Iran: Human Rights Developments, 1996
IRAN
Human Rights Developments
As international debate focused on how to influence Iran’s foreign policy, with
the U.S. adopting stronger sanctions and Europe pursuing a policy of “critical dialogue,”
human rights developments were influenced mainly by domestic concerns. Personal
freedoms suffered, public executions increased, and advocates of reform within
the framework of the Islamic revolution found a less tolerant climate in which
to express their views.
The government announced the discovery of “spy
rings” on
several occasions. In January three “U.S.
spies” and two
“Iraqi spies” were charged with
espionage in Kermanshah. Later in January six “U.S.
and Israeli spies”
were charged in Tehran. In February the government announced the arrest of six
members of a “Qatari
spy ring.” In
April, Information Minister Ali Fallahian announced the arrest of twenty-nine “Turkish spies” in western
Azerbaijan province. In June, thirty-three members of an “enormous espionage
organization,”
centered in Tehran and Orumieh and composed mainly of public employees, were
arrested. The proceedings against these suspects, all of whom could face the
death penalty, took place mostly in secret and failed to comply with
international standards for a fair trial. The outcome of the proceedings was
unknown as this report went to press.
The authorities took harsher measures against convicted criminals in 1996.
After an absence of several years, public executions resumed with the hanging
of two convicted murderers in the Tehran suburb of Narmak in January. They had
each been given seventy-four lashes prior to being taken to the gallows.
Reports of the execution of large numbers of convicted drug traffickers also
resumed in the Iranian press after several years’
absence.
On May 15 five young men whom the government claimed had been convicted of rape
and murder were executed in Tabriz and their bodies driven through the streets
hanging from construction cranes. These public executions brought to an end
street protests that had occurred in Tabriz on an almost-daily basis following
the removal of a popular candidate from the ballot for parliamentary elections
(see below).
The first round of the election for the 270-member parliament, or Majles,
took place on March 8. Arbitrary bans on candidates and political parties, and
restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly for opposition candidates,
greatly restricted the rights of citizens to participate in selecting their
representatives. The government-appointed Council of Guardians vetoed some 44
percent of the 5,121 declared candidates. The twelve-person council, composed
of senior clerical figures and religious jurists, tightly controlled access to
the electoral process by assessing such matters as candidate’ “practical adherence
to Islam” and
support for the principle of “rule
by the pre-eminent religious jurist (velayat-e faqih).”
The constitution provides for the Majles to be elected directly by the people
and for the Council of Guardians to play a supervisory role in the process.
Many argued that in excluding candidates in a summary and arbitrary manner the
council overstepped its constitutional powers. Its decisions to exclude
candidates and to annul voting results in some cities were the most troubling
aspects of the parliamentary elections and violated the right to political
participation, which is upheld in international human rights treaties to which Iran
is a State Party.
Fifteen supporters of the Freedom Movement, a banned but tolerated political
party, presented themselves as candidates. Only four made it through
preliminary vetting, three of whom were excluded before polling day. By that
time the party had announced its intention to withdraw from the election,
complaining that government restrictions made it impossible to communicate with
the public. Other tolerated opposition parties, like the Iran Nation Party and
the National Front, boycotted the elections.
The government’s
tolerance or support for violent religious zealots known as Partisans of the
Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah) undermined the meaningful participation of
parties from outside the closed circle of the clerical leadership in the
elections. Hezbollahi-led mobs disrupted their attempts to hold press
conferences, political rallies, and other public gatherings.
After the voting, the Council of Guardians summarily annulled the results in
eight cities, including Iran’s
third largest, Isfahan. On April 6 the council accused some candidates of using
antirevolutionary slogans, making illusory promises and vote-buying. It neither
identified those candidates nor substantiated its claims. In other cities where
first-round results were annulled, no reason was provided, suggesting that the
Council of Guardians was unhappy with the election results, not the process.
On April 19 the election committee in Tabriz, a body reporting to the Council
of Guardians, removed Muhammad Ali Chehregani’s
name from the ballot. His campaign had highlighted issues of cultural
discrimination against the Azari minority. This summary measure prompted as
many as 40,000 people to demonstrate in Tabriz. Security forces broke up the
protest and detained more than 600 people, according to local press reports.
The government also stepped up attacks on the press. Newspapers that published
critical commentary risked suspension and prosecution. In November 1995 the
government lifted the ban on Tous, a Mashad daily supportive of radical
clerics critical of President Rafsanjani. But editor Mohammed Sadegh
Javadi-Hesseri was subsequently arrested and sentenced to six months
imprisonment and twenty lashes for “defamatory” reporting on
government policies. In January the press court sentenced Abolghassem Golbaf,
publisher of the monthly Gouzarish, to three months in prison in a case
brought by Agriculture Minister Issa Kalantari, in violation of the procedures
for prosecutions before the press court. Neither of these sentences had been
carried out as of November 1996.
On January 27 a Tehran press court convicted Gardoun editor Abbas
Maroufi of “publishing
lies.” For
this offense he received a sentence of six months in prison and thirty lashes.
There were many violations of fair trial procedures in the prosecution,
including the introduction of new charges during the proceedings without new
evidence and without giving defense lawyers time to prepare. Maroufi left the
country without serving his sentence but has repeatedly stated his willingness
to return if he will be permitted to continue to publish his magazine.
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mostafa Mir Salam wrote in the Tehran
daily Keyhan on February 8, “the
press does not understand its limits”
and acts “without
wisdom and common sense.”
More than 190 journalists wrote an open letter to President Rafsanjani to
protest the minister=s
remarks and to criticize arbitrary attacks on press freedom. On March 14, Bahman,
the Tehran newspaper that published this open letter, received a suspension
order from the Press Advisory Board for its critical reporting. That ban was
overturned by an appeals court in September.
In February the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance announced that it
would impose pre-publication censorship on all books, a unprecedented measure
in Iran’s
modern history. Previous policy had left publishers with the obligation to
abide by guidelines and subject to penalties if they violated them. The new
policies prompted deputy minister Ahmad Masjed Jamei to resign, saying he would
“not accept
responsibility for them.”
In July agents from the Intelligence Ministry raided the home of a German
cultural attaché as he hosted a group of Iranian writers. The six writers in
attendance, together with their spouses, were detained overnight. In September
security agents raided the home of prominent writer Farhad Koushan, where a
group of thirteen writers were holding an informal weekly gathering. The
writers were released in the early morning hours after being warned to halt
such meetings.
Hezbollahi-led mobs loyal to factions or individuals within the leadership (see
above) harassed government critics of all kinds, burning property, beating
individuals and disrupting gatherings with impunity. On May 12, a Hezbollahi
mob prevented philosopher Abdol Karim Soroush from delivering a lecture at Amir
Kabir Technical University. In an open letter to President Rafsanjani sparked
by this incident Soroush noted that he had turned down all previous invitations
to speak, and canceled his university classes “in
the interests of the country,”
but had not gained anything from this approach. He added, “I have gradually
lost my professional and personal security as the brazen have become more
impudent.” Hezbollahi militants attacked two Tehran cinemas showing the film Indian
Gift, which they thought to be corrupt even though it had been approved by
government censors. They assaulted audiences and vandalized the cinemas.
Hezbollahi mobs demonstrated in the streets of Tehran against women bicyclists
in April, criticizing also President Rafsanjani’s
daughter Faezeh Hashemi, a leading vote-winner in the parliamentary elections,
who had supported women’s
right to ride in public. The authorities ceded to Hezbollahi demands, limiting
women to riding on segregated paths out of sight of men.
Restrictions on personal liberty had a harsh impact on women. In November 1995,
the Basiji, the anti-vice branch of the security forces, announced that it had
detained 86,000 suspects in the previous twelve-month period. Most of them were
thought to have been women detained for violating the dress code, which
required covering the hair and wearing a flowing somber-colored body garment.
The new penal code, which went into effect on July 9, substituted fines and
prison terms for the penalty of lashes for violators of the dress code. One
positive development for women was the reform of the divorce law in November
1995, enabling women to obtain a divorce even if their husbands did not
consent.
A contraction of basic liberties was apparent in the treatment of religious
minorities. For the first time since 1992, death sentences were imposed on
followers of the persecuted Bahai faith. On January 2, a revolutionary court in
Yazd sentenced Zabihullah Mahrami to death for apostasy. Mahrami had announced
his conversion to Islam during the early days of the revolution in the hope of
avoiding trouble for his family, but after arranging for his daughter to marry
a Bahai in late 1995, the authorities conducted hearings to examine Mahrami’s religious
beliefs. Finding him an unrepentant Bahai believer, the court sentenced him to
death. Kayvan Khalajabadi and Bahman Mithaqi, imprisoned since 1989 for taking
part in Bahai activities, had their death sentences confirmed by the Supreme
Court. All three remained in prison as this report went to press.
Members of Protestant Christian churches also continued to suffer persecution
for their beliefs. Only two Protestant churches that conducted services in
Farsi, the Assembly of God churches in Tehran and Rasht, remained open. The
murder of three leading Protestant clergy in 1994 had a devastating impact on
the Protestant community. In November 1995, church sources reported the
detention of Reverend Harmik Torosian, an Assembly of God pastor in Shiraz.
Religious persecution was not confined to non-Muslims. Followers of Shi`a
Muslim clerics who had expressed opposition to the interpretation of Islam
promoted by the government remained in detention in Qom, the center of Shi`a
learning. For example, at least eighteen followers of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad
Shirazi had remained in detention without charge since November 1995.
“Anti-vice” raids by the
security forces on private homes continued. One such operation in June, in a
wealthy Tehran neighborhood, resulted in the fatal fall of a young man from an
eighteenth-story window. Accounts differed as to whether he was pushed by the
police or slipped while trying to escape.
The new penal code, reflecting a harsher approach to law enforcement, gave
prominence to corporal punishments like lashing and amputations of fingers,
hands, and toes. Although the previous code provided for such punishments, they
were rarely imposed. The new code simplified procedures for imposing corporal
punishments, prescribed them for a wider variety of crimes, and reduced judges’ discretion to
impose alternative sentences. Six repeat offenders convicted of theft had the
fingers of their right hands amputated soon after the implementation in July of
the new code, in prison and in the presence of other convicted thieves.
Many Iranian asylum-seekers in Turkey were summarily returned to Iran by
Turkish authorities without their claim for political asylum being assessed by
Turkish authorities or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This
long-established practice took place without any mechanisms in place for
monitoring the fate of the asylum-seekers who had been forced to return to
Iran. There were also cases of individual refugees whose claims had been recognized
by the UNHCR, and who in a few cases had even been accepted for resettlement in
third countries, being subjected by Turkey to refoulement to Iran. No
information was available of the treatment of those returned by Iranian
authorities.
The Right to Monitor
For the first time since 1991, the government agreed to permit the U.N. special
representative on the human rights situation in Iran, Maurice Copithorne, to
visit the country. His visit in February was preceded by visits by two
rapporteurs of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The special rapporteur on
religious intolerance visited in December 1995, and the special rapporteur on
freedom of expression in January 1996. Also in January, the government for the
first time permitted a fact-finding mission by Human Rights Watch, albeit under
near constant undisguised surveillance. Authorities did not authorize visits by
other international human rights groups.
This partial openness to international monitoring was a welcome change from
the obstructive attitude of recent years. However, the extension of invitations
to international monitors was not matched by any relaxation of the prohibition
of independent domestic monitoring. Iranians who made critical comments about
the human rights situation risked harassment by the authorities or attack by
Hezbollahi mobs. Under the new penal code, the crime of espionage was defined
so broadly as to criminalize the passing of almost any type of information
about country conditions to foreigners, potentially criminalizing the
transmission of human rights information to international bodies, and in
violation of international law guaranteeing the right to receive and impart
information. U.N. Special Representative Copithorne remarked in his report to
the commission that “even
the concept of human rights is not well understood” by the Iranian government.
Human Rights Watch honored Tehran lawyer Shirin Ebadi as a human rights monitor
in 1996, in recognition of her work for human rights and legal reform in Iran.
The Role of the International Community
United Nations
In April the U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution strongly
condemning Iran for wide-ranging violations and renewing the mandate of the
special representative on the human rights situation in Iran. Finding no
satisfactory Iranian response, some European countries dropped their effort to
offer a more conciliatory resolution in return for an explicit pledge by Iran
not to take any action to carry out the death sentence decreed against British author
Salman Rushdie in 1989. In August the Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities also passed a resolution condemning
the government’s
involvement in the killing of dissidents in exile.
European Union
European governments and the European Parliament voiced frustration with the
failure of their “critical
dialogue”
policy toward Iran to modify Iranian policy. Although human rights violations
inside Iran were explicitly included in the European policy, they were rarely
highlighted among the issues on the agenda.
In February the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging Tehran to give
assurances it would not carry out the fatwa sentencing Salman Rushdie to
death, and urged the E.U. to increase pressure on the Iranian authorities to
issue such a declaration. In July, the European Parliament again raised the
Rushdie case and urged the European Council of Ministers to review its “critical dialogue” policy if the
Iranian government refused to make sufficient concessions in this regard.
At a meeting of European foreign ministers in March, Germany’s Klaus Kinkel, a
leading defender of the policy, told the press that “we are close to the red line.” He said that the
E.U. would continue to seek to moderate Iran=s
behavior through dialogue, “but
not at any price.”
Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo was even more outspoken, while at the
same time rejecting U.S. efforts to stiffen sanctions against Tehran. In
August, Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen announced his government’s withdrawal from
the “critical
dialogue,”
explaining, “I
cannot point to one single improvement as a result of critical dialogue.”
United States
The U.S. has no diplomatic relations with Iran and asserts that it is a pariah
state. Iranian leaders, meanwhile, habitually refer to the United States as “the Great Satan”, or as the leader
of “global
arrogance.” In
1996, human rights conditions inside Iran played only a minor role in the
competition between the Democratic administration and the Republican-controlled
Congress to show who was toughest on that country’s
government. Alleged support for international terrorism led the list of reasons
behind moves to punish Tehran, including adoption of a law imposing sanctions
on non-U.S. companies that invest in that country.
U.S. pressure on governments, the private sector and multilateral bodies
certainly hindered Tehran in its efforts to attract foreign capital and
investment. However, the impact of the sanctions policy on human rights was difficult
to gauge.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau, speaking on May 14 in Tampa,
Florida, said, “We
have deep objections to several of Iran’s
policies, including its support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
support for Hamas and other violent groups seeking to derail the [Arab-Israeli]
peace process, subversion of other governments, and a human rights record which
is deservedly condemned by the international community.”
U.S. officials, in public statements on Iran, occasionally mentioned human
rights conditions but rarely highlighted them. The Iran chapter in the State
Department’s Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995, while generally accurate, spoke
in broad generalities and presented few revelations, reflecting the lack of
engagement on human rights conditions in U.S. policy.