” About three months after Mr. Farzadnia disappeared, in March 1997, Information Office agents said they had no information about him or the other people who had disappeared at that office. They said, “Ask about their whereabouts from the person who told you they were here.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022). When the families of the disappeared people persisted, the Esfahan Information Office agents took at least one of them into the Press Office building, interrogated them for their repeated inquiries about the fate of their relative, and told him, “We would not be afraid to tell you if they were here.  We would put them on trial, and if they were guilty and it was necessary, we would execute them.” (ABC Interview, March 5, 2022).

The provincial and local officials, such as officials from the governor’s office and the deputy governor’s office for political, security, and social services told Mr. Farzadnia’s family, “The Ministry of Information would not do such a thing, [to abduct somebody.]” According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, the deputy governor for political affairs was a former Education Department high school teacher, who knew Mr. Farzadnia well, and of course they did not get along at all.  [Mr. Farzadnia] would criticize the government officials in the presence of this person.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, not only did the Judiciary and Security officials fail to investigate the disappearance of Mr. Farzadnia, they summoned his family to the Information Office many times.  They forbid them to pursue the disappearance of Mr. Farzadnia and threatened: “You are slandering the Ministry information.  We will file a report on you.” (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022)

Familys’ Reaction

The family of Mr. Farzadnia reported his disappearance to Branch One “Criminal Division” of the Esfahan Police Department. Along with the families of the other disappeared people, they also consistently appealed to the Esfahan Information Office Press Office for about 6 months (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

According to Mr. Farzadnia’s acquaintance, up until September 1997, his family and the families of the other disappeared people appealed several times to the office of Esfahan Province political, security, and social services. They met with the governor of Esfahan and the deputy governor for political affairs. They also met with the regional governor and with the head of the Judiciary of Esfahan.  They appealed to the Press Office of the Revolutionary Guard, Press Office of the Security Forces, Military Prosecutor’s Office, and the Supreme Court. None of these offices gave them a satisfactory response (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

When the role of the Ministry of Information in the killings known as “serial killings” became public knowledge, Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of the other disappeared people corresponded through a third party with the Article 90 Commission of the Constitution of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (9).  They never received a response (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

Mr. Farzadnia’s family approached several lawyers in Esfahan, to pursue this case on their behalf. “But they were afraid to become involved.” Mr. Farzadnia’s family and the families of the other disappeared people corresponded with the lawyers working on the “serial killings” case, after these killings became public knowledge (ABC Interview, February 28, 2022).

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1) According to the testimonies of some of the political prisoners who were tried during the executions of the summer of 1988 in some of the prisons, the trials took place in a room in the prison after a few weeks of isolation during which prisoners were deprived of visitation, television and radio broadcasts, and outdoors time. In August and September, a three-member delegation composed of the public prosecutor, a religious judge, and a representative of the Ministry of Information asked prisoners questions about their views on Mojahedin, whether they would renounce their beliefs and if they were ready to cooperate against the Mojahedin. 
Based on what the answers were, the prisoners would have been charged with “counter revolutionary, anti-religion and anti-Islam” or “associated with military action or with various [opposition] groups based near the borders” and would be sentenced to death.   The authorities never informed prisoners about the delegation’s purpose and the serious implications of their responses. According to survivors, during the summer of 1988 a large number of prisoners sympathizing with the Mojahedin or Leftist groups were executed for not recanting their beliefs.  
Relatives of political prisoners executed in 1988 refute the legality of the judicial process that resulted in thousands of executions throughout Iran. In their 1988 open letter to then-Minister of Justice Dr. Habibi, they argue that the official secrecy surrounding these executions is proof of their illegality. They note that an overwhelming majority of these prisoners had been tried and sentenced to prison terms, which they were either serving or had already completed when they were retried and sentenced to death.
In their letters to the Minister of Justice (1988) and to the UN Special Rapporteur visiting Iran (February 2003), the families of the victims refer to the authorities’ accusations against the prisoners – accusations that may have led to their execution. These accusations include being “counter-revolutionary, anti-religion, and anti-Islam,” as well as being “associated with military action or with various [opposition] groups based near the borders.” 
An edict of the Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, reproduced in the memoirs of Ayatollah Montazeri, his designated successor, corroborates the reported claims regarding the charges against the executed prisoners. In this edict, Ayatollah Khomeini refers to members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization as “hypocrites” who do not believe in Islam and “wage war against God” and decrees that prisoners who still approve of the positions taken by this organization are also “waging war against God” and should be sentenced to death.   
The same letter, rebutting the accusation that these prisoners (from inside the prison) had collaborated with armed members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization in clashes with armed forces of the Islamic Republic, states that such claims “are false, considering the circumstances in prisons; for our children faced most difficult conditions [in prison, with] visitation rights of once every 15 days, each visitation lasting ten minutes through a telephone, from behind the glass window, and were deprived of any connection with the outside world. We faced such conditions for seven years, which proves the truth of our claim.” 
The details regarding the execution sentence are not available.  Months after the executions, prison authorities informed the families about the executions and handed in the victims’ belongings to their families.  The bodies, however, were not returned to them.  The bodies were buried in mass graves and the locations are not known to the families.  Authorities warned the families of prisoners against holding memorial ceremonies.
2) The exclusion of MKO members from government offices and the closure of their centers and publishing houses, in conjunction with to the Islamic Republic authorities’ different interpretation of Islam, widened the gap between the two. Authorities of the new regime referred to the Mojahedin as “Hypocrites” and the Hezbollahi supporters of the regime attacked the Mojahedin sympathizers regularly during demonstrations and while distributing publications, leading to the death of several MKO supporters. On June 20, 1981, the MKO called for a demonstration protesting their treatment by governmental officials and the government officials’ efforts to impeach their ally, President Abolhassan Banisadr. Despite the fact that the regime called this demonstration illegal, thousands came to the streets, some of whom confronted the Revolutionary Guardsmen and Hezbollahis. The number of casualties that resulted from this demonstration is unknown but a large number of demonstrators were arrested and executed in the following days and weeks. The day after the demonstration, the Islamic Republic regime started a repressive campaign – unprecedented in modern Iranian history. Thousands of MKO members and sympathizers were arrested or executed. On June 21, 1981, the MKO announced an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic and assassinated a number of high-ranking officials and supporters of the Islamic regime.
In the summer of 1981, the leader of the MKO and the impeached President (Banisadr) fled Iran to reside in France, where they founded the National Council of Resistance. After the MKO leaders and many of its members were expelled from France, they went to Iraq and founded the National Liberation Army of Iran in 1987, which entered Iranian territory a few times during the Iran-Iraq war. They were defeated in July 1988 during their last operation, the “Forugh Javidan” Operation. A few days after this operation, thousands of imprisoned Mojahedin supporters were killed during the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Ever since the summer of 1981, the MKO has continued its activities outside of Iran. No information is available regarding members and activities of the MKO inside the country. 
In spite of the “armed struggle” announcement by the MKO on June 20, 1981, many sympathizers of the organization had no military training, were not armed, and did not participate in armed conflict.
3) Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms.
4) Investigations into the murder of well-known personalities in France, Germany and Switzerland have yielded evidence and documentation showing that the officials and employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as accomplices and principals [in the killings]. In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information. 
5) A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”.
6) Forqan was formed in 1977 by a group of Ali Shari’ati’s followers with a modern interpretation of the Qoran and Islamic ideology. It is not clear whether or not the group was armed, but it went underground soon after its formation. Based on documents available in the archives of the Islamic Revolution Documentation Center (gathered and reported by Ahmad Gudarzi on Bacheha-ye Ghalam website), this group opposed from the onset of the Revolution the involvement of the clergy in the government and the particular interpretation of Islam later implemented by the Islamic Republic authorities. In its short period of post-revolutionary activity, the group was accused of involvement in several assassinations and armed robberies, the first one reportedly as early as May 1979, only a couple of months after the triumph of the Revolution. Based on the above mentioned report, most of the known members of the group were executed or killed in clashes with Islamic Revolutionary Committee forces, which led to the total elimination of the group in January 1980.
7) Arman-e Mostaza’fin Organization was founded in the summer of 1976 before the Islamic Revolution. This organization, just like the MKO, were followers of Mohammad Ali Shariati’s ideology, and started their ideological activities after the revolution by publishing a magazine called “Arman or Payam-e Mostaz’afin”. There are a few members in this group and they were mainly active in Dezful (in Khuzestan Province). They were against armed struggle and their ideological activities lasted until February 1982 when their leaders and members were arrested. Although the leaders were not executed, some of the members were executed in different cities.
8)  Mehrdad Aalikhani, one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case, had stated in his confession that, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs in the years 1989 to 1998, had told him: “If you ever leave, be careful not to talk about the work you’ve done in the past; leave those tasks alone.” (Marze Porgohar Party (quoted in Pezhvak-e Iran, August 3, 2021).
9) The Article 90 Commission is one of the specialized commissions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly whose task is to implement Article 90 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to this article "Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the executive power or the judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly. The Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply."

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