Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Havreh Karsaz

About

Age: 34
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: September 8, 2018
Location of Killing: Koy-Sanjagk, Iraq
Mode of Killing: Extrajudicial Execution

Human rights violations in this case

Extrajudicial killings

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a long history of politically motivated violence in Iran and around the world. Since the 1979 Revolution, Islamic Republic operatives inside and outside the country have engaged in kidnapping, disappearing, and killing a large number of individuals whose activities they deemed undesirable. The actual number of the victims of extrajudicial killings inside Iran is not clear; however, these murders began in February 1979, with the murder of Parviz Sayyah Sina, an Anglican Bishop, and have continued since then, both inside and outside Iran. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center has so far identified over 500 extrajudicial killings outside Iran attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.(1)

Dissidents have been assassinated by the agents of the Islamic Republic outside Iran, where one of the first assassinations, that of a Navy Officer, Shahriar Shafiq, took place in Paris in December 1979. These assassinations have taken place in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Europe; and the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. In too many cases, states have failed to guarantee the victims’ rights to the truth, justice, and remedy; states have revealed little about the assassinations and have not issued arrest warrants. Where there have been arrests and prosecutions, available information reveals a state policy of eliminating perceived enemies. 

Documentation, evidence, and traces obtained through investigations conducted by local police and judicial authorities confirm, however, the theory of state committed crimes. In certain cases, these investigations have resulted in the expulsion (The Netherlands, 2018) or arrest (Brussels, 2020; Turkey, 2021) of Iranian diplomats. In limited cases outside Iran, the perpetrators of these murders have been arrested and put on trial (Paris 1980 and 1991) and the evidence presented, revealed the defendants’ connection to Iran’s government institutions, and an arrest warrant (the Mikonos Trial in Germany) has been issued for Iran’s then-Minister of Information, Ali Fallahian and the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Hossein Sheikh Attar.

The manner in which these killings were organized and implemented in Iran and abroad, is indicative of a single pattern which, according to Roland Chatelin, the Swiss prosecutor, contains common parameters and detailed planning. It can be ascertained from the similarities between these murders in different countries that the Iranian government is the principal entity who ordered the implementation of these crimes. (2). In 1997, the Berlin Criminal Court, in charge of hearing the case of the shooting of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, officially announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s highest-ranking officials had issued the order to carry out the killings. According to the indictment, the decision to commit the murders was made in a committee called the “Special Operations Committee” composed of the President, the Minister of Information and Security (VAVAK), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the various security organs and other organizations, and finally, the Leader of the Revolution. 

Iranian authorities have not officially accepted responsibility for these murders and have even attributed their commission to internal strife in opposition groups. Nevertheless, since the very inception of the Islamic Republic regime, the Islamic Republic officials have justified these crimes from an ideological and legal standpoint. In the spring of 1979, Sadeq Khalkhali, the first Chief Shari’a Judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, officially announced the regime’s decision to implement extrajudicial executions, and justified the decision: “ … These people have been sentenced to death; from the Iranian people’s perspective, if someone wants to assassinate these individuals abroad, in any country, no government has any right to bring the perpetrator to trial as a terrorist, because such a person is the implementing agent of the sentence issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Therefore, they are Mahduroddam (“one whose blood may be spilled, whose life can be taken, without the perpetrator incurring any punishment”) and their sentence is death regardless of where they are [and where you find them].” 

More than 10 years after these proclamations, in a speech about the security forces’ success, Ali Fallahian, the regime’s Minister of Information stated the following regarding the elimination of members of the opposition: “ … We have had success in inflicting damage to many of these little groups outside the country and on our borders” (Speech broadcast on the state-run Iranian Radio and Television on August 31, 1992, quoted from Asr Iran, August 17, 2006).

Extrajudicial killings have rarely been pursued legally in Iran. The few murders that were followed up on in 1998 , which came to be known as “the Serial (Chain) Murders(3),” have brought to light the involvement and responsibility of the country’s Information officials. Several Ministry of Information agents who were defendants in the Serial Murders case, confirmed the existence of a long term government policy of extrajudicial killings and emphasized that there was planning on an annual basis to carry out these executions, for which a religious decree was issued. There was a budget allocated and there were objectives set, and those who participated in the murders were commended. In a lecture given at [the city of] Hamedan’s Bu Ali University in 1996, Sa’eed Emami, Ministry of Information Deputy Minister for Security Affairs and one of the principal defendants in the Serial Murders case – who was later said by Iranian officials to have committed suicide while in detention – had stressed that the activities of Iran’s security forces were not confined to the country’s borders: “ … We have set the security perimeter within the confines of our borders. [However,] if we see threats infiltrating inside the country from abroad, we will enlarge the perimeter.”

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1) Among the first known murders that occurred a week after the February 1979 Revolution was that of Mr. Parviz (Arastu) Sayyah Sina, the bishop of a church in the city of Shiraz. The assassination of Mr. Shahriar Shafiq, an Imperial Navy officer, in December 1979 in Paris is among the first murders committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside the country. ​​These killings continued in the following years inside and outside the country and in various forms.
2) Investigations into the murder of well-known personalities in France, Germany and Switzerland have yielded evidence and documentation showing that the officials and employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as accomplices and principals [in the killings]. In France, the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraph was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his assistant, Sorush Katibeh. In Germany (Berlin), the Islamic Republic’s security agents and agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of four Kurdish opposition leaders. In connection with the latter case, German Judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the then-Minister of Information. 
3) A few days before Mr. Mokhtari’s murder, Dariush Foruhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, leaders of the People of Iran Party, had been killed in a most heinous manner in their own home. After Mr. Mokhtari’s body was found, the body of Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh, another well-known literary figure, was discovered in a village near the city of Karaj. These four individuals’ cases was named the “Serial Murders”.
Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1.

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion.

 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law.

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Capital punishment
  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Mr. Karsaz was an intellectual whose biggest wish was for Iranian Kurdistan to be liberated so that the people could live freely.

Information regarding the killing of Mr. Havreh Karsaz, son of Khaled and Maryam, was obtained from an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with Ms. Shabbu Banafsheh, Mr. Karsaz’ wife (December 17, 2020). The news of this killing was also published on the Akam News website (September 9, 2018), on the official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd (September 9, 2018), the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s archives (undated), and on the Hengaw Human Rights Organization website (September 9, 2018).

Additional information was obtained through interviews conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with Mr. Kamal Karimi, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (January 1, February 4, and March 2, 2021), Mr. Mansur Khosravi, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (March 31, 2021), and Mr. Farzin Nadimi, research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (April 20, 2021). Additional information was obtained from the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Charter, passed in its 16thCongress (February 2016), Reuters News Agency (July 21, 2018), Persian Deutsche Welle (July 10, 1nd 22, 2018), the official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd (February 16, 2016; September 7, 2016; September 8, 2018), ISNA News Agency (September 10, and 14, 2018), and other sources.*

Mr. Karsaz was an ethnic Kurd, married, and was born in 1985-86, in the Sheikhan region of Oshnuyeh County in West Azarbaijan Province. Mr. Karsaz’ father was one of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s old Peshmerga. Mr. Karsaz finished elementary school and then started working as a mechanic’s helper in a mechanic shop in Oshnuyeh, and was drawn to political and party-related activities. (Boroumand Center interview, December 17, 2020).

In 2005-06, Mr. Karsaz joined the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s secret organization located in Oshnuyeh County. In 2006, after the split in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, he became a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party as a Peshmerga. He joined the Party’s Security Committee in 2011-12, and became a member of the Party’s Financial Commission in 2012-13. In 2014-15, Mr. Karsaz became a political staff member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Security and Protection Forces of the Political Office, and became the commander of these forces in March-April 2018. (Party Archives).

Mr. Karsaz was an intellectual and extremely active, who always wanted to make progress. His biggest wish was for Iranian Kurdistan to be liberated so that the people could live freely, and so he could see his family once again. (Boroumand Center interview, December 17, 2020).

The Kurdish Problem in the Islamic Republic

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the disagreements between the government of the Shiite Islamic Republic and the organizations in the Kurdish regions of western Iran regarding the rights and roles of minorities in drafting the Constitution; whether the government should be secular or religious, and especially the issue of Kurdish autonomy; and conflicts that resulted in Kurdish political organizations boycotting the April 1979 Referendum on instituting an Islamic Republic; led to serious, and at times armed, clashes between the central government and the Peshmerga (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s armed forces).

On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the oldest and most influential Kurdish Party, “the Party of the Devil”, and declared it “unofficial and illegal”, and ordered a military attack on Kurdistan. Mass executions and intense armed clashes continued in the region for months, clashes that resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians and the displacement and relocation of the residents of certain towns. In the next four years, Kurdish parties lost their grip on power in the region to a great extent, and relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, a number of their leaders and members have been assassinated outside Iran, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan.

In the years since the Islamic Republic has been in existence, in addition to such entities as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan), the Koran School led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (which was active in the early years of the Revolution), certain other Kurdish opposition parties were established outside Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). These parties, with policies and ideologies that are not necessarily similar and uniform, have settled in parts of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq, such as Koy, Soleimanieh, and in the foothills of Qandil mountains. Some of these parties have undergone splits in recent years. These conflicts have been more about the methods of running the organizations rather than theoretical and ideological differences. These parties have not controlled any part of the Iranian territory since the late 1980’s, and have adopted different strategies in different periods in order to confront the Islamic Republic, advance their political objectives, and recruit members.

Beginning in 2006, the conflicts between the regime and Kurdish parties – who had increased their presence in Iran in reaction to the government intensifying the detention and execution of Kurdish activists and the spread of fundamentalist beliefs in Kurdish regions – entered a new and more serious phase. Kurdish forces, especially the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the PJAK, were attacked several times inside Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan border regions by border patrol forces and the revolutionary Guards. That same year, Revolutionary Guards conducted armed attacks against the positions of Iranian Kurdish parties inside the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. The bombing of the Night of Yalda ceremonies (an ancient celebration of the longest night of the year) in 2006, which was also Abdorrahman Qassemlu’s birthday, resulted in the death of five Party members and 2 members of the Iraqi Kurdistan security forces. Kurdish forces also attacked Islamic Republic forces on several occasions. At least dozens were killed on each side in these military clashes.**

In subsequent years, particularly in 2017 and 2018, the clashes continued with less frequency and intensity. The most important of these clashes was the attack by PJAK forces on a border post on July 21, 2018, which resulted in 11 deaths. (Deutsche Welle, July 22, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018). On September 8 of that same year, the seat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – a party that opposed armed struggle and had not participated in the clashes with the Islamic Republic forces – located in Koy in Iraqi Kurdistan, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in which 16 people were killed and 50 injured. (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018; Kurdistan u Kurd website (September 8, 2018).

Background on the Formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party

Following internal conflicts within the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan – established in 1945 with the aim of autonomy for Kurdistan in northwestern Iran – the Party went through a shakeup in 2006 and was split into two separate organizations, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK). The PDK seeks “the establishment of a Kurdistan Republic within the framework of a federal Iran”. (Charter of the PDK, passed in its 16thCongress in February 2016). This party has not ruled out armed struggle; it has, however, prioritized political struggle and the expression of the people of Kurdistan’s demands through elections and other civil activities within the framework of existing domestic laws in order to achieve their goals. (The official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd, February 16, 2016).

The PDK has demanded the implementation of, and even negotiation over, Principles 15*** and 19**** of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that deals with the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. In 2016-17, Party officials met with Iran’s National Security High Council officials in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. On February 15, 2016, in the Concluding Declaration of its 16thCongress, the Party emphasized “rendering the struggle and the activities more robust, both inside and outside the country, and strengthening the nationalist discourse as well as the spirit of unity and solidarity in Iranian Kurdistan in all areas and contexts” through “utilization of all means and methods of struggle for the purpose of universalizing the nationalist discourse in Iranian Kurdistan, relying on unity and solidarity”. (Boroumand Center interview, February 4, 2021; Giarang, January 3, 2019; Deutsche Welle, July 10, 2019; the official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan u Kurd, February 16, 2016).

Threats Made Against Mr. Karsaz and His Death

On September 8, 2018, Mr. Havreh Karsaz was killed in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ rocket attack on the location where a meeting of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Central Committee was being held in the town of Koy Sanjaq, located in Iraq’s Erbil Province.

According to Ms. Banafsheh, Mr. Karsaz went to his place of work at the Party headquarters known as “Qala” (“Qal’eh” or fort) at 8 o’clock in the morning as he was the person in charge of the guards. He contacted his wife at 9:30 AM and had a brief visit with her a short while later. Ms. Banafsheh said this to the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center regarding the attack: “It was exactly 10:45 in the morning when a thunderous sound was heard as a result of the explosion caused by the first rocket, which was 2 to 3 meters (approximately 2 to 3 yards) from us. The rocket hit exactly the door to the entrance of the Kurdistan Women’s Solidarity Office, where I worked.” (Boroumand Center interview, December 17, 2020).

At 10:45 in the morning of September 8, 2018, the political offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) located in a building known as the Democratic Qala (“Fort”) in Koy Sanjaq, a town 66 kilometers (41 miles) from the Iran-Iraq border, was the target of a rocket attack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The structure, which is 700 meters (765 yards) long and 200 meters (218 yards) wide, is comprised of 100 rooms on two levels and a basement, where all of the Party’s various sections are located, that is, the political and military sections, other sections related to women, children, and youth issues, the Party’s radio and television, as well as the sleeping and living quarters of the single members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Peshmerga. Married Peshmerga and their families live one kilometer from this structure. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s offices and buildings, including the Party’s training and education center is also approximately one kilometer to the east of this structure. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s training and education center is the closest building to the Qala. Party ceremonies used to be conducted in this building prior to the attack. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s political and military training headquarters were also targeted. (Boroumand Center interview, March 31, 2021).

According to the Revolutionary Guards and local eyewitnesses, seven ground to ground precision missiles were fired, three of which hit the PDK headquarters, and two hit the ground close to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s training center. As a result, 14 PDK members and 2 PDKI members were killed, and 50 were wounded, a number of whom were women and children. (Boroumand Center interview, January 1, 2021; official website of the Kurdistan Democratic Party; Holy Defense News Agency, September 9, 2018).

In an interview with Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Farzin Nadimi, research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stated: “Based on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ claims, the technology used in the Fateh 110 missile used in the attack against the Kurdistan Democratic Party headquarters probably had a high level of precision.” According to Mr. Nadimi, one cannot opine on why the other two missiles did not hit a specific target, and it is not clear whether these rockets were supposed to hit the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s headquarters or the seat of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. (Boroumand Center interview, April 20, 2021).

Ms. Banafsheh and her colleagues in the Women’s Solidarity section were wounded as a result of the attack. She was in a car being taken to the hospital when the next rockets hit the location where the meeting of the Party’s leaders was being held. She learned of her husband’s death on September 11, 2018. (Boroumand Center interview, December 17, 2020).

After the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ rocket attack on the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s headquarters and the execution of three Kurdish political prisoners, Zanyar Moradi, Loqman Moradi, and Ramin Hosseinpanahi, Kurdish civil and political activists and Kurdish parties, including the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan, the Iranian Kurdistan Struggle, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a call for a nationwide strike on September 8, 2018. Following this call, business owners in bazars of various towns in Kurdistan, Western Azarbaijan, and Kermanshah Provinces shut down their stores on September 12, 2018. (Deutsche Welle, September 12, 2018).

Iranian Officials’ Reaction

News of the September 8 rocket attack was initially published by semi-official media close to military institutions. A day later, on September 9, 2021, the Revolutionary Guards Corps issued an announcement in which it accepted responsibility for the rocket attack on the Kurdistan Democratic Party camp, stating that the reason for the attack was “the leaders of these groups’ defiance and inattention to serious warnings issued by the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region’s officials emphasizing the Islamic Republic’s determination to remove their bases, and the necessity for putting an end to their mischief, aggression, and invasive and terrorist activities against Islamic Iran”. (Holy Defense News Agency, September 9, 2018). Bahram Qassemi, then-spokesman of Iran’s Foreign Ministry declared that the attack was a response to the July 21, 2018 attack on the border post that had resulted in the death of several border patrolmen. (Mehr News Agency, September 10, 2018). On July 21, 2018, however, Reuters New Agency had quoted Hossein Khosheqbal, Kurdistan Province’s Deputy Governor for Political [Affairs], as attributing the attack on the border post to the PJAK. In an interview with Fars News Agency, Mohammad Hossein Rajabi, commander of Kurdistan’s Shahid Shahramfar Provincial Military Base had also stated on September 8, 2018, that is, one day after the attack on Kurdish parties in Iraq, that the killing of 6 PJAK members [on September 7, 2018] by the Revolutionary Guards local forces in “a pursuit operation named after the great Heidar Karrar” was in response to the attack on the border post and the killing of “11 indigenous Guards”. (Fars News Agency, September 8, 2018; Reuters, July 21, 2018).

Confirming Iran’s rocket attack, Ali Shamkhani, National Security High Council’s Secretary, stated that it was a response to “activities that jeopardized [national] security”. (ISNA News Agency, September 10, 2018). Furthermore, Major-General Mohammad Baqeri, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces asked the Iraqi Government and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous Region to either turn over the members of that Party and of other parties opposed to Iran, or expel them from their territory. (ISNA News Agency, September 14, 2018).

The Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Reaction

In an interview with the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Kamal Karimi, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s political office stated that the Party had not conducted any military operations inside Iran since the split in 2006, and that the dispatch of the Peshmerga inside Iran was in order to conduct propaganda and promotion activities. (Boroumand Center interview, February 4, 2021). Hengaw Human Rights Organization’s 2016 report (the timeframe of the research conducted), which records military activities between Kurdish parties and the Iranian regime’s military forces, does not contain any form of clashes between the members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party with the Islamic Republic’s military and security forces. The Kurdistan u Kurd website, the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s news arm, reported the killing of two of its members on September 6, 2016, that had been in Iran in order to carry out “political activities” and had been trapped in an “explosive net”. (Kurdistan u Kurd website, September 7, 2016).

The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan reacted to the Islamic republic’s missile attack in separate announcements. The Kurdistan Democratic Party’s political office condemned the Revolutionary Guards’ missile attack on the Party’s bases, and asked political groups, activists, international organizations and institutions, and the world public opinion to condemn the attack. In its announcement, the Party emphasized that the location where the missiles had hit were the Party’s offices and civic centers. (Kurdistan Democratic Party’s website, September 8, 2018). According to Kamal Karimi, the 2018 attack on a border post in [the town of] Marivan, which was the pretext for the missile attack on the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s offices, had been carried out by the PJAK and the latter had officially accepted responsibility for that attack. (Boroumand Center interview, March 2, 2021; Radio France, July 21, 2018).

According to available information, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has continued negotiations with the Islamic Republic after the missile attack. The Party and three other Kurdish political groups were in direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic in July 2019, with a Norwegian non-governmental organization as intermediary. However, in an interview with the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Kamal Karimi, member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s political office, stated that these negotiations have been halted for now. (Deutsche Welle, July 8, 2019; Boroumand Center interview, February 4, 2021).

Reaction of the Governments of Iraq and the Kurdistan Autonomous Region of Iraq

On Sunday, September 9, 2018, the Iraqi government condemned the missile attack on the bases of two opposition Kurdish parties by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and called it a “violation of its sovereignty”. Ahmad Mahjub, Iraq Foreign Ministry’s spokesman stressed: “Iraq wishes to [maintain] the security of its neighboring countries, and is opposed to any use of its territory for the purpose of endangering the security of these nations. Therefore, Baghdad strongly refutes any breach of its sovereignty caused by bombing any targets inside Iraqi territory without first obtaining the prior consent of Iraqi authorities.” The government of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region also issued a statement in which it condemned the Revolutionary Guards Corps’ aerial attack on the democratic parties’ offices and asked the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Kurdish parties settled in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region not to turn the Region into a conflict and competition zone. The Iraqi President Foad Massum expressed his concern and sorrow and stated that Iran’s attack on the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s camp and offices in the town of Koy constituted an extensive breach of the country’s security. (Radio Farda, September 9, 2018; Kurdistan 24, September 9, 2018; ISNA News Agency, September 10 and 14, 2018).

Impacts on Family

Regarding the effect of her husband’s death, Ms. Banafsheh told the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center: “It was extremely painful. Imagine how difficult it is to lose the most precious person in your life, someone you shared your life with. It’s not something you can forget. Every day, I go over everything he ever went through, his pain, the injustices and misery he endured. My child who was 6 years old when her father was killed, is very sad. He/she came to me three days after his/her father’s death, but he/she was afraid of me and was extremely upset and was constantly screaming his/her father’s name. Although he/she feels a bit better, he/she talks to me about his/her father every day and recounts his memories. He/she likes to visit his grave every day, and he/she finds solace there.”

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* Holy Defense News Agency (September 9, 2018); Fars News Agency (September 8, 2018); Hengaw Human Rights Organizations Annual Report (2016); Radio France (July 21, 2018); Radio Farda (September 9, 2018); Kurdistan 24 website (September 9, 2018); Ara News (April 20, and September 25, 2016, March 20, 2017); Giarang website (January 3, 2019); Mehr News Agency (September 10, 2018).
** For instance, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) Peshmerga’s attack on the soldiers’ parade on April 17, 2016 (Ara News, April 19, 2016); the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s attack in Oshnuyeh on June 15, 2016, that resulted in the death of 6 Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen (Rudaw, June 16, 2016); the attack by the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan Peshmerga on a large Security location in the town of Piranshahr on September 24, 2016, following the arrest of dozens of Kurdish activists that resulted in more than 30 Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen dead and dozens injured (Ara News, September 25, 2016); the attack by the “Eagles of Zagros” group in the town of Marivan in March 2017, that resulted in the death of at least two Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen (Ara News, March 19, 2017).
*** Principle 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as textbooks, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.”
**** Principle 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran:” All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.”

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