Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Zeinab Sekaanvand Lokran

About

Age: 24
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: October 2, 2018
Location of Killing: Central Prison (Darya), Orumieh, Azarbaijan-e Gharbi Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Hanging
Charges: Murder
Age at time of alleged offense: 17

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1.

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law.

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been

convicted or acquitted.

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment
  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

  • The right of a person not to be subjected to the capital punishment for an offence committed before the age of eighteen. The right not to be deprived of life while pregnant.

ICCPR, Article 6.5; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37.a.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

got married when she was only 15 years old and was abused verbally and physically by her husband repeatedly.

The news of the execution of Mrs. Zeinab Sekaanvand Lokran, daughter of Khatoon and Mohammad, was published on the websites of Mizan News Agency on October 7, 2018 and Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) on October 8, 2018. Additional information regarding this execution was obtained through Human Rights Activists News Agency- HRANA (October 2, 2018), Center for Human Rights in Iran (October 2, 2018), Kurdistan Human Rights Network (May 15 and October 4, 2016, and January 8, 2017), Iran Human Rights (October 7, 2016), and Amnesty International newsletters (October 11, 2016 and March 17, 2017).

Mrs. Sekaanvand was born on June 22, 1994 in a poor, traditional Kurdish family in the city of Maku in West Azerbaijan Province. She got married in February/March 2010 when she was just 15, and according to one of her relatives, she was abused verbally and physically by her husband (HRANA, Center for Human Rights in Iran, Amnesty International newsletter, October 11, 2016).

Mrs. Sekaanvand’s case was related to her husband’s death in the city of Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on February 24, 2012.

At the time of the incident, Mrs. Sekaanvand was 17 years old. International laws have strictly prohibited capital punishment for those who were under the age of 18 at the time of committing a crime. As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Iran has the obligation not to impose capital punishment for an offence committed before the age of eighteen.

On October 11, 2016, Amnesty International urged the Iranian authorities to stop execution of Mrs. Sekaanvand.

Mrs. Sekaanvand was held in a police station for 20 days, during which she was repeatedly beaten by police officers.

Arrest and detention

Information regarding the exact time and manner of arrest and detention of Mrs. Sekaanvand is contradictory.

According to Mrs. Sekaanvand’s lawyer, she turned herself into police on February 24, 2012. Based on Amnesty International’s report, Mrs. Sekaanvand was held in a police station for 20 days, during which she was repeatedly beaten by police officers. After 20 days, Mrs. Sekaanvand was transferred to Urmia Central Prison (Center for Human Rights in Iran, Amnesty International’s newsletter).

However, according to some other news agencies, Mrs. Sekaanvand was arrested on March 1, 2012, and spent the first two years of detention at the city of Khoy’s Prison and after the court order was issued, she was transferred to the women’s ward of Urmia Central Prison (HRANA, Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Iran Human Rights).

In 2015/2016, Mrs. Sekaanvand married a prisoner in the Urmia Central Prison and became pregnant, but due to psychological stress after the execution of one of her cellmates, the baby was born stillborn in Urmia on September 30, 2016. According to Amnesty International, Mrs. Sekaanvand was returned to prison one day after her delivery and was deprived of access to medical care and a psychologist (HRANA, Center for Human Rights in Iran, Iran Human Rights, and Kurdistan Human Rights Network- October 4, 2016).

Mrs. Sekaanvand was deprived of access to medical services during pregnancy and was examined by a doctor once. Two weeks before Mrs. Sekaanvand’s delivery, the prison’s health clinic made a request to send her to a hospital for examination and ultrasound, but prison authorities refused this request (Kurdistan Human Rights Network- October 4, 2016).

In January 2017, the authorities in Urmia Central Prison banned Mrs. Sekaanvand from weekly visits with her husband. The reason for such a decision was the widespread news about Mrs. Sekaanvand’s case in the foreign media and human rights organizations. In protest against this decision, Mrs. Sekaanvand had been on hunger strike since January 7, 2017 (Kurdistan Human Rights Network, January 8, 2017).

Mrs. Sekaanvand did not meet with her lawyer until the last session of the trial.

During the preliminary investigation, Mrs. Sekaanvand was denied access to a lawyer. Since she was not financially capable of recruiting a lawyer, the court appointed her a lawyer (Amnesty International newsletters, October 11, 2016 and Kurdistan Human Rights Network, January 8, 2017). Mrs. Sekaanvand did not meet with her lawyer until the last session of the trial (Amnesty International newsletters, March 17, 2017).

Trial

Branch Two of the Criminal Court in Urmia County tried Mrs. Sekaanvand in three sessions. The final court session was held on October 18, 2014 (Kurdistan Human Rights Network, October 4, 2016).

Charges

The charge brought against Mrs. Sekaanvand was “murder.”

The validity of the criminal charges brought against this defendant cannot be ascertained in the absence of the basic guarantees of a fair trial.  International human rights organizations have drawn attention to reports indicating that the Islamic Republic authorities have brought trumped-up charges, including drug trafficking, sexual, and other criminal offences, against their opponents (including political, civil society activists, as well as unionists and ethnic and religious minorities). Each year Iranian authorities sentence to death hundreds of alleged common criminals, following judicial processes that fail to meet international standards. The exact number of people convicted and executed based on trumped-up charges is unknown.

According to Mrs. Sekaanvand’s attorney, the judge ignored her reasoning about her client’s innocence.

Evidence of guilt

According to the official reports regarding this execution, the “explicit confession of the accused party” was used as the evidence against Mrs. Sekaanvand. The reports stated that Mrs. Sekaanvand had turned herself into police and that “at the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the court, she explained and confessed that following the murder she drove her car to a hospital and informed the police” (Mizan and ILNA News Agencies).

According to available information, Mrs. Sekaanvand had confessed that at the night of the incident, she and her husband were in her father-in-law’s house for dinner and after watching a movie, they returned to their home. Then they had an argument and she went off in a huff. When her husband noticed she was sad he “offered for her to tie his hands, feet, and eyes up and beat him so as to calm down. But after she tied her husband’s hands, feet, and eyes, she took a knife from the kitchen and stabbed twice in her husband’s throat, which eventually caused his death. Then she turned herself into police (Mizan and ILNA News Agencies).

Defense

Mrs. Sekaanvand was 17 years old at the time of the incident and the court tried and sentenced her without complying with the rules of procedure regarding juvenile offenders. Despite the fact that Mrs. Sekaanvand’s trial and conviction came after the passage of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, it does not appear that the court applied Article 91 of that Code which empowers judges to issue an alternative sentence to the death penalty where a juvenile offender is found to have not understood the nature of the crime committed or their full mental development is uncertain.

According to Mrs. Sekaanvand’s attorney, the judge ignored her reasoning about her client’s innocence. She continued that Mrs. Sekaanvand could not have been a murderer for certain reasons, but that these reasons were not considered by the judge. In this report, Mrs. Sekaanvand’s attorney did not mention her arguments and reasons and stated: “I’m no longer willing to talk about them now. Those issues should have been considered when the case was under review” (Center for Human Rights in Iran).

According to the Iran Human Rights’ report, the court order issued for Mrs. Sekaanvand referred to her statements made during interrogations that she was beaten and abused by her husband, and even filed a complaint. However, the authorities do not appear to have conducted any investigations into the allegations of domestic abuse (Center for Human Rights in Iran).

Mrs. Sekaanvand repeatedly recanted her confessions.

A  source well-informed about Mrs. Sekaanvand’s case stated: “A reconstruction of the murder scene [was not carried out while she was in detention], and many doubts were raised as to why there were no blood spots on her clothing as well as to the direction of the knife wound on the victim’s body” (Center for Human Rights in Iran). In this regard, the Kurdistan Human Rights Network quoted Mrs. Sekaanvand’s court appointed lawyer: “Considering the fact that Zeinab was right-handed and the throat was cut from behind, the direction of the wound on the victim’s throat should be from left to right. However, the direction was from right to left, and shows that the victim’s throat had been cut from the front. If Zeinab’s confessions about cutting victim’s throat from behind were true, regardless of the direction of the knife’s movement, given that the wall behind Zeinab was bloody, her clothing should be bloody too, which was not at all the case. Another important point is that the other possible fingerprints on the knife have not been examined at all” (Kurdistan Human Rights Network, October 4, 2016).

According to available information, Mrs. Sekaanvand repeatedly recanted her confessions (Center for Human Rights in Iran). According to one of her cellmates, Mrs. Sekaanvand has consistently denied committing the murder since 2016, and told other prisoners that “she confessed instead of someone else, and never thought it would get her in such trouble” (Kurdistan Human Rights Network, January 8, 2017).

During police investigations, Mrs. Sekaanvand’s phone calls were tracked and this showed that she had regularly called her brother-in-law. The criminal prosecutor had raised the possibility of this person having been involved in the murder. Accordingly, the victim’s brother was also arrested, but eventually he was released due to lack of sufficient evidence. According to the court order issued against Mrs. Sekaanvand: “The defendant has sent a letter from prison mentioning that she was raped by her brother-in-law, and that he seduced her into having sex with him several times, and that her brother-in-law’s daughter knew about this, that her brother-in-law committed the murder the night of the incident, and that she did not play a role in her husband’s death” (Iran Human Rights, Amnesty International newsletters, October 11, 2016). At the court session, Mrs. Sekaanvand stated that her brother-in-law forced her to confess to the murder, and her brother-in-law had promised her that as the next of kin, he would not request qesas*. However, the court did not pay any attention to Mrs. Sekaanvand’s statements, and issued the order based on her initial confessions (Amnesty International newsletters, October 11, 2016).

Mrs. Sekaanvand was 24 years old at the time of the execution.

A Summary of the Defects of Ms. Zeinab Sekaanvand’s Legal Proceedings

According to available information, Ms. Zeinab Sekaanvand confessed to having committed murder at certain stages of the adjudication, and called the confession false at others, pointing the finger to her brother-in-law (her husband’s brother) as the murderer. According to reports, however, Zeinab Sekaanvand’s confession was one of the main reasons for her conviction, whereas pursuant to Iranian law, a confession can only be considered as evidence if made before the judge issuing a sentence in the case. In other words, if a defendant denies his/her previous confession at any stage of the proceedings, such confession can only be considered as circumstantial evidence and not evidence that can, solely on its own merit, be considered as proof of the commission of the crime.

At trial, Ms. Sekaanvand’s attorney described the circumstances of the murder and stated that the investigations that had been conducted were not sufficient. He claimed that his client was not the person who had committed murder. Ms. Sekaanvand’s attorney also claimed later that the court did not pay attention to his defense of his client.

According to available reports, Zeinab Sekaanvand was 17 years old at the time of the murder. Although the age of criminal responsibility in Iranian law is the age where an individual reaches puberty, and Ms. Sekaanvand had reached puberty at the time of the murder, the change in the Islamic Penal Code in 2013, provides individuals under the age of 18 with the possibility of being exempt from the death penalty. Pursuant to Article 91 of said Law, “In crimes requiring Hadd or Qesas, if the individuals under the age of 18 who have attained puberty cannot comprehend the nature of the crime or the prohibition thereof, or if there is doubt as to their mental development [and capacity] and maturity, they will be sentenced to the punishments prescribed in this chapter on a case by case basis. In order to ascertain mental development and maturity, the court may obtain the medical examiner’s opinion, or utilize any other method it deems appropriate.” Although the murder occurred prior to the passage of said Law, the Law does, however, apply retroactively, and covers final judgments issued prior to the passage of the Law. According to a Supreme Court General Council Uniform Procedure Decision, “Whereas Article 10(b) of the Islamic Penal Code of April 21, 2013 provides for exemption from crimes requiring Hadd and Qesas punishments in said Article’s opening provision, and whereas the powers prescribed for the sentence implementation judge in amending a sentence and/or the convicted individual’s right to ask the court for a reduced sentence as provided for in said paragraph is not in conflict with the Law on General and Revolutionary Courts Rules of Criminal Procedure Article 272, Paragraph 7, and does not nullify the same, therefore, in the event that individuals sentenced to Qesas, who were under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime and the final sentences in their cases were issued prior to the Islamic Penal Code of April 21, 2013, coming into force, claim the applicability of Article 91, since the modification and reduction of the sentence as provided for in said article ultimately constitutes a reduced sentence and a more favorable punishment, they may ask for de novo adjudication pursuant to Article 272(7) of the aforementioned Rules of Procedure...” (Uniform Procedure Decision number 737, December 2, 2014, Supreme Court General Council). In the present case, it appears that judicial authorities did not believe that Zeinab Sekaanvand was not mentally developed and mature at the time of the murder. Generally speaking, however, a 17-year-old individual can hardly understand the nature of his/her actions as would an adult. There is no unified procedure in Iranian courts to ascertain a person’s mental development and maturity. What courts generally take into account is the defendant’s conduct at the time of the murder and thereafter. Lack of a unified procedure, and not making proper use of specialized medical and psychological capabilities, has resulted in certain defendants under the age of 18 being found as lacking mental development and maturity in certain cases, and as mentally developed and mature in other similar cases, and therefore subject to the death penalty. It therefore appears that Article 91 is not applied to certain juvenile offenders in a methodical and well thought out manner. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran became a signatory in 1993, issuance of a death sentence for individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime is prohibited. Additionally, according to Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is prohibited to issue a sentence of death for individuals under the age of 18. Even though the Iranian government made certain reservations when becoming a party to both of these conventions, violation of these conventions constitutes, however, a breach of its obligations and of international laws and regulations.

Judgment

On October 22, 2014, Branch Two of the Criminal Court in Urmia sentenced Mrs. Zeinab Sekaanvand Lokran to qesas. The sentence was upheld by Branch Seven of the Supreme Court on July 20, 2015 (Kurdistan Human Rights Network, October 4, 2016 and Amnesty International newsletters).

Mrs. Zeinab Sekaanvand Lokran was hanged in Urmia Central Prison on October 2, 2018.

Mrs. Sekaanvand was 24 years old at the time of the execution.

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*   Article 351 of the Islamic Penal Code: “Next of kin is the victim’s heir with the exception of victim’s husband or wife, who does not have the right to qesas”.
Article 347 of the Islamic Penal Code: “The owner of the qesas right may not exercise his right at any stage of the prosecution, trail, or implementation of the court order in return for any right or property.”

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