Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

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One Person’s Story

Qader Qaderi

About

Age: 49
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: March 6, 2018
Location of Killing: Ranya, Iraq
Mode of Killing: Extrajudicial shooting
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Human rights violations in this case

Extrajudicial killings

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979, with the murder of Parviz Sayyah Sina, an Anglican Bishop, and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 500 extrajudicial killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.(1)

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies. 

Documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion (The Netherlands, 2018) or arrest (Brussels, 2020; Turkey, 2021) of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial (Paris 1980 and 1991) and the evidence presented, revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant (the Mikonos Trial in Germany) has been issued for Iran’s then-Minister of Information, Ali Fallahian and the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikh Attar.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity who ordered the implementation of these crimes. (2). In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution. 

Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions, and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam (“one whose blood may be spilled, whose life can be taken, without the perpetrator incurring any punishment”) and their sentence is death regardless of where they are [and where you find them].” 

More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders” (Speech broadcast on the state-run Iranian Radio and Television on August 31, 1992, quoted from Asr Iran, August 17, 2006).

Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998 , which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders(3),” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

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1) Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. ​​These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms.
2) Investigations into the murder of well-known personalities in France, Germany and Switzerland have yielded evidence and documentation showing that the officials and employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as accomplices and principals [in the killings]. In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information. 
3) A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”.
Human rights violations

About this Case

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Mr. Qaderi was described by family members as “a very calm and collected person who established a rapport with the people around him and did not get angry”.

Information regarding the extrajudicial killing of Mr. Qader Qaderi, son of Osman, was obtained through interviews conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with a family member (October 20, 2021), one of the attorneys in the case (November 17, 2021) and Kamal Karimi, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Political Office (January 1, 2021; February 4, 2021; March 2, 2021). Additional information was obtained from the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Charter, passed in its 16thCongress (February 2016); the Persian Section of the website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd (February 16, 2016; March 8, and 19, 2018; August 2, and 5, 2021; August 29, 2018); ISNA News Agency (September 14, 2018), Reuters News Agency (July 21, 2018), Persian Deutsche Welle (March 8, 2018; July 22, 2018; July 10, 2019); Giarang website (January 3, 2019); Radio Farda (March 7, 2018); Facebook, Ista Page (August 2, 2021); Akam News (October 30, 2018). 

Mr. Qaderi was born on March 15, 1969, in a village on the outskirts of [the town of] Piranshahr in West Azarbaijan Province. He finished fifth grade in that same village. Mr. Qaderi joined the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan as Peshmerga in 1981, and remained a member of the Party until the very last moments of his life. He worked for various sections within the Party. Mr. Qaderi was initially a Peshmerga, and subsequently was Party cadre, and then functioned as a military commander in the Democratic Party. He was active in the Party’s Education, Organizational, Social, and Judicial Sections. In the final years of his life, in addition to being “protection commander”, he was also “commander of Helgurd forces”* of the Kurdistan Democratic Party stationed on the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. (Boroumand Center interview, November 17, 2021). According to one of the Party’s spokespeople, “he had been a military commander in the past but he was in charge of one of the organizational sections in recent years”. (Radio Farda, March 7, 2018). 

Mr. Qaderi was married and had six children. Family members described him as “a very calm and collected person who established a rapport with the people around him and did not get angry”. (Boroumand Center interview, November 17, 2021). The Kurdistan Democratic Party described him as “a prominent cadre and an eminent [military] commander”. (Website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 8, 2018). 

The Kurdish Problem in the Islamic Republic 

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the disagreements between the government of the Shiite Islamic Republic and the organizations in the Kurdish regions of western Iran regarding the rights and roles of minorities in drafting the Constitution; whether the government should be secular or religious, and especially the issue of Kurdish autonomy; and conflicts that resulted in Kurdish political organizations boycotting the April 1979 Referendum on instituting an Islamic Republic; led to serious, and at times armed, clashes between the central government and the Peshmerga (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s armed forces). 

On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the oldest and most influential Kurdish Party, “the Party of the Devil”, and declared it “unofficial and illegal”, and ordered a military attack on Kurdistan. Mass executions and intense armed clashes continued in the region for months, clashes that resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians and the displacement and relocation of the residents of certain towns. In the next four years, Kurdish parties lost their grip on power in the region to a great extent, and relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, a number of their leaders and members have been assassinated outside Iran, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. 

In the years since the Islamic Republic has been in existence, in addition to such entities as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan), the Koran School led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (which was active in the early years of the Revolution), certain other Kurdish opposition parties were established outside Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These parties, with policies and ideologies that are not necessarily similar and uniform, have settled in parts of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq, such as Koy, Soleimanieh, and in the foothills of Qandil mountains. Some of these parties have undergone splits in recent years. These conflicts have been more about the methods of running the organizations rather than theoretical and ideological differences. These parties have not controlled any part of the Iranian territory since the late 1980’s, and have adopted different strategies in different periods in order to confront the Islamic Republic, advance their political objectives, and recruit members. 

Beginning in 2006, the conflicts between the regime and Kurdish parties – who had increased their presence in Iran in reaction to the government intensifying the detention and execution of Kurdish activists and the spread of fundamentalist beliefs in Kurdish regions – entered a new and more serious phase. Kurdish forces, especially the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the PJAK, were attacked several times inside Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan border regions by border patrol forces and the revolutionary Guards. That same year, Revolutionary Guards conducted armed attacks against the positions of Iranian Kurdish parties inside the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. The bombing of the Night of Yalda ceremonies (an ancient celebration of the longest night of the year) in 2006, which was also Abdorrahman Qassemlu’s birthday, resulted in the death of five Party members and 2 members of the Iraqi Kurdistan security forces. Kurdish forces also attacked Islamic Republic forces on several occasions. At least dozens were killed on each side in these military clashes. ** 

In subsequent years, particularly in 2017 and 2018, the clashes continued with less frequency and intensity. The most important of these clashes was the attack by PJAK forces on a border post on July 21, 2018, which resulted in 11 deaths. (Deutsche Welle, July 22, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018). On September 8 of that same year, the seat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – a party that opposed armed struggle and had not participated in the clashes with the Islamic Republic forces – located in Koy in Iraqi Kurdistan, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in which 16 people were killed and 50 injured. (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018; Kurdistan u Kurd website, September 8, 2018). 

Background on the Formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 

Following internal conflicts within the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan – established in 1945 with the aim of autonomy for Kurdistan in northwestern Iran – the Party went through a shakeup in 2006 and was split into two separate organizations, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK). The PDK seeks “the establishment of a Kurdistan Republic within the framework of a federal Iran”. (Charter of the PDK, passed in its 16thCongress in February 2016). This party has not ruled out armed struggle; it has, however, prioritized political struggle and the expression of the people of Kurdistan’s demands through elections and other civil activities within the framework of existing domestic laws in order to achieve their goals. (The official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd, February 16, 2016). 

The PDK has demanded the implementation of, and even negotiation over, Principles 15 *** and 19 **** of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that deal with the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. In 2016-17, Party officials met with Iran’s National Security High Council officials in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. On February 15, 2016, in the Concluding Declaration of its 16thCongress, the Party emphasized “rendering the struggle and the activities more robust, both inside and outside the country, and strengthening the nationalist discourse as well as the spirit of unity and solidarity in Iranian Kurdistan in all areas and contexts” through “utilization of all means and methods of struggle for the purpose of universalizing the nationalist discourse in Iranian Kurdistan, relying on unity and solidarity”. (Boroumand Center interview, February 4, 2021; Giarang, January 3, 2019; Deutsche Welle, July 10, 2019; the official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd, February 16, 2016). 

Threats Against Mr. Qaderi, and His Murder 

According to available information and the Boroumand Center research, Mr. Qader Qaderi was killed on the night of March 6, 2018, by a flurry of bullets shot at the car carrying him when he was on a road to the village of Balissan near the town of Ranieh. (Boroumand Center interview, November 17, 2021). According to the Kurdistan Democratic Party, 20 bullets hit Mr. Qader Qaderi and his body was found lying next to the automobile. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 19, 2018). 

Mr. Qaderi’s family stated that on the day of his assassination, “he had gone to meet a Party member who had come from inside [Iran] for Party related business”. His family then advised him to stay [where he was] when the meeting took longer than scheduled. (Radio Farda, March 7, 2018). That was the family’s last contact with Mr. Qaderi. 

A few days after this event, The Democratic Party reported the arrest of five defendants in relation to this case, including a woman. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 19, 2018). 

In coordinating Mr. Qaderi’s murder, a number of automobiles with government plates and a government issue Kalashnikov weapon were used. One of the accused was a member of the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Peshmerga forces. (Boroumand Center Interview, October 20, 2021). According to one of the attorneys in the case “at the time of the arrest, in addition to the weapon and the SIM cards through which the defendants had made certain calls, the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region police found Mr. Qaderi’s Party issue firearm which the killers had taken after the murder. (Boroumand Center Interview, October 20, 2021). 

Mr. Qaderi had been threatened numerous times before being killed. According to family members, in the years prior to his death, he had been threatened in different ways, including receiving death threats on the phone. These threats had increased, however, in the years and the month that culminated in his murder, and especially since he had become commander of the Helgurd forces. The family does not know what or who the sources of these threats were, but Mr. qaderi had told his relatives that he knew where “these calls in which he was threatened in Farsi” come from. (Boroumand Center Interview, November 17, 2021). 

Mr. Qaderi’s body was laid to rest in the town of Kuye’s, in the Democratic Partty’s Martyrs’ Cemetery in the presence of his family, and the Party cadre, Peshmerga, and members. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 8, 2018). 

Mr. Qaderi’s funeral services were held at the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Headquarters near the town of Kuye Sanjaq. Other family members in Iran were not allowed to hold services for him but services were held for him unofficially nonetheless, a number of people came to Mr. Qaderi’s family home in Piranshahr to pay their respects and express their condolences. (Boroumand Center Interview, November 17, 2021). 

The Party’s Reaction 

Following Mr. Qaderi’s murder, the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a statement in which it recalled the extrajudicial killings of Kurdish opposition members in the Iraqi Autonomous Region and stated: “The assassinated individual did not have any personal enmity with anyone, and we believe that the responsibility for this assassination lies with the Islamic Republic [of Iran].” 

The Party announced in its statement that it expected Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s government, people, and political forces, as well as Iranian Kurds residing in the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region “to watch out for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s terrorist conspiracies.” According to this statement, “in the course of close and intensive cooperation, the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region security and other relevant organs, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Security Committee began investigations into the initial clues regarding the event. Follow-ups and interrogation of several suspects of the assassination led to the identification and the arrest of the principal defendants responsible for the martyrdom of Qader Qaderi. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 19, 2018). 

On Monday, March 19, 2019, the Kurdistan Democratic Party announced that with the cooperation of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s security apparatus, the people responsible for Mr. Qaderi’s assassination had been identified and arrested.

Immediately after Mr. Qaderi’s murder, the Kurdistan Democratic Party initiated legal proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s courts. (Boroumand Center Interview, October 20, 2021). 

Reacting to the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Irbil Criminal Court’s ruling, Mansur Morovati, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s leadership, stated in a press conference: “From the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s perspective, [Mr. Qaderi’s murder] is an assassination, and not a regular murder. We therefore expect the Criminal Court to condemn the actual instruments of this crime, that is, the Islamic Republic [of Iran], which, unfortunately, has an extensive record of assassinating prominent Kurdish [opponents] in this part of Kurdistan [meaning Iraqi Kurdistan].” (Facebook, Esta Page, August 2, 2021). 

In another reaction to the Irbil Criminal Court’s ruling, the Party expressed optimism that this decision would be a turning point in re-examining the assassinations of other political activists in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region by the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website’s Kurdish Section, Kurdistan u Kurd, August 5, 2021). 

Assu Hassanzadeh, Kurdistan Democratic Party spokesperson stated in this regard: “The Islamic Republic has great influence in Iraq. In the 1990’s, when Kurdish parties were entangled in divisive behavior and infighting, [the Islamic Republic] set up terrorist and security cells. After the Referendum, when things have gotten worse in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, the Islamic Republic has better opportunities to carry out its threats against our party.” Only five days before Qader Qaderi’s assassination, a Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan commander’s automobile had exploded in a bombing. (Persian Deutsche Welle, March 8, 2018). 

In response to a question regarding the possibility of internal conflict [among Kurdish parties] that had been published by certain media close to the Iranian government (Akam News, October 30, 2018), Mr. Hassanzadeh stated: “That is absolutely not the case. It is true that Kurdish parties are not as united as they should be but we turned over a new leaf and have started a good level of cooperation and unity. We have established the Center for the Cooperation and Coordination of Iranian Kurdish Parties, and cooperation between Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan is very good right now.” (Persian Deutsche Welle, March 8, 2018). 

Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Reaction 

Following Mr. Qaderi’s murder, Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s security institutions began investigations that ultimately led to the arrest of the five principal defendants. Four were citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan and one was an Iranian Kurdish citizen. 

All five defendants were tried in the Irbil Criminal Court. The Irbil Criminal Court sentenced Osman Faqih Maleki (AKA Molla Mostafa Hizop), Salam Mahmud Qader, and Soleiman Ebrahim Soleiman, to death for being directly involved in Mr. Qaderi’s murder, a senior member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The sentenced was issued pursuant to Article 406, Paragraphs (a) and (b) [of the Iraqi Penal Code]. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website’s Kurdish Section, Kurdistan u Kurd, August 2, 2021). 

Another individual by the name of Barzan Borhan Esmail, and a woman by the name of Ayisha Mohammad Hassan, were each sentenced to 5 years in prison and a monetary penalty. These two individuals were convicted pursuant to Article 247 of the Iraqi Penal Code. (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website’s Kurdish Section, Kurdistan u Kurd, August 2, 2021). 

After the court issued its ruling, Mr. Ayad Kakai, one of the members of a team of attorneys in Mr. Qaderi’s case, stated in a news conference that the defendants had confessed that a foreign power was involved in Mr. Qaderi’s murder and that they had been assigned the task of killing him in exchange for certain sums of money, and with the full knowledge that he was a political personality. (Facebook, Esta Page, August 2, 2021). However, Sohrab Rahmati, another one of the attorneys in the case, stated that in spite of that fact, the case was adjudicated under Iraqi general penal law as “intentional murder”. (Boroumand Center Interview, October 20, 2021). 

Mr. Qaderi’s attorneys appealed the decision and requested that the Appeals Court re-examine the case. They asked that [the case be considered under] Article 2, Note 7 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Law on Terror of 2006 instead of [under Iraqi Penal Code] Article 406. According to the attorneys, examining Mr. Qaderi’s murder case pursuant to Article 2 [of the Law on Terror] makes it possible to put forth the theory of “foreign involvement”. Regarding the death penalty for the three principal defendants, Mr. Rahmati stated: “They might still be sentenced to death even if they are tried under the Law on Terror, but the content of the charge and the ruling will change. Obviously when a defendant is [tried and] sentenced pursuant to Article 2 of the Law on Terror, he/she will be presented as a terrorist, and he/she will not have the privileges of an individual who has been sentenced in accordance with Article 406. For instance, a sentence issued under the Law on Terror will absolutely not be subjected to a pardon.” (Boroumand Center Interview, October 20, 2021). 

During Mr. Qaderi’s burial, a number of the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s officials, as well as some opposition Iranian Kurdish parties’ officials expressed their condolences to Mr. Qaderi’s family. Qobad Talebani, Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Deputy Prime Minister sent a message where he “expressed his condolences to Martyr Qaderi’s family and brothers in arm and condemned this terrorist act, and emphasized that the police and other relevant authorities are duty-bound to investigate and follow-up on this terrorist act.” (Kurdistan Democratic Party Website’s Kurdish Section, Kurdistan u Kurd, March 8, 2018). 

Islamic Republic Officials’ Reaction 

The Islamic Republic did not react officially to the accusation of being involved in Mr. Qaderi’s assassination. In similar cases, the Islamic Republic has either stayed silent on the matter or has ascribed the killing of opponents to “internal conflict” among opposition groups. Regarding this case, a number of the media close to the Iranian regime, considered Mr. Qaderi’s murder to have been “the settling of a personal matter (vendetta)”. (Akam News, October 30, 2018). 

Family’s Reaction 

Mr. Qaderi’s family’s first reaction to his murder was to bring a complaint in the Irbil Criminal Court. (Boroumand Center Interview, November 17, 2021). 

After the issuance of the sentence, they asked that the case be re-examined under the Iraqi

Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s Law on Terror at the Appeals Court. (Boroumand Center Interview, November 17, 2021). 

The family considers the Islamic Republic as the principal culprit in Mr. Qaderi’s killing. They have not lodged any complaints in Iranian courts as of this writing, however, because of the special circumstances in Iran. (Boroumand Center Interview, November 17, 2021). 

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* “Helgurd,” a Kurdish term, is the name of one of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s military forces, that had been based along the Iran – Iraqi Kurdistan border in years past, in a camp much farther than the Party’s main headquarters. 
*** Principle 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.” 
**** Principle 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran:” All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.”

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